Cover and contents (PDF, 4 pages, 187 kb)
Transparency, Communication and Commitment
Introduction to a special Issue of the International Journal of Central Banking
by John Taylor, Hyun Shin, Frank Smets, Kazuo Ueda and Michael Woodford
Editorial Board
Optimal Economic Transparency
by Carl E. Walsh
The Mystique of Central Bank Speak
by Petra M. Geraats
Imperfect Common Knowledge in First-Generation Models of Currency Crises
by Gara MÃnguez-Afonso
Manipulation in Money Markets
by Christian Ewerhart, Nuno Cassola, Steen Ejerskov and Natacha Valla
Monetary Policy under Imperfect Commitment: Reconciling Theory with Evidence
by A. Hakan Kara
Transparency, Disclosure and the Federal Reserve
by Michael Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher