Central Banking in a Balance Sheet Recession
by Jaime Caruana Bank for International Settlements
Introduction
It is a great pleasure and a privilege to have been invited to speak
at this prestigious event in honor of Don Kohn. The breadth of this
topic - central banking before, during, and after the crisis - matches
the breadth of Don's contribution. We at the Bank for International
Settlements have benefited enormously from his experience,
his thoughtful analysis, and his extraordinary common sense. Don
is the quintessential central banker.
The topic of the conference is a challenging one. There is no
question that the crisis has been a defining moment in the history
of central banking. It has raised first - order economic, intellectual,
and institutional challenges that, I suspect, will profoundly change
central banking in the years ahead. In my remarks today, however,
I will just focus on one of them: central banking in a balance
sheet recession. The question is how to formulate policies that
reduce the risk of protracted weakness and accelerate the return to
a self - sustained recovery.
My main message is simple. Unquestionably, decisive action by
central banks during the crisis has played a critical role in preventing
a financial meltdown and a potential deflationary spiral. But the
policies that are most suited to crisis management are not necessarily
the best for crisis resolution. By crisis resolution, I mean the
stage after the most acute crisis phase, when balance sheet repair
must be addressed head-on to ensure a self - sustained recovery. Then,
unless other fundamental measures are taken, there is a serious risk
of overburdening monetary policy. From this balance sheet perspective,
extraordinarily easy monetary policy-through both interest
rates and the forceful use of central bank balance sheets-can certainly
buy time, but it can also make it easier to waste that time.
It is therefore important to acknowledge the possible limitations of
this policy, to study them further, and to communicate them clearly.
In what follows, I shall first set the stage by exploring the special
features of balance sheet recessions. I shall then turn to what
monetary policy can and cannot do. I will then conclude with some
reflections on the longer-term political economy and institutional
challenges, with special attention to the need to preserve central
banks’ autonomy.
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