Abstract
This paper analyzes the cost-benefit trade-off of leaning against the wind (LAW) in monetary policy. Our starting point is a New Keynesian regime-switching model where the economy can be in a normal state or in a crisis state. The setup enables us to weigh benefits against costs for different systematic LAW policies. We find that the benefits of LAW in terms of a lower frequency of severe financial recessions exceed costs in terms of higher volatility in normal times when the severity of a crisis is endogenous (when "credit bites back"). Our qualitative results are robust to alternative specifications for the probability of a crisis. Our results hinge on the endogeneity of crisis severity. When the severity of a crisis is exogenous, we find that, if anything, it is optimal to lean with the wind.
Authors
- Karsten R. Gerdrup
- Frank Hansen
- Tord Krogh
JEL codes
- E12
- E52
- G01