A Medium-Scale DSGE Model for the Integrated Policy Framework*

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This paper jointly analyzes the optimal conduct of monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macroprudential policy, and capital flow management. This policy analysis is based on an estimated medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the world economy, featuring a range of nominal and real rigidities, extensive macrofinancial linkages with endogenous risk, and diverse spillover transmission channels. In the pursuit of inflation and output stabilization objectives, it is optimal to adjust all policies in response to global financial cycle upturns and downturns when feasible—including foreign exchange intervention and capital flow management under some conditions—to widely varying degrees depending on the structural characteristics of the economy. The framework is applied empirically to four small open advanced and emerging market economies.

JEL Codes: E3, E5, E6.

1. Introduction

International financial integration has increasingly exposed small open advanced and emerging market economies to volatile global capital flows. To cope with recurrent capital inflow and outflow surges—often associated with global financial cycle upturns and downturns—policymakers in some of these economies have occasionally responded with eclectic policy mix adjustments. In particular, to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability amid

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*The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions from the IPF team at the IMF, in particular from Emine Boz, Christopher Erceg, Gita Gopinath, Marcin Kolasa, and Jesper Lindé. Author contact: International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street NW, Washington, DC, USA, 20431. E-mail Addresses: TAdrian@imf.org; VGaspar@imf.org; FVitek@imf.org.
volatile capital flows, they have occasionally deployed some combination of monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macroprudential policy, or capital flow management measures. As discussed in International Monetary Fund (2020), analyzing such high-dimensional policy responses requires an integrated policy framework (IPF).

This paper jointly analyzes the optimal conduct of monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macroprudential policy, and capital flow management for four small open advanced and emerging market economies. In the spirit of the inflation-targeting literature, we jointly optimize simple instrument rules governing the decentralized conduct of these policies to minimize an intertemporal loss function quadratically penalizing the deviations of inflation from target and output from potential, subject to our representation of the world economy. We then examine how the policy mix should be adjusted in response to global financial cycle upturns and downturns, with and without policy space constraints. We represent the world economy with an estimated medium-scale heteroskedastic linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a pair of economies that are asymmetric in size. This framework features multiple distortions—associated with nominal rigidities and financial frictions—and internalizes extensive interactions among the policies under consideration. We consider a diverse set of small open advanced and emerging market economies that have experienced volatile capital flows, comprising Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand. Given our focus on the global financial cycle, we represent the rest of the world with the United States.

Our DSGE model features a range of nominal and real rigidities, extensive macrofinancial linkages with endogenous risk, and diverse spillover transmission channels. The specification of nominal and real rigidities builds on the seminal work of Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), and Monacelli (2005). This allows our model to account for the empirical evidence concerning the monetary transmission mechanism in a small open economy, while generating reasonably accurate forecasts of inflation and output growth, as documented in Vitek (2008). To integrate the other policies under consideration, we extend this conventional framework in multiple directions. To integrate fiscal policy, we add a fiscal sector and credit constraints. The credit constraints endow our model
with empirically plausible fiscal multipliers, following the theoretical fiscal policy analysis literature. To integrate macroprudential policy, we add housing and banking sectors together with financial accelerator and endogenous risk mechanisms, building on Adrian and Vitek (2020). The endogenous risk mechanism captures the negative correlation between the conditional mean and variance of output growth emphasized by the growth at risk literature introduced by Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019). To integrate foreign exchange intervention, we make explicit the balance sheet of the central bank, and drive a wedge into the uncovered interest parity condition spanning the globally integrated interbank market with a foreign currency liquidity regulation cost, motivated by Gabaix and Maggiori (2015). By altering the currency composition of the balance sheet of the central bank, sterilized foreign exchange intervention influences the exchange rate by inducing the banking sector to substitute between domestic- and foreign-currency-denominated interbank funding, with the latter costing an exposure-dependent premium. Finally, we integrate capital flow management by treating domestic and external mortgage and corporate debt as imperfect substitutes, and levying capital control taxes on cross-border borrowing. This is analogous to treating domestic and foreign output goods as imperfect substitutes, and levying tariffs on imports, as is standard in the theoretical trade policy analysis literature.

To our knowledge, this paper is the first to quantitatively analyze the optimal joint conduct of monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macroprudential policy, and capital flow management. A vast literature has jointly analyzed the optimal conduct of subsets of these policies. Broadly speaking, the empirical optimal policy analysis literature has addressed positive issues using partial equilibrium reduced-form models, while the theoretical literature has tackled normative issues using general equilibrium structural models. A branch of the theoretical optimal policy analysis literature comprises papers that derive conceptual principles guiding the optimal conduct of policy using theoretically stylized models, by analytically solving for the Ramsey optimal policy mix that supports the efficient allocation, or instrument rules that decentralize its constrained counterpart. An example of a recent paper similar in scope to ours is Basu et al. (2020), which jointly analyzes the optimal conduct of monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention,
macroprudential policy, and capital flow management, by solving for the Ramsey optimal policy mix that supports the constrained efficient allocation. Their paper analyzes the optimal policy mix conceptually, whereas ours does so quantitatively, using a fundamentally different theoretical framework. In particular, their model features occasionally binding borrowing constraints, whereas ours always bind. Another branch of the theoretical optimal policy analysis literature consists of papers that generate quantitative policy prescriptions using empirically congruent models, typically by numerically optimizing the response coefficients of simple instrument rules under a flexible inflation-targeting regime. An example of a recent paper related to ours is Lama and Medina (2020), which jointly optimizes simple instrument rules governing the conduct of monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, macroprudential policy, and capital flow management, to minimize an intertemporal loss function quadratically penalizing the deviations of inflation from target and output from potential. Another example is Adrian et al. (2021), which examines how foreign exchange intervention and capital flow management can improve monetary policy trade-offs and promote financial stability. Our paper contributes to this quantitative branch of the theoretical optimal policy analysis literature, expanding the range of policies considered.

Our optimal policy analysis broadly supports the observed tendency for policymakers in some small open advanced and emerging market economies to respond to recurrent capital inflow and outflow surges with eclectic policy mix adjustments. A general principle that emerges is that economies with larger international trade and financial exposures should more actively use foreign exchange intervention and capital flow management if these policies are effective and their response thresholds are crossed. Intuitively, foreign exchange intervention tends to be more effective at stabilizing inflation and output in economies with higher trade openness due to stronger exchange rate pass-through and expenditure switching. In parallel, capital flow management tends to be more effective at stabilizing economies with larger unhedged external foreign-currency-denominated debt exposures due to more sensitive financial conditions and vulnerabilities, which influence growth at risk. We illustrate this general principle by simulating global financial cycle upturn and downturn scenarios using our model, conditional on our optimized policy rules. When
unconstrained, monetary policy plays the primary role in stabilizing consumption price inflation and output. Foreign exchange intervention enhances monetary autonomy through a supporting role in stabilizing consumption price inflation, while its destabilizing effect on output under these scenarios is offset by fiscal policy. Finally, macroprudential policy and capital flow management have much smaller effects on the conditional means of consumption price inflation and the output gap under these scenarios, but help maintain macroeconomic stability by safeguarding financial stability, by leaning against financial developments that put growth at risk.

The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section develops the theoretical framework, while Section 3 describes the corresponding empirical framework. These sections are necessarily technically complex given the scope of our policy analysis, and readers content to understand our results at an intuitive level without fully knowing their underpinnings can skip them. Estimation of our empirical framework, and examination of its goodness of fit, is the subject of Section 4. Policy analysis using this empirical framework is conducted in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2. The Theoretical Framework

Consider a pair of structurally isomorphic open economies that are asymmetric in size and constitute the world economy. Each of these economies consists of households, firms, banks, and a government, which in turn consists of a monetary authority, a fiscal authority, and a macroprudential authority. Households, firms, and banks optimize intertemporally, interacting with the government in an uncertain environment to determine equilibrium prices and quantities under rational expectations in globally integrated output and financial markets. All transactions in the foreign exchange market are intermediated by banks.

2.1 The Household Sector

There exists a continuum of households indexed by \( h \in [0,1] \). Households are differentiated according to whether they are credit constrained, but are otherwise identical. Credit-unconstrained
households of type $Z = U$ and measure $\phi^U$ have access to domestic banks where they accumulate deposits, to global banks from which they secure mortgage loans, to the domestic housing market where they trade houses, and to domestic financial markets where they trade government bonds, firm stocks, and bank stocks, where $0 < \phi^U < 1$. These mortgage loans are composites of domestic-currency-denominated mortgage loans from domestic banks, and unhedged foreign-currency-denominated mortgage loans from foreign banks, giving rise to a balance sheet currency mismatch. In contrast, credit-constrained households of type $Z = C$ and measure $\phi^C$ do not have access to banks, or to the housing and financial markets, where $0 < \phi^C < 1$ and $\phi^U + \phi^C = 1$. Houses are in fixed supply at one per credit-unconstrained household. Government bonds are perpetual bonds with coupon payments that decay exponentially at rate $\omega^G$ where $0 < \omega^G \leq 1$, following Woodford (2001).

In a reinterpretation of the labor market in the model of nominal wage rigidity proposed by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) to incorporate involuntary unemployment along the lines of Galí (2011), each household consists of a continuum of members represented by the unit square and indexed by $(i, j) \in [0,1] \times [0,1]$. There is full risk-sharing among household members, who supply indivisible differentiated intermediate labor services indexed by $i \in [0,1]$, incurring disutility from work determined by $j \in [0,1]$ if they are employed and zero otherwise. Trade-specific intermediate labor services supplied by credit-unconstrained and credit-constrained households are perfect substitutes.

2.1.1 Consumption, Saving, and Residential Investment

Each infinitely lived household $h$ has preferences defined over consumption $C_{h,s}$, housing $S^H_{h,s}H_{h,s}$, labor supply $\{L_{h,i,s}\}_{i=0}^1$, houses $S^H_{h,s+1}$, government bonds $\{S^G_{h,v,s+1}\}_{v=1}^s$, and firm stocks $\{S^F_{h,f,s+1}\}_{f=0}^1$ represented by intertemporal utility function

$$U_{h,t} = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(C_{h,s}, S^H_{h,s}H_{h,s}, \{L_{h,i,s}\}_{i=0}^1, S^H_{h,s+1}, \{S^G_{h,v,s+1}\}_{v=1}^s, \{S^F_{h,f,s+1}\}_{f=0}^1),$$

(1)
where $E_t$ denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available in period $t$, and $0 < \beta < 1$. The intratemporal utility function is additively separable and represents external habit formation preferences in consumption and labor supply,

$$u(C_{h,s}, S^H_{h,s} H_{h,s}, \{ L_{h,i,s} \}_{i=0}^1, S^H_{h,s+1}, \{ S^G_{h,v,s+1} \}_{v=1}^s, \{ S^F_{h,f,s+1} \}_{f=0}^1) = v^C_s \left[ \frac{1}{1 - 1/\sigma} \left( C_{h,s} - \alpha^C C^Z_{s-1} \right)^{1-1/\sigma} + v^D_s \left( S^H_{h,s} H_{h,s} \right)^{1-1/\xi} \right. $$

$$- v^N_s \sum_{v=1}^s V^G_{v,s} S^G_{h,v,s+1} - v^S_s \int_0^1 V^F_{f,s} S^F_{h,f,s+1} df \right],$$

(2)

where $0 \leq \alpha^C < 1$ and $0 \leq \alpha^L < 1$. To introduce exogenous asset risk premiums that affect intertemporal substitution, we specify preference shifters $v^C_s$, $v^H_s$, $v^B_s$, and $v^S_s$ as functions of aggregate endogenous variables or structural shocks,

$$v^C_t = v^C_t - \frac{\phi^C_H}{1 - \rho_H} v^H_t - \frac{\phi^C_B}{1 - \rho_B} \tilde{v}^B_t - \frac{\phi^C_S}{1 - \rho_S} \tilde{v}^S_t,$$

$$v^H_s = \frac{\tilde{v}^B_s + v^H_s}{v(C^Z_s, C^Z_{s-1})}, \quad v^B_s = \frac{\tilde{v}^B_s + \tilde{v}^B_s}{v(C^Z_s, C^Z_{s-1})}, \quad v^S_s = \frac{\tilde{v}^B_s + \tilde{v}^S_s}{v(C^Z_s, C^Z_{s-1})},$$

$$v(C^Z_s, C^Z_{s-1}) = \left( \frac{C^Z_s}{\phi^Z} - \alpha^C \frac{C^Z_{s-1}}{\phi^Z} \right)^{1/\sigma},$$

(3)

where $\phi^C_H > 0$, $\phi^C_B > 0$, and $\phi^C_S > 0$. To support the existence of a long-run balanced-growth path, we also specify preference shifters $v^D_s$ and $v^N_s$ as functions of aggregate endogenous variables or structural shocks,

$$v^D_s = \frac{\nu^D}{v(C^Z_s, C^Z_{s-1})} (C_s)^{1/\zeta}, \quad v^N_s = \frac{A^T_s}{v(C^Z_s, C^Z_{s-1})} (L_s/v^N_s)^{\mu/\eta} w(L^Z_s, L^Z_{s-1}),$$

$$w(L^Z_s, L^Z_{s-1}) = \left( \frac{L^Z_s}{\phi^Z} - \alpha^L \frac{L^Z_{s-1}}{\phi^Z} \right)^{1/\eta},$$

(4)
where $\mu > 0$. We assume that the intratemporal utility function is strictly increasing with respect to consumption and housing, and is strictly decreasing with respect to labor supply. This implies restrictions on serially correlated private consumption demand shock $\nu_s^C$ and labor supply shock $\nu_s^N$, given mean zero and serially correlated housing risk premium shock $\nu_s^H$, as well as mean zero and internationally and serially correlated duration risk premium shock $\tilde{\nu}_s^B$ and equity risk premium shock $\tilde{\nu}_s^S$. Given these and other restrictions, this intratemporal utility function is strictly concave with respect to consumption, housing, and labor supply if $\sigma > 0$, $\varsigma > 0$, and $\eta > 0$.

The household enters period $s$ with previously accumulated wealth, allocated across the values of bank deposits, mortgage loans, houses, government bonds, firm stocks, and bank stocks. In particular, it holds bank deposits $B_{h,s}^{H,D}$ which pay interest at risk-free deposit rate $i_{s-1}^D$, secures new borrowing $B_{h,s}^{H,H}$ from global banks on its $S_{h,s}^H$ mortgage loans, owns $S_{h,s}^H$ houses worth $V_{h,s}^H$, owns $\{S_{h,v,s}^G\}_{v=1}^{s-1}$ vintage-specific government bonds worth $\{V_{v,s}^G\}_{v=1}^{s-1}$ which pay coupons $\{\Pi_{v,s}^G\}_{v=1}^{s-1}$, owns $\{S_{h,f,s}^F\}_{f=0}^{1}$ firm stocks worth $\{V_{f,s}^F\}_{f=0}^{1}$ which pay dividends $\{\Pi_{f,s}^F\}_{f=0}^{1}$, and owns $\{S_{h,b,s}^B\}_{b=0}^{1}$ bank stocks worth $\{V_{b,s}^B\}_{b=0}^{1}$ which pay dividends $\{\Pi_{b,s}^B\}_{b=0}^{1}$. The user cost per house $\Pi_{h,s}^H$ satisfies $\Pi_{h,s}^H = P_{h,s}^H H_{h,s} + (B_{h,s}^{H,H} - C_{h,s}^H) - P_{s}^H I_{h,s}$, where $P_{s}^H$ denotes the implicit rental price of housing. The coupon payment per government bond $\Pi_{v,s}^G$ satisfies $\Pi_{v,s}^G = (1 + i_v^G - \omega_v^G)(\omega_v^G)^{s-v}V_{v,v}^G$, where $i_v^G$ denotes the vintage-specific yield to maturity on government bonds at issuance when $V_{v,v} = 1$. During period $s$, the household receives profit income $\Pi_{h,s}^D$ from global banks, where $\Pi_{h,s}^D = \Pi_{h,s}^{D,H} + \Pi_{h,s}^{D,F}$. It also supplies differentiated intermediate labor services $\{L_{h,i,s}\}_{i=0}^{1}$, earning labor income at trade-specific wages $\{W_{i,s}\}_{i=0}^{1}$. The government levies a tax on household labor income at rate $\tau_{s}^L$, and remits household type specific lump-sum transfer payment $T_{h,s}^Z$. These sources of funds are summed in the household dynamic budget constraint:

$$
B_{h,s+1}^{H,D} + S_{h,s}^H C_{h,s}^{H,H} + V_{h,s}^H S_{h,s+1}^H + \sum_{v=1}^{s} V_{v,s}^G S_{h,v,s+1}^G + \int_0^1 V_{f,s}^F S_{h,f,s+1}^F df + \int_0^1 V_{b,s}^B S_{h,b,s+1}^B db
$$
\[ \begin{align*}
+ (1 + \tau^C_s) P^C_s C_{h,s} + P^I_s^H S^H_{h,s} I^H_{h,s} &= (1 + i^D_{s-1}) B_{h,s}^{H,D} \\
+ S^H_{h,s} B^H_{h,s} + V^H_{h,s} S^H_{h,s} + \sum_{v=1}^{s-1} (\Pi^G_{v,s} + V^G_{v,s}) S^G_{h,v,s} \\
+ \int_0^1 \left( \Pi^F_{f,s} + V^F_{f,s} \right) S^F_{h,f,s} df + \int_0^1 \left( \Pi^B_{b,s} + V^B_{b,s} \right) S^B_{h,b,s} db + \Pi^D_{h,s} \\
+ (1 - \tau^L_s) \int_0^1 W_{i,s} L_{h,i,s} di + T^Z_{h,s}. \tag{5}
\end{align*} \]

According to this dynamic budget constraint, at the end of period \( s \) the household reallocates its wealth across the values of bank deposits, mortgage loans, houses, government bonds, firm stocks, and bank stocks. In particular, it holds bank deposits \( B^H_{h,s+1} \), pays debt service cost \( C^H_{H,h,s} \) to global banks on its \( S^H_{h,s} \) mortgage loans, owns \( S^H_{h,s+1} \) houses worth \( V^H_{h,s} \), owns \( \{S^G_{h,v,s+1}\}_{v=1} \) vintage-specific government bonds worth \( \{V^G_{v,s}\}_{v=1} \), owns \( \{S^F_{h,f,s+1}\}_{f=0} \) firm stocks worth \( \{V^F_{f,s}\}_{f=0} \), and owns \( \{S^B_{h,b,s+1}\}_{b=0} \) bank stocks worth \( \{V^B_{b,s}\}_{b=0} \). Finally, the household purchases private consumption good \( C_{h,s} \) at price \( P^C_s \), and residential investment good \( I^H_{h,s} \) for its \( S^H_{h,s} \) houses at price \( P^I_s \). The government levies a tax on household consumption expenditures at rate \( \tau^C_s \).

The household enters period \( s \) with housing of previously accumulated quality \( H_{h,s} \), which subsequently evolves according to accumulation function

\[ H_{h,s+1} = (1 - \delta_H) H_{h,s} + \mathcal{H}^H (I^H_{h,s}, I^H_{h,s-1}), \tag{6} \]

where \( 0 \leq \delta_H \leq 1 \). Effective residential investment function \( \mathcal{H}^H (I^H_{h,s}, I^H_{h,s-1}) \) incorporates convex adjustment costs in the gross growth rate of the ratio of nominal residential investment to nominal output,

\[ \mathcal{H}^H (I^H_{h,s}, I^H_{h,s-1}) = \nu_s^H \left[ 1 - \frac{\chi^H}{2} \left( \frac{P^I_s}{P^I_{s-1}} \frac{I^H_{h,s}}{I^H_{h,s-1}} - 1 \right) \right] I^H_{h,s}, \tag{7} \]
where serially correlated residential investment demand shock $\nu^I_s$ satisfies $\nu^I_s > 0$, while $\chi^H > 0$. In steady-state equilibrium, these adjustment costs equal zero, and effective residential investment equals actual residential investment.

The household enters period $s$ with previously accumulated mortgage debt $D_{h,s}^H$, which subsequently evolves according to accumulation function

$$D_{h,s+1}^H = (1 - \alpha^H)D_{h,s}^H + B_{h,s+1}^H, \quad (8)$$

where $0 \leq \alpha^H \leq 1$. Adopting the collateralized borrowing variant of the financial accelerator mechanism due to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the household secures new mortgage borrowing from global banks to finance a fraction of the installed value of residential investment,

$$B_{h,s}^{H,H} = \phi^H_s Q^H_s I^H_{h,s}, \quad (9)$$
given by regulatory mortgage loan-to-value ratio limit $\phi^H_s$.

Its debt service cost satisfies

$$C_{h,s}^{H,H} = (1 - \delta^H_s)(\alpha^H + i^{H,E}_{s-1})D_{h,s}^H,$$

reflecting an amortization payment at rate $\alpha^H$ and an interest payment at effective mortgage loan rate $i^{H,E}_{s-1}$ on the outstanding stock of mortgage debt, net of a writedown at mortgage loan default rate $\delta^H_s$.

**Credit-Unconstrained Households.** In period $t$, the credit-unconstrained household chooses state-contingent sequences for consumption $\{C_h, t\}_{s=t}^\infty$, residential investment $\{I^H_{h,s}\}_{s=t}^\infty$, housing quality $\{H_{h,s+1}\}_{s=t}^\infty$, labor force participation $\{\{N_{h,i,s}\}_{i=0}^1\}_{s=t}^\infty$, bank deposits $\{A^D_{h,s+1}\}_{s=t}^\infty$, mortgage debt $\{D^H_{h,s+1}\}_{s=t}^\infty$, houses $\{S^H_{h,s+1}\}_{s=t}^\infty$, government bonds $\{\{S^G_{h,v,s+1}\}_{v=1}^s\}_{s=t}^\infty$, firm stocks $\{\{S^F_{h,f,s+1}\}_{f=0}^1\}_{s=t}^\infty$, and bank stocks $\{\{S^B_{h,b,s+1}\}_{b=0}^1\}_{s=t}^\infty$ to maximize intertemporal utility function (1) subject to dynamic budget constraint (5), housing quality accumulation function (6), mortgage debt accumulation function (8), and terminal non-negativity constraints $H_{h,T+1} \geq 0$, $A^D_{h,T+1} \geq 0$, $D^H_{h,T+1} \geq 0$, $S^H_{h,T+1} \geq 0$, $S^G_{h,v,T+1} \geq 0$, $S^F_{h,f,T+1} \geq 0$, and $S^B_{h,b,T+1} \geq 0$ for $T \to \infty$. In equilibrium, the solutions to this utility maximization problem satisfy intertemporal and intratemporal optimality conditions

$$E_t \frac{\beta u_C(h, t + 1)}{u_C(h, t)} \frac{1 + \tau^C_t}{1 + \tau^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^C_t}{P^C_{t+1}} (1 + i^D_t) = 1, \quad (10)$$
\[
\frac{Q^H_{h,t}}{P^H_{t}} H^H_1(h,t) + \phi^H_t (1 + R^H_{h,t}) \frac{Q^H_t}{P^H_t} \\
+ E_t \frac{\beta u_C(h,t + 1)}{u_C(h,t)} \frac{1 + \tau^C_t}{1 + \tau^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^C_t}{P^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^H_{t+1} Q^H_{h,t+1}}{P^H_{t+1}} H^H_2(h,t + 1) = 1, \\
\]
(11)

\[
\frac{Q^H_{h,t}}{P^H_{t}} = E_t \frac{\beta u_C(h,t + 1)}{u_C(h,t)} \frac{1 + \tau^C_t}{1 + \tau^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^C_t}{P^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^H_{t+1} Q^H_{h,t+1}}{P^H_{t+1}} \\
\times \left[ \frac{P^H_{t+1}}{P^H_{t+1}} + (1 - \delta^H_t) \frac{Q^H_{h,t+1}}{P^H_{t+1}} \right] , \\
\]
(12)

\[
u^H_{S,H}(h,t) = \frac{1}{1 + \tau^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^H_t}{P^C_t}, \\
\]
(13)

\[
R^H_{h,t} = E_t \frac{\beta u_C(h,t + 1)}{u_C(h,t)} \frac{1 + \tau^C_t}{1 + \tau^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^C_t}{P^C_{t+1}} \\
\times \left[ (1 - \alpha^H_t) R^H_{h,t+1} - (1 - \delta^H_{t+1})(\alpha^H_t + \nu^H_{t+1}) \right] , \\
\]
(14)

\[
- \frac{\nu_L(h,i,t)}{u_C(h,t)} = \frac{1 - \tau^L_t}{1 + \tau^C_t} W_{i,t} \\
\]
(15)

\[
E_t \frac{\beta u_C(h,t + 1)}{u_C(h,t)} \frac{1 + \tau^C_t}{1 + \tau^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^C_t}{P^C_{t+1}} \left[ \frac{\Pi^H_{h,t+1} + V^H_{h,t+1}}{V^H_{h,t}} - (1 + i^D_t) \right] \\
= \frac{u_C(t)}{u_C(h,t)} (\tilde{\nu}^B_t + \nu^H_t), \\
\]
(16)

\[
E_t \frac{\beta u_C(h,t + 1)}{u_C(h,t)} \frac{1 + \tau^C_t}{1 + \tau^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^C_t}{P^C_{t+1}} \left[ \frac{\Pi^G_{v,t+1} + V^G_{v,t+1}}{V^G_{v,t}} - (1 + i^D_t) \right] \\
= \frac{u_C(t)}{u_C(h,t)} \tilde{\nu}^B_t, \\
\]
(17)

\[
E_t \frac{\beta u_C(h,t + 1)}{u_C(h,t)} \frac{1 + \tau^C_t}{1 + \tau^C_{t+1}} \frac{P^C_t}{P^C_{t+1}} \left[ \frac{\Pi^F_{f,t+1} + V^F_{f,t+1}}{V^F_{f,t}} - (1 + i^D_t) \right] \\
= \frac{u_C(t)}{u_C(h,t)} (\tilde{\nu}^B_t + \tilde{\nu}^S_t), \\
\]
(18)
\begin{equation}
\frac{E_t}{u_C(h,t)} \beta u_C(h, t + 1) \left( \frac{1 + \tau_t^C}{1 + \tau_{t+1}^C} \frac{P_t^C}{P_{t+1}^C} \right) \left[ \frac{\Pi_{b,t+1}^B + V_{b,t+1}^B}{V_{b,t}^B} - (1 + i_t^D) \right] = 0.
\end{equation}

Here $Q^H_{h,s}$ denotes the shadow price of housing, which is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier on the period $s$ housing quality accumulation function, while $R^H_{h,s}$ denotes the shadow price of mortgage debt, which is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier on the period $s$ mortgage debt accumulation function.

**Credit-Constrained Households.** In period $t$, the credit-constrained household chooses state-contingent sequences for consumption $\{C_{h,s}\}_{s=t}^\infty$ and labor force participation $\{N_{h,i,s}\}_{i=0}^1_{s=t}$ to maximize intertemporal utility function (1) subject to dynamic budget constraint (5) and the applicable access restrictions. In equilibrium, the solutions to this utility maximization problem satisfy

\begin{equation}
(1 + \tau_t^C)P_t^C C_{h,t} = (1 - \tau_t^L) \int_0^1 W_i,t L_{h,i,t} di + T_{h,t}^C,
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
- \frac{u_L(h, i, t)}{u_C(h, t)} = \frac{1 - \tau_t^L}{1 + \tau_t^C} \frac{W_i,t}{P_t^C}.
\end{equation}

Here household static budget constraint (20) equates consumption expenditures to disposable labor income plus transfers.

### 2.1.2 Labor Supply

The unemployment rate $u_t^L$ measures the share of the labor force $N_t$ in unemployment $U_t$, that is, $u_t^L = U_t / N_t$, where unemployment equals the labor force less employment $L_t$, that is, $U_t = N_t - L_t$. The labor force satisfies $N_t = \int_0^1 N_{i,t} di$.

There exist a large number of perfectly competitive firms which combine differentiated intermediate labor services $\{L_{i,t}\}_{i=0}^1$ supplied by trade unions of workers to produce final labor service $L_t$ according to constant elasticity of substitution production function

\begin{equation}
L_t = \left[ \int_0^1 (L_{i,t})^{\sigma_t^L - 1} \left( \frac{\sigma_t^L}{\sigma_t^L - 1} \right) \right]^{\sigma_t^L - 1}. \tag{22}
\end{equation}
The representative final labor service firm maximizes profits from production of the final labor service with respect to inputs of intermediate labor services, implying

$$L_{i,t} = \left( \frac{W_{i,t}}{W_t} \right)^{-\theta_t^L} L_t, \quad (23)$$

$$W_t = \left[ \int_0^1 (W_{i,t})^{1-\theta_t^L} d\omega \right]^{1/1-\theta_t^L}. \quad (24)$$

Serially uncorrelated wage markup shock $\vartheta_t^L$ satisfies $\vartheta_t^L = \theta_t^L / (\theta_t^L - 1)$, where the wage elasticity of demand for intermediate labor services $\theta_t^L$ satisfies $\theta_t^L > 1$.

In an extension of the model of nominal wage rigidity proposed by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2003), each period a randomly selected fraction $1 - \omega^L$ of trade unions adjust their wage optimally, where $0 \leq \omega^L < 1$. The remaining fraction $\omega^L$ of trade unions adjust their wage to account for past wage inflation, as well as past consumption price inflation and trend productivity growth, according to partial indexation rule

$$W_{i,t} = \left[ \left( \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\mu^L} \left( \frac{P_{t-1} A_{t-1}}{P_{t-2} A_{t-2}} \right)^{\mu^L} \right]^{\gamma^L} \times \left[ \left( \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\mu^L} \left( \frac{P_{t-1} \bar{A}_{t-1}}{P_{t-2} \bar{A}_{t-2}} \right)^{\mu^L} \right]^{1-\gamma^L} W_{i,t-1}, \quad (25)$$

where $0 \leq \gamma^L \leq 1$ and $0 \leq \mu^L \leq 1$. If trade union $i$ can adjust its wage optimally in period $t$, then it does so to maximize intertemporal utility function (1) subject to dynamic budget constraint (5), intermediate labor service demand function (23), and the assumed form of nominal wage rigidity. Since all trade unions that adjust their wage optimally in period $t$ solve an identical utility maximization problem, in equilibrium they all choose a common wage $W_t^*$ given by necessary first-order condition
\[
E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^L)^{s-t} \frac{\beta^{s-t} u_C(h,s)}{u_C(h,t)} \theta_s^L \frac{u_L(h,i,s)}{u_C(h,s)}
\times \left\{ \left[ \left( \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{s-1}} \right)^{1-\mu_L^L} \left( \frac{P_{C_{t-1}} A_{t-1}^T}{P_{s-1}^C A_{s-1}^T} \right) \right]^{\gamma_L^L}
\times \left[ \left( \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{s-1}} \right)^{1-\mu_L^L} \left( \frac{\bar{P}_{C_{t-1}} \bar{A}_{t-1}}{P_{C_{t-1}} A_{t-1}^T} \right) \mu_L^L \right]^{1-\gamma_L^L} \frac{W_{s-1}}{W_t} \right\} \theta_s^{L-1}
\times \left( \frac{W_t^*}{W_t} \right)^{-\theta_s^L} L_{h,s}.
\]

\[ W_t^* = \frac{W_t^*}{W_t} - \frac{E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^L)^{s-t} \frac{\beta^{s-t} u_C(h,s)}{u_C(h,t)} (\theta_s^L - 1) \frac{1-\gamma_L^L}{1+\gamma_L^L} \frac{W_{s-1}}{W_t}}{E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^L)^{s-t} \frac{\beta^{s-t} u_C(h,s)}{u_C(h,t)} (\theta_s^L - 1) \frac{1-\gamma_L^L}{1+\gamma_L^L} \frac{W_{s-1}}{W_t}} \times \left[ \left( \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{s-1}} \right)^{1-\mu_L^L} \left( \frac{P_{C_{t-1}} A_{t-1}^T}{P_{s-1}^C A_{s-1}^T} \right) \right]^{\gamma_L^L}
\times \left[ \left( \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{s-1}} \right)^{1-\mu_L^L} \left( \frac{\bar{P}_{C_{t-1}} \bar{A}_{t-1}}{P_{C_{t-1}} A_{t-1}^T} \right) \mu_L^L \right]^{1-\gamma_L^L} \frac{W_{s-1}}{W_t} \right\} \theta_s^{L-1}
\times \left( \frac{W_t^*}{W_t} \right)^{-\theta_s^L} L_{h,s}.
\]

Aggregate wage index (24) equals an average of the wage set by the fraction \(1 - \omega^L\) of trade unions that adjust their wage optimally in period \(t\), and the average of the wages set by the remaining fraction \(\omega^L\) of trade unions that adjust their wage according to partial indexation rule (25):

\[
W_t = \left\{ (1 - \omega^L)(W_t^*)^{1-\theta_t^L} + \omega^L \left[ \left( \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\mu_L^L} \left( \frac{P_{C_{t-1}} A_{t-1}^T}{P_{C_{t-1}} A_{t-1}^T} \right) \right]^{\gamma_L^L}
\times \left[ \left( \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\mu_L^L} \left( \frac{\bar{P}_{C_{t-1}} \bar{A}_{t-1}}{P_{C_{t-1}} A_{t-1}^T} \right) \right]^{1-\gamma_L^L} \frac{W_{t-1}}{W_{t-2}} \right\}^{1-\theta_t^L} \frac{1}{1-\theta_t^L}.
\]

(27)

Since those trade unions able to adjust their wage optimally in period \(t\) are selected randomly from among all trade unions, the average wage set by the remaining trade unions equals the value of the aggregate wage index that prevailed during period \(t-1\), rescaled to account for past wage inflation, as well as past consumption price inflation and trend productivity growth.
2.2 The Production Sector

The production sector supplies a final output good for absorption by domestic and foreign households, firms, and governments. In doing so, firms demand the final labor service from households, obtain corporate loans from global banks, and accumulate private physical capital through business investment. These corporate loans are composites of domestic-currency-denominated corporate loans from domestic banks, and unhedged foreign-currency-denominated corporate loans from foreign banks, giving rise to a balance sheet currency mismatch.

2.2.1 Output Demand

There exist a large number of perfectly competitive firms which combine differentiated intermediate output goods \( \{Y_{f,t}\}_{f=0} \) supplied by intermediate output good firms to produce final output good \( Y_t \) according to constant elasticity of substitution production function

\[
Y_t = \left[ \int_0^1 (Y_{f,t})^{\frac{\theta Y - 1}{\theta Y}} \, df \right]^{\frac{\theta Y}{\theta Y - 1}}. \tag{28}
\]

The representative final output good firm maximizes profits from production of the final output good with respect to inputs of intermediate output goods, implying

\[
Y_{f,t} = \left( \frac{P_{Y,t}}{P_Y} \right)^{-\theta_Y} Y_t, \tag{29}
\]

\[
P_Y = \left[ \int_0^1 (P_{f,t})^{1-\theta_Y} \, df \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta_Y}}. \tag{30}
\]

Serially uncorrelated output price markup shock \( \vartheta_Y \) satisfies \( \vartheta_Y = \theta_Y/(\theta_Y - 1) \), where the price elasticity of demand for intermediate output goods \( \theta_Y \) satisfies \( \theta_Y > 1 \).

2.2.2 Labor Demand and Business Investment

There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate output good firms indexed by \( f \in [0, 1] \). Intermediate output
good firms supply differentiated intermediate output goods, but are otherwise identical.

Each intermediate output good firm \( f \) sells shares to domestic credit-unconstrained households at price \( V_{f,t}^F \). Acting in the interests of its shareholders, it maximizes its pre-dividend stock market value,

\[
\Pi_{f,t}^F + V_{f,t}^F = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{\beta^{s-t} \lambda_s^F}{\lambda_t^F} \Pi_{f,s}^F,
\]

where \( \lambda_s^F = \lambda_s^U \prod_{r=1}^{s-1} (1 + \tilde{\nu}_r^B + \tilde{\nu}_r^S)^{-1} \), while \( \lambda_{h,s} \) denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the period \( s \) household dynamic budget constraint. Shares entitle households to dividend payments equal to net profits \( \Pi_{f,s}^F \), defined as after-tax earnings, plus new corporate borrowing \( B_{f,s}^F \) less debt service cost \( C_{f,s}^F \), minus business investment expenditures,

\[
\Pi_{f,s}^F = (1 - \tau^K_s) (P_Y f,s Y_{f,s} - W_s L_{f,s} - \Phi_{f,s}^F) + (B_{f,s}^F - C_{f,s}^F)
\]

\[
- P^K_s I^K_{f,s},
\]

where \( Y_{f,s} = \mathcal{F}(u^K_{f,s} K_{f,s}, A_s L_{f,s}) \). Earnings are defined as revenues from sales of differentiated intermediate output good \( Y_{f,s} \) at price \( P_Y f,s \), less expenditures on final labor service \( L_{f,s} \), and other variable costs \( \Phi_{f,s}^F \). The government levies a tax on corporate earnings at rate \( \tau^K_s \).

The intermediate output good firm utilizes private physical capital \( K_{f,s} \) at rate \( u^K_{f,s} \) and rents final labor service \( L_{f,s} \) to produce differentiated intermediate output good \( Y_{f,s} \) according to production function

\[
\mathcal{F}(u^K_{f,s} K_{f,s}, A_s L_{f,s}) = (u^K_{f,s} K_{f,s})^{\phi^Y} (A_s L_{f,s})^{1-\phi^Y}.
\]

This production function exhibits constant returns to scale, with \( 0 \leq \phi^Y \leq 1 \). Productivity \( A_s \) depends on the ratio of the public capital stock to the aggregate labor force,

\[
A_s = (\tilde{\nu}_s^A) \phi^A \left( \frac{K^G_s}{N_s} \right)^{1-\phi^A},
\]

where internationally and serially correlated productivity shock \( \tilde{\nu}_s^A \) satisfies \( \tilde{\nu}_s^A > 0 \), while \( 0 < \phi^A \leq 1 \). Trend productivity \( A_T^s \) exhibits
partial adjustment dynamics, that is, 
\[ A_s^T = (A_{s-1}^T)^{\rho^A_T} (A_s^T)^{1-\rho^A_T} \]
where \( 0 \leq \rho^A_T < 1 \).

In utilizing private physical capital to produce output, the intermediate output good firm incurs a cost \( G^K(u^K_{f,s}, K_{f,s}) \) denominated in terms of business investment:
\[ \Phi^{F,F}_{f,s} = P^I_K G^K(u^K_{f,s}, K_{f,s}) + F^E_f. \] (35)

Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), this capital utilization cost is increasing in the capital utilization rate at an increasing rate,
\[ G^K(u^K_{f,s}, K_{f,s}) = \mu^K \left[ e^{\eta^K(u^K_{f,s-1})} - 1 \right] K_{f,s}, \] (36)
where \( \mu^K > 0 \) and \( \eta^K > 0 \). In steady-state equilibrium, the capital utilization cost equals one, and the cost of utilizing capital equals zero. Fixed cost \( F^E_f \) ensures that \( \int_0^1 \Phi^{F,F}_{f,s} df = 0 \).

The intermediate output good firm enters period \( s \) with previously accumulated private physical capital stock \( K_{f,s} \), which subsequently evolves according to accumulation function
\[ K_{f,s+1} = (1 - \delta^K)K_{f,s} + \mathcal{H}^K(I^K_{f,s}, I^K_{f,s-1}), \] (37)
where \( 0 \leq \delta^K \leq 1 \). Motivated by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), effective business investment function \( \mathcal{H}^K(I^K_{f,s}, I^K_{f,s-1}) \) incorporates convex adjustment costs in the gross growth rate of the ratio of nominal business investment to aggregate nominal output,
\[ \mathcal{H}^K(I^K_{f,s}, I^K_{f,s-1}) = \nu^K_s \left[ 1 - \frac{\chi^K}{2} \left( \frac{P^I_K I^K_{f,s}}{P^I_{s-1} I^K_{f,s-1}} \frac{P^Y_{s-1} Y_{s-1}}{P^Y_s Y_s} - 1 \right) \right]^2 I^K_{f,s}, \] (38)
where serially correlated business investment demand shock \( \nu^K_s \) satisfies \( \nu^K_s > 0 \), while \( \chi^K > 0 \). In steady-state equilibrium, these adjustment costs equal zero, and effective business investment equals actual business investment.

The intermediate output good firm enters period \( s \) with previously accumulated corporate debt \( D^F_{f,s} \), which subsequently evolves according to accumulation function
\[ D^F_{f,s+1} = (1 - \alpha^F)D^F_{f,s} + B^F_{f,s}, \] (39)
where $0 \leq \alpha^F \leq 1$. Adopting the collateralized borrowing variant of the financial accelerator mechanism due to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the intermediate output good firm secures new corporate borrowing from global banks to finance a fraction of the installed value of business investment,

$$B_{f,s}^F = \phi_s^F Q_s^K I_{f,s}^K,$$

(40)

given by regulatory corporate loan-to-value ratio limit $\phi_s^F$. Its debt service cost satisfies $C_{f,s}^F = (1 - \delta_s^F)(\alpha^F + i_{s-1}^F) D_{f,s}^F$, reflecting an amortization payment at rate $\alpha^F$ and an interest payment at effective corporate loan rate $i_{s-1}^F$ on the outstanding stock of corporate debt, net of a writedown at corporate loan default rate $\delta_s^F$.

In period $t$, the intermediate output good firm chooses state-contingent sequences for employment $\{L_{f,s}\}_{s=t}^{\infty}$, the capital utilization rate $\{u_{f,s}^K\}_{s=t}^{\infty}$, business investment $\{I_{f,s}^K\}_{s=t}^{\infty}$, the private physical capital stock $\{K_{f,s+1}\}_{s=t}^{\infty}$, and corporate debt $\{D_{f,s+1}^F\}_{s=t}^{\infty}$ to maximize pre-dividend stock market value (31) subject to production function (33), private physical capital accumulation function (37), corporate debt accumulation function (39), and terminal non-negativity constraints $K_{f,T+1} \geq 0$ and $D_{f,T+1}^F \geq 0$ for $T \rightarrow \infty$. In equilibrium, the solutions to this value maximization problem satisfy necessary first-order conditions

$$\mathcal{F}_{u^K}(f,t) \Psi_{f,t} = (1 - \tau^K_t) \frac{W_t}{P_t^Y A_t},$$

(41)

$$\mathcal{F}_{u^K}(f,t) \frac{P_t^Y}{P_{t+1}^K} \Psi_{f,t} = (1 - \tau^K_t) \frac{Q^K_{u^K}(f,t)}{K_{f,t}},$$

(42)

$$\frac{Q_{f,t}^K}{P_{t+1}^K} \mathcal{H}_1^K(f,t) + \phi_t^F (1 + R^K_{f,t}) \frac{Q^K_{t+1}^K}{P_{t+1}^K}$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta \lambda_{t+1}^F P_{t+1}^K}{P_{t+1}^K} Q_{f,t+1}^K \mathcal{H}_2^K(f,t+1) = 1,$$

(43)

$$\frac{Q_{f,t}^K}{P_{t+1}^K} = \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta \lambda_{t+1}^F P_{t+1}^K}{P_{t+1}^K} \left[ u_{f,t+1}^K \mathcal{F}_{u^K}(f,t+1) \frac{P_t^Y}{P_{t+1}^K} \Psi_{f,t+1} 

-(1 - \tau^K_{t+1}) \mathcal{G}^K_{u^K}(f,t+1) + (1 - \delta^K_t) \frac{Q_{f,t+1}^K}{P_{t+1}^K} \right],$$

(44)
\[ R^K_{f,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta \lambda_{t+1}^F}{\lambda_t^F} \left[ (1 - \alpha^F) R^K_{f,t+1} - (1 - \delta^F_{t+1})(\alpha^F + \eta_{t}^{FE}) \right]. \quad (45) \]

Here \( \Psi_{f,s}^F \) denotes real marginal cost, which is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier on the period \( s \) production technology constraint, while \( Q^K_{f,s} \) denotes the shadow price of private physical capital, which is the Lagrange multiplier on the period \( s \) private physical capital accumulation function, and \( R^K_{f,s} \) denotes the shadow price of corporate debt, which is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier on the period \( s \) corporate debt accumulation function.

### 2.2.3 Output Supply

In an extension of the model of nominal output price rigidity proposed by Calvo (1983) along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2003), each period a randomly selected fraction \( 1 - \omega^Y \) of intermediate output good firms adjust their price optimally, where \( 0 \leq \omega^Y < 1 \). The remaining fraction \( \omega^Y \) of intermediate output good firms adjust their price to account for past output price inflation according to partial indexation rule

\[ P^Y_{f,t} = \left( \frac{P^Y_{t-1}}{\bar{P}^Y_{t-1}} \right)^{\gamma^Y} \left( \frac{\bar{P}^Y_{t-1}}{P^Y_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\gamma^Y} P^Y_{f,t-1}, \quad (46) \]

where \( 0 \leq \gamma^Y \leq 1 \). If the intermediate output good firm can adjust its price optimally in period \( t \), then it does so to maximize pre-dividend stock market value (31) subject to production function (33), intermediate output good demand function (29), and the assumed form of nominal output price rigidity. We consider a symmetric equilibrium under which all firm-specific endogenous state variables are restricted to equal their aggregate counterparts. It follows that all intermediate output good firms that adjust their price optimally in period \( t \) solve an identical value maximization problem, which implies that they all choose a common price \( P^Y_{t,*} \) given by necessary first-order condition
Aggregate output price index (30) equals an average of the price set by the fraction $1 - \omega^Y$ of intermediate output good firms that adjust their price optimally in period $t$, and the average of the prices set by the remaining fraction $\omega^Y$ of intermediate output good firms that adjust their price according to partial indexation rule (46):

$$
\frac{P^Y_{t^*,}}{P^Y_t} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^Y)^{s-t} \frac{\beta^{s-t} \lambda^F}{\lambda^F_t} \theta^Y_s \Psi_{f,s}}{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^Y)^{s-t} \frac{\beta^{s-t} \lambda^F}{\lambda^F_t} (\theta^Y_s - 1)(1 - \tau^K)}
$$

$$
\times \left[ \left( \frac{P^Y_{t-1}}{P^Y_{t-1}} \right)^{\gamma^Y} \left( \frac{P^Y_{t-2}}{P^Y_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\gamma^Y} \frac{P^Y_{t}}{P^Y_{t}} \right]^{\theta^Y_s - 1} \left( \frac{P^Y_{t^*}}{P^Y_{t}} \right)^{-\theta^Y_t} P^Y_s Y_s
$$

(47)

Since those intermediate output good firms able to adjust their price optimally in period $t$ are selected randomly from among all intermediate output good firms, the average price set by the remaining intermediate output good firms equals the value of the aggregate output price index that prevailed during period $t - 1$, rescaled to account for past output price inflation.

$$
P^Y_t = \left\{ (1 - \omega^Y)(P^Y_{t^*})^{1-\theta^Y_t} \right. $$

$$
+ \omega^Y \left[ \left( \frac{P^Y_{t-1}}{P^Y_{t-2}} \right)^{\gamma^Y} \left( \frac{P^Y_{t-1}}{P^Y_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\gamma^Y} \frac{P^Y_{t}}{P^Y_{t-1}} \right]^{1-\theta^Y_t} \left( \frac{1}{1-\theta^Y_t} \right)^{1-\theta^Y_t} \right\}.
$$

(48)

2.3 The Banking Sector

The banking sector supplies global financial intermediation services subject to financial frictions and regulatory constraints. In particular, global banks issue risky mortgage or corporate loans to
domestic and foreign households or firms. These mortgage or corporate loans are composites of domestic-currency-denominated mortgage or corporate loans from domestic banks, and foreign-currency-denominated mortgage or corporate loans from foreign banks. These currency-specific mortgage and corporate loans are issued at infrequently adjusted predetermined mortgage and corporate loan rates. Mortgage and corporate borrowing by households and firms is subject to regulatory loan-to-value ratio limits. Cross-border mortgage and corporate borrowing is also subject to capital controls, represented by taxes on capital inflows.

Domestic banks accumulate bank capital from retained earnings given credit losses to satisfy a regulatory capital ratio requirement. They obtain funding from domestic households via deposits and from the globally integrated interbank market via loans, giving rise to a balance sheet currency mismatch. Cross-border interbank borrowing is subject to a foreign currency liquidity regulation cost, which is influenced by foreign exchange intervention.

2.3.1 Credit Demand

There exist a large number of perfectly competitive risk-neutral banks owned by domestic credit-unconstrained households which combine the domestic final mortgage or corporate loan $D_{z,h}^{Z,t+1}$ with the foreign final mortgage or corporate loan $D_{z,f}^{Z,t+1}$ to produce global mortgage or corporate loan $D^{Z,t+1}$ according to constant elasticity of substitution portfolio aggregator

$$D^{Z,t+1} = \left[ (1 - \phi_Z^B)^{\frac{1}{\psi_B}} (D_{t+1}^{Z,h})^{\frac{\psi_B - 1}{\psi_B}} + (\phi_Z^B)^{\frac{1}{\psi_B}} (\mathcal{E}_t D_{t+1}^{Z,f})^{\frac{\psi_B - 1}{\psi_B}} \right]^{\frac{\psi_B}{\psi_B - 1}},$$

(49)

where $Z \in \{H,F\}$, while $0 \leq \phi_Z^B < 1$ and $\psi_B > 0$. The government levies a tax on cross-border mortgage or corporate borrowing at rate $\tau_t^Z$. The representative global bank maximizes expected profits from intermediation of the global mortgage or corporate loan, with respect to inputs of the domestic and foreign final mortgage or corporate loans, implying
\[ D^{Z,h}_{t+1} = (1 - \phi^B_Z) \left[ \frac{E_t(1 - \delta^{Z}_{t+1})(\alpha^Z + i^Z_t)}{E_t(1 - \delta^{Z}_{t+1})(\alpha^Z + i^E_t)} \right]^{-\psi^B} D^Z_{t+1}, \]

\[ D^{Z,f}_{t+1} = \phi^B_Z \left[ \frac{E_t(1 + \tau^Z_t)(1 - \delta^{Z}_{t+1})(\alpha^Z + i^Z_{f,t}) \frac{E_{t+1}}{\xi_t}}{E_t(1 - \delta^{Z}_{t+1})(\alpha^Z + i^E_t)} \right]^{-\psi^B} \frac{D^Z_{t+1}}{E_t}, \]

\[ E_t(1 - \delta^{Z}_{t+1})(\alpha^Z + i^E_t) = \left\{ (1 - \phi^B_Z) \left[ E_t(1 - \delta^{Z}_{t+1})(\alpha^Z + i^Z_t) \right]^{1-\psi^B} + \phi^B_Z \left[ E_t(1 + \tau^Z_t)(1 - \delta^{Z}_{t+1})(\alpha^Z + i^Z_{f,t}) \frac{E_{t+1}}{\xi_t} \right]^{1-\psi^B} \right\} \frac{1}{1-\psi^B}. \]

(50)

(51)

The effective mortgage or corporate loan rate \( i^Z_{E,t} \) equals the minimum expected cost of producing one unit of the global mortgage or corporate loan, given the expected domestic-currency-denominated costs of borrowing from domestic and foreign final banks.

There exist a large number of perfectly competitive banks which combine differentiated intermediate mortgage or corporate loans \( \{A_{b,t+1}^{B,Z}\}_{b=0}^1 \) supplied by intermediate banks to produce final mortgage or corporate loan \( A_{t+1}^{B,Z} \) according to constant elasticity of substitution portfolio aggregator

\[ A_{t+1}^{B,Z} = \left[ \int_0^1 \left( A_{b,t+1}^{B,Z} \right)^{\frac{\sigma^Z_{t+1} - 1}{\sigma^Z_{t+1}}} db \right]^{\frac{\sigma^Z_{t+1} - 1}{\sigma^Z_{t+1} - 1}}, \]

(52)

where \( Z \in \{H,F\} \). The representative domestic final bank maximizes profits from intermediation of the final mortgage or corporate loan with respect to inputs of intermediate mortgage or corporate loans, implying

\[ A_{b,t+1}^{B,Z} = \left( \frac{\alpha^Z + i^Z_{b,t}}{\alpha^Z + i^Z_t} \right)^{-\theta^Z_{t+1}} A_{t+1}^{B,Z}, \]

(53)

\[ \alpha^Z + i^Z_t = \left[ \int_0^1 (\alpha^Z + i^Z_{b,t})^{1-\theta^Z_{t+1}} db \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta^Z_{t+1}}}. \]

(54)
Serially correlated mortgage or corporate loan markup shock $\vartheta_{t+1}$ satisfies $\vartheta_{t+1} = \theta_{t+1}/(\theta_{t+1} - 1)$, where the rate elasticity of demand for intermediate mortgage or corporate loans $\theta_{t+1}$ satisfies $\theta_{t+1} > 1$.

### 2.3.2 Funding Demand and Bank Capital Accumulation

There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate banks indexed by $b \in [0, 1]$. Intermediate banks supply differentiated intermediate mortgage and corporate loans, but are otherwise identical.

Each intermediate bank $b$ sells shares to domestic credit-unconstrained households at price $V_{b,t}^B$. Acting in the interests of its shareholders, it maximizes its pre-dividend stock market value:

$$\Pi_{b,t}^B + V_{b,t}^B = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{\beta^{s-t} \lambda_U}{\lambda_t^U} \Pi_{b,s}^B. \tag{55}$$

Shares entitle households to dividend payments $\Pi_{b,s}^B$, defined as profits from providing financial intermediation services less retained earnings $I_{b,s}^B$:

$$\Pi_{b,s}^B = (B_{b,s+1}^{B,D} - (1 + i_{s-1}^D)B_{b,s}^{B,D}) + (B_{b,s+1}^{B,B_h} - (1 + i_{s-1}^B)B_{b,s}^{B,B_h})$$
$$+ E_s(B_{b,s+1}^{B,B_f} - (1 + i_{s-1}^B)B_{b,s}^{B,B_f})$$
$$- (B_{b,s}^{B,H} - C_{b,s}^{B,H}) - (B_{b,s}^{B,F} - C_{b,s}^{B,F}) - \Phi_{b,s}^B - I_{b,s}^B. \tag{56}$$

Profits are defined as the increase in deposits $B_{b,s+1}^{B,D}$ from domestic households net of interest payments at the deposit rate $i_{s-1}^D$, plus the increase in net loans $B_{b,s+1}^{B,B_h}$ from the domestic interbank market net of interest payments at the domestic interbank rate $i_{s-1}^B$, plus the domestic-currency-denominated increase in net loans $B_{b,s+1}^{B,B_f}$ from the foreign interbank market net of interest payments at the foreign interbank rate $i_{s-1}^B$, minus new mortgage lending $B_{b,s}^{B,H}$ net of mortgage loan income $C_{b,s}^{B,H}$, minus new corporate lending net of corporate loan income $C_{b,s}^{B,F}$, minus regulation costs $\Phi_{b,s}^B$. 

Forthcoming A Medium-Scale DSGE Model 23
The intermediate bank enters period $s$ with previously accumulated mortgage or corporate credit outstanding $A_{b,s}^{B,Z}$, which subsequently evolves according to accumulation function

$$A_{b,s+1}^{B,Z} = (1 - \alpha Z)A_{b,s}^{B,Z} + B_{b,s}^{B,Z},$$

where $Z \in \{H, F\}$, while $0 \leq \alpha^Z \leq 1$. During period $s$, the intermediate bank extends new mortgage or corporate credit $B_{b,s}^{B,Z}$ to satisfy demand, ultimately from domestic and foreign households or firms. Its mortgage or corporate loan income $C_{b,s}^{B,Z}$ satisfies

$$C_{b,s}^{B,Z} = (\alpha^Z + i_{b,s-1}^Z)A_{b,s}^{B,Z},$$

reflecting amortization income at rate $\alpha^Z$ and interest income at variable mortgage or corporate loan rate $i_{b,s-1}^Z$ on the outstanding stock of mortgage or corporate credit.

The intermediate bank transforms deposit and money market funding into risky differentiated intermediate mortgage and corporate loans according to balance sheet identity:

$$A_{b,s+1}^{B,H} + A_{b,s+1}^{B,F} = B_{b,s+1}^{B,D} + B_{b,s+1}^{B,B^h} + \epsilon_s B_{b,s+1}^{B,B^f} + K_{b,s+1}^B.$$  

The bank credit stock $A_{s+1}^{B}$ measures aggregate bank assets, that is, $A_{s+1}^{B} = A_{s+1}^{B,H} + A_{s+1}^{B,F}$, while the money stock $M_{s+1}^S$ measures aggregate bank funding, that is, $M_{s+1}^S = B_{s+1}^{B,D} + B_{s+1}^{B,B^h} + \epsilon_s B_{s+1}^{B,B^f}$. The bank capital ratio $\kappa_{s+1}$ equals the ratio of aggregate bank capital to assets, that is, $\kappa_{s+1} = K_{s+1}^B/A_{s+1}^B$. The banking sector takes offsetting positions in the domestic and foreign interbank markets, that is, $B_{s+1}^{B,B^h} + \epsilon_s B_{s+1}^{B,B^f} = 0$.

In transforming deposit and money market funding into risky mortgage and corporate loans, the intermediate bank incurs costs of satisfying the regulatory capital and foreign currency liquidity requirements:

$$\Phi_{b,s}^B = G^{B,C}(A_{b,s}^{B,H}, A_{b,s}^{B,F}, K_{b,s}^B) + G^{B,L}(B_{b,s}^{B,B^f}) + F_{b,s}^B.$$  

Motivated by Gerali et al. (2010), the capital regulation cost is decreasing in the ratio of bank capital to assets at a decreasing rate,
\[ G^{B,C}(A_{b,s+1}^{B,H}, A_{b,s+1}^{B,F}, K_{b,s+1}^{B}) = \mu^{B} \left[ e^{(2+\eta^{B}) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\kappa_{s+1}^{R} + A_{b,s+1}^{B,H} + A_{b,s+1}^{B,F}} \right)} - 1 \right] K_{b,s+1}^{B}, \] (61)
given bank capital requirement \( \kappa_{s+1}^{R} \), where \( \mu^{B} > 0 \) and \( \eta^{B} > 0 \). In steady-state equilibrium, the bank capital ratio equals its required value, and the cost of capital regulation is constant. Motivated by Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), the foreign currency liquidity regulation cost is convex with respect to the ratio of net foreign interbank market funding to nominal output,

\[ G^{B,L}(B_{b,s+1}^{B,F}) = \beta \left[ \gamma^{B} \left( \frac{E^{s} D_{b,s+1}^{B,F}}{P^{s} Y_{s}} \right)^{2} - \gamma^{B} \left( \frac{E^{s} D_{b,s+1}^{B,F}}{P^{s} Y_{s}} \right) \right] P^{s} Y_{s}, \] (62)
given foreign currency liquidity shifter \( \gamma^{B} \), where \( \gamma^{B} > 0 \). Fixed cost \( F^{C} \) ensures that \( \int_{0}^{1} H_{b,s}^{B} db = -\Delta K_{b,s+1}^{B} \).

The intermediate bank enters period \( s \) with previously accumulated bank capital stock \( K_{b,s}^{B} \), which subsequently evolves according to accumulation function

\[ K_{b,s+1}^{B} = (1 - \delta_{b,s}^{B}) K_{b,s}^{B} + H^{B}(I_{b,s}^{B}, I_{b,s-1}^{B}). \] (63)
The bank capital destruction rate \( \delta_{b,s}^{B} \) equals the ratio of credit losses on mortgage and corporate loans to capital, given mortgage credit loss rate \( \delta_{s}^{H} \) and corporate credit loss rate \( \delta_{s}^{F} \):

\[ \delta_{b,s}^{B} K_{b,s}^{B} = \delta_{s}^{H} (\alpha^{H} + i_{b,s-1}^{H}) A_{b,s}^{B,H} + \delta_{s}^{F} (\alpha^{F} + i_{b,s-1}^{F}) A_{b,s}^{B,F}. \] (64)
The intermediate bank smooths retained earnings intertemporally, and effective retained earnings function \( H^{B}(I_{b,s}^{B}, I_{b,s-1}^{B}) \) incorporates convex adjustment costs,

\[ H^{B}(I_{b,s}^{B}, I_{b,s-1}^{B}) = \left[ 1 - \frac{\chi^{B}}{2} \left( \frac{I_{b,s}^{B}}{I_{b,s-1}^{B}} - 1 \right)^{2} \right] I_{b,s}^{B} - F^{C}, \] (65)
where \( \chi^{B} > 0 \). In steady-state equilibrium, these adjustment costs equal zero, and effective retained earnings equals actual retained earnings. Fixed cost \( F^{C} \) ensures that \( \int_{0}^{1} H^{B}(I_{b,s}^{B}, I_{b,s-1}^{B}) db = I_{b,s}^{B} \).
In period $t$, the intermediate bank chooses state-contingent sequences for deposit funding $\{B_{b,s+1}^{B,D}\}_{s=t}^\infty$, net domestic interbank market funding $\{B_{b,s+1}^{B,B,B}\}_{s=t}^\infty$, net foreign interbank market funding $\{B_{b,s+1}^{B,B,B}\}_{s=t}^\infty$, retained earnings $\{I_{b,s}^B\}_{s=t}^\infty$, and the bank capital stock $\{K_{b,s+1}^B\}_{s=t}^\infty$ to maximize pre-dividend stock market value (55) subject to balance sheet identity (59), bank capital accumulation function (63), mortgage and corporate credit accumulation functions (57), and terminal non-negativity constraint $K_{b,T+1}^B \geq 0$ for $T \to \infty$.

In equilibrium, the solutions to this value maximization problem satisfy necessary first-order conditions

$$1 + i_t^B = 1 + i_t^D,$$

$$E_t \frac{\beta \lambda_{t+1} U}{\lambda_t U} \left[ (1 + i_t^B) - (1 + i_t^{B,f}) \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] = E_t \frac{\beta \lambda_{t+1} U}{\lambda_t U} \frac{G_{B,L}^B (b, t + 1)}{E_t},$$


$$\frac{Q_{b,t}^B}{P_t^Y} = \frac{E_t \frac{\beta \lambda_{t+1} U}{\lambda_t U} \left[ \frac{\lambda_t U}{\beta \lambda_{t+1}} - (1 + i_t^B) \right] - G_{K,B}^B (b, t + 1)}{1 + i_t^B} = \frac{E_t \frac{\beta \lambda_{t+1} U}{\lambda_t U} \left[ \frac{\lambda_t U}{\beta \lambda_{t+1}} - (1 + i_t^B) \right] - G_{K,B}^B (b, t + 1)}{1 + i_t^B},$$

\[Q_{b,t}^B = \frac{E_t \frac{\beta \lambda_{t+1} U}{\lambda_t U} \left[ \frac{\lambda_t U}{\beta \lambda_{t+1}} - (1 + i_t^B) \right] - G_{K,B}^B (b, t + 1)}{1 + i_t^B},\]

Here $Q_{b,s}^B$ denotes the shadow price of bank capital, which is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier on the period $s$ bank capital accumulation function.

2.3.3 Credit Supply

In an adaptation of the model of nominal price rigidity proposed by Calvo (1983) to the banking sector along the lines of Hülsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershäuser (2009), each period a randomly selected fraction $1 - \omega^B$ of intermediate banks adjust their gross mortgage and corporate loan rates optimally, where $0 \leq \omega^B < 1$. The remaining fraction $\omega^B$ of intermediate banks do not adjust their loan rates,

$$\alpha^Z + i_{b,t}^Z = \alpha^Z + i_{b,t-1}^Z,$$

where $Z \in \{H,F\}$. If the intermediate bank can adjust its gross mortgage and corporate loan rates in period $t$, then it does so to
maximize pre-dividend stock market value (55) subject to balance sheet identity (59), intermediate loan demand function (53), and the assumed financial friction. We consider a symmetric equilibrium under which all bank-specific endogenous state variables are restricted to equal their aggregate counterparts. It follows that all intermediate banks that adjust their loan rates in period \( t \) solve an identical value maximization problem, which implies that they all choose common loan rates \( i^*_t \) given by necessary first-order conditions:

\[
\frac{\alpha^Z + i^Z_t}{\alpha^Z + i^Z_{t-1}} = \frac{E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^B)^{s-t} \beta^{s-t} \lambda^U_s \theta^Z_s (1+i^B_{s-1}) + G^{B,C}_{A,B,Z}(b,s)}{\alpha^Z + i^Z_{t-1} A_{s}^{B,Z}} \times \left( \frac{\alpha^Z + i^Z_{s-1}}{\alpha^Z + i^Z_t} \right)^{\theta^Z_s (\alpha^Z + i^Z_{s-1}) - \theta^Z_s (\alpha^Z + i^Z_{s-1})} \left( \frac{\alpha^Z + i^Z_{s-1}}{\alpha^Z + i^Z_t} \right)^{-\theta^Z_s (\alpha^Z + i^Z_{s-1})} \times (\alpha^Z + i^Z_{s-1} A_{s}^{B,Z})
\]

Aggregate gross mortgage or corporate loan rate index (54) equals an average of the gross mortgage or corporate loan rate set by the fraction \( 1 - \omega^B \) of intermediate banks that adjust their loan rates in period \( t \), and the average of the gross mortgage or corporate loan rates set by the remaining fraction \( \omega^B \) of intermediate banks that do not adjust their loan rates:

\[
\alpha^Z + i^Z_t = \left[ (1 - \omega^B)(\alpha^Z + i^Z_{t-1})^{1-\theta^Z_{t+1}} + \omega^B (\alpha^Z + i^Z_{t-1})^{1-\theta^Z_{t+1}} \right]^{1-\theta^Z_{t+1}}. \tag{72}
\]

Since those intermediate banks able to adjust their loan rates in period \( t \) are selected randomly from among all intermediate banks, the average gross mortgage or corporate loan rate set by the remaining intermediate banks equals the value of the aggregate gross mortgage or corporate loan rate index that prevailed during period \( t - 1 \).
2.3.4 Loan Defaults and Foreign Currency Liquidity

We define the financial gap as a weighted average of the contemporaneous deviations of real non-financial private-sector debt and the relative prices of housing and equity from their steady-state equilibrium values,

\[
\ln F_t - \ln \bar{F}_t = \phi_F^B \left( \ln \frac{D_{t+1}^P}{P_t^Y} - \ln \frac{\bar{D}_{t+1}^P}{\bar{P}_t^Y} \right) + \phi_F^H \left( \ln \frac{V_t^H}{P_t^Y} - \ln \frac{\bar{V}_t^H}{\bar{P}_t^Y} \right)
\]

\[
+ \phi_F^F \left( \ln \frac{V_t^F}{P_t^Y} - \ln \frac{\bar{V}_t^F}{\bar{P}_t^Y} \right),
\]

(73)

where \( \phi_F^B > 0, \phi_F^H > 0, \) and \( \phi_F^F = 1.\) Non-financial private-sector debt \( D_{t+1}^P \) satisfies \( D_{t+1}^P = D_{t+1}^H + D_{t+1}^F.\) The change in the financial gap reflects financial conditions, as well as other drivers of the financial cycle, while its level measures financial vulnerability.

The mortgage and corporate loan default rates satisfy loan default relationships exhibiting partial adjustment dynamics of the form

\[
\delta_t Z - \delta Z = \rho \delta^{C} (\delta_{t-1} Z - \delta Z) - (1 - \rho \delta^{C}) \zeta^{Z} \delta Z
\]

\[
\times \left[ (\ln Y_t - \ln Y_t^P) + \zeta^F (\ln F_t - \ln \bar{F}_t) \right] + \nu^Z \delta Z,
\]

(74)

where \( Z \in \{H, F\}, \) while \( 0 < \delta Z < 1, 0 \leq \rho \delta^{C} < 1, \) \( \zeta^{Z} > 0, \) and \( \zeta^F > 0.\) As specified, the deviation of the mortgage or corporate loan default rate from its steady-state equilibrium value is inertially decreasing in the contemporaneous output and financial gaps. Deviations from these default rate relationships are captured by mean zero and serially correlated mortgage or corporate loan default shock \( \nu^Z \delta Z.\)

The foreign currency liquidity shifter satisfies a foreign currency liquidity relationship that helps stabilize the net foreign asset ratio of the form

\[
r(\gamma_t^B - \gamma^B) = -\zeta^E \left( \frac{A_{t+1}}{P_t^Y Y_t} - \frac{\bar{A}_{t+1}}{\bar{P}_t^Y \bar{Y}_t} \right) + \nu^E \zeta^E,
\]

(75)

where \( \zeta^E > 0.\) As specified, the deviation of the foreign currency liquidity shifter from its steady-state equilibrium value is decreasing in the contemporaneous deviation of the net foreign asset ratio from
its steady-state equilibrium value. Deviations from this foreign currency liquidity relationship are captured by mean zero and serially correlated foreign currency liquidity shock $\nu_t^E$.

2.4 The Trade Sector

Let $Q_t$ denote the real exchange rate, which measures the price of foreign output in terms of domestic output, that is, $Q_t = \mathcal{E}_t P_t^{Y,f}/P_t^{Y}$. 

2.4.1 The Export Sector

The export sector transforms the final output good into a final export good under producer currency pricing, with partial indexation to contemporaneous domestic-currency-denominated foreign output price inflation. This partial indexation mechanism incorporates some degree of local currency pricing.

**Export Demand.** There exist a large number of perfectly competitive firms which combine differentiated intermediate export goods $\{X_{x,t}\}_{x=0}^1$ supplied by intermediate export good firms to produce final export good $X_t$ according to constant elasticity of substitution production function

$$X_t = \left[ \int_0^1 (X_{x,t})^{\frac{\theta^X_{x,t} - 1}{\theta^X_t - 1}} dx \right]^{\frac{\theta^X_t}{\theta^X_t - 1}}. \quad (76)$$

The representative final export good firm maximizes profits from production of the final export good with respect to inputs of intermediate export goods, implying

$$X_{x,t} = \left( \frac{P_{x,t}^X}{P_t^X} \right)^{-\theta^X_t} X_t, \quad (77)$$

$$P_t^X = \left[ \int_0^1 (P_{x,t}^X)^{1-\theta^X_t} dx \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta^X_t}}. \quad (78)$$

Serially uncorrelated export price markup shock $\theta^X_t$ satisfies $\theta^X_t = \theta^X_t/(\theta^X_t - 1)$, where the price elasticity of demand for intermediate export goods $\theta^X_t$ satisfies $\theta^X_t > 1$. 
Export Supply. There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate export good firms indexed by $x \in [0, 1]$. Intermediate export good firms supply differentiated intermediate export goods, but are otherwise identical.

Each intermediate good exporter $x$ sells shares to domestic credit-unconstrained households at price $V_{x,t}^X$. Acting in the interests of its shareholders, it maximizes its pre-dividend stock market value:

$$\Pi_{x,t}^X + V_{x,t}^X = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{\beta^{s-t} \lambda_s^U}{\lambda_t^U} \Pi_{x,s}^X. \quad (79)$$

Shares entitle households to dividend payments equal to profits $\Pi_{x,s}^X$, defined as earnings less fixed cost $F_s^X$:

$$\Pi_{x,s}^X = P_{x,s}^X X_{x,s} - P_s^Y X_{x,s} - F_s^X. \quad (80)$$

Earnings are defined as revenues from sales of differentiated intermediate export good $X_{x,s}$ at price $P_{x,s}^X$ minus expenditures on final output good $X_{x,s}$. The representative intermediate export good firm purchases the final output good and differentiates it. Fixed cost $F_s^X$ ensures that $\int_0^1 \Pi_{x,s}^X dx = 0$.

In an adaptation of the model of nominal import price rigidity proposed by Monacelli (2005) to the export sector, each period a randomly selected fraction $1 - \omega_X$ of intermediate export good firms adjust their price optimally, where $0 \leq \omega_X < 1$. The remaining fraction $\omega_X$ of intermediate export good firms adjust their price to account for past export price inflation, as well as contemporaneous domestic-currency-denominated foreign output price inflation, according to partial indexation rule

$$P_{x,t}^X = \left[ \left( \frac{P_{t-1}^X}{P_{t-2}^X} \right)^{1-\mu_X} \left( \frac{\xi_t P_{t}^{Y,f}}{\xi_{t-1} P_{t-1}^{Y,f}} \right)^{\mu^X_x} \right]^{1-\gamma_X}$$

$$\times \left[ \left( \frac{\bar{P}_{t-1}^X}{\bar{P}_{t-2}^X} \right)^{1-\mu_X} \left( \frac{\bar{\xi}_t P_{t}^{Y,f}}{\bar{\xi}_{t-1} P_{t-1}^{Y,f}} \right)^{\mu^X_x} \right]^{1-\gamma_X} P_{x,t-1}^X, \quad (81)$$
where $0 \leq \gamma^X \leq 1$ and $0 \leq \mu^X \leq 1$. If the representative intermediate export good firm can adjust its price optimally in period $t$, then it does so to maximize pre-dividend stock market value (79) subject to intermediate export good demand function (77), and the assumed form of nominal export price rigidity. Since all intermediate export good firms that adjust their price optimally in period $t$ solve an identical value maximization problem, in equilibrium they all choose a common price $P^X_{t,*}$ given by necessary first-order condition:

$$
E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^X)^{s-t} \beta^{s-t} \frac{U^X}{\lambda^X} \theta^X_s \frac{P^Y}{P^X_s} \times \left\{ \left[ \left( \frac{P^X_{s-1}}{P^X_s} \right)^{1-\mu^X} \left( \frac{\xi_t P^Y_{t,f}}{\xi_s P^Y_{s,f}} \right)^{\mu^X} \right] \gamma^X \right\} \times \left[ \left( \frac{P^X_{s-1}}{P^X_s} \right)^{1-\mu^X} \left( \frac{\xi_t P^Y_{t,f}}{\xi_s P^Y_{s,f}} \right)^{\mu^X} \right]^{1-\gamma^X} \frac{P^X_{s}}{P^X_t} \right\} \frac{\theta^X_s}{\gamma^X} \times \left( \frac{P^X_{s,*}}{P^X_t} \right)^{-\theta^X_s} P^X_s X_s
$$

Aggregate export price index (78) equals an average of the price set by the fraction $1 - \omega^X$ of intermediate export good firms that adjust their price optimally in period $t$, and the average of the prices set by the remaining fraction $\omega^X$ of intermediate export good firms that adjust their price according to partial indexation rule (81):

$$
P^X_{t,*} = \frac{\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^X)^{s-t} \beta^{s-t} \frac{U^X}{\lambda^X} (\theta^X_s - 1)}{E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^X)^{s-t} \beta^{s-t} \frac{U^X}{\lambda^X} (\theta^X_s - 1)}.$$
\[
P_t^X = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \omega^X)(P_t^{X,*})^{1-\theta^X} + \omega^X \\
\times \left\{ \left[ \left( \frac{P_{t-1}^X}{P_{t-2}^X} \right)^{1-\mu^X} \left( \frac{\mathcal{E}_t P_t^{Y,f}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1} P_{t-1}^{Y,f}} \right)^{\mu^X} \right]^{\gamma^X} \\
\times \left[ \left( \frac{P_{t-1}^X}{P_{t-2}^X} \right)^{1-\mu^X} \left( \frac{\mathcal{E}_t P_t^{Y,f}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1} P_{t-1}^{Y,f}} \right)^{\mu^X} \right]^{1-\gamma^X} P_t^X \right\}^{\frac{1-\theta^X}{1-\theta^X}} \right\}
\end{cases}
\]

Since those intermediate export good firms able to adjust their price optimally in period \( t \) are selected randomly from among all intermediate export good firms, the average price set by the remaining intermediate export good firms equals the value of the aggregate export price index that prevailed during period \( t - 1 \), rescaled to account for past export price inflation, as well as contemporaneous domestic-currency-denominated foreign output price inflation.

2.4.2 The Import Sector

The import sector transforms the foreign final export good into a final import good under local currency pricing, with partial indexation to contemporaneous domestic-currency-denominated foreign output price inflation. This partial indexation mechanism incorporates some degree of producer currency pricing. The final import good is then combined with the final output good to produce goods for absorption by households, firms, and the government. Under this transformation, exchange rate pass-through to the prices of these absorption goods is incomplete in the short run but complete in the long run.

**Import Demand.** There exist a large number of perfectly competitive firms which combine the final output good \( Z_t^h \in \{C_t^h, I_t^{H,h}, I_t^{K,h}, G_t^C, I_t^{I,h} \} \) with the final import good \( Z_t^f \in \)...
\{C_t^f, I_t^H, I_t^K, G_t^C, G_t^I, f\} to produce private consumption, residential investment, business investment, public consumption, or public investment good \(Z_t \in \{C_t, I_t^H, I_t^K, G_t^C, G_t^I\}\) according to constant elasticity of substitution production function

\[
Z_t = \left(1 - \phi_Z^M\right)^{-\psi_M} \left(Z_t^h\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi_M}} \left(1 + \phi_Z^M \left(\frac{P_t}{P_M} \frac{P^M_t}{P^M_Z}\right)^{-\psi_M}\right) \psi_M \frac{\psi_M - 1}{\psi_M - 1}, \tag{84}
\]

where \(0 \leq \phi_Z^M < 1\) and \(\psi_M > 0\), while \(\phi_I^M = \phi_K^M = \phi_I^M\) and \(\phi_C^M = \phi_G^M = \phi_G^M\). The representative absorption good firm maximizes profits from production of the private consumption, residential investment, business investment, public consumption, or public investment good, with respect to inputs of the final output and import goods, implying

\[
Z_t^h = (1 - \phi_Z^M) \left(\frac{P_t^Y}{P_t^Z}\right)^{-\psi_M} Z_t, \quad Z_t^f = \phi_Z^M \left(\frac{1}{\partial X} \frac{P_t}{P_M^M}\right)^{-\psi_M}, \quad Z_t = \frac{\theta_X}{\partial M} M_t \tag{85}
\]

\[
P_t^Z = \left[(1 - \phi_Z^M) \left(P_t^Y\right)^{1-\psi_M} + \phi_Z^M \left(\frac{P_t^M}{\partial X} \partial M\right)^{1-\psi_M}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\psi_M}}. \tag{86}
\]

The aggregate absorption price indices \(P_t^Z\) equal the minimum cost of producing one unit of the absorption good, given the prices of the final output and import goods.

There exist a large number of perfectly competitive firms which combine differentiated intermediate import goods \(\{M_{m,t}\}_{m=0}^1\) supplied by intermediate import good firms to produce final import good \(M_t\) according to constant elasticity of substitution production function:

\[
M_t = \left[\int_0^1 (M_{m,t}) \frac{\theta_{t^M}^M}{\theta_{t^M}^M} dm\right]^\frac{\theta_{t^M}^M}{\theta_{t^M}^M - 1}. \tag{87}
\]

The representative final import good firm maximizes profits from production of the final import good with respect to inputs of intermediate import goods, implying
\[ M_{m,t} = \left( \frac{P_{m,t}}{P_t^M} \right)^{-\theta_{t}^M} M_t, \]  
\[ P_t^M = \left[ \int_0^1 (P_{m,t}^M)^{1-\theta_{t}^M} dm \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta_{t}^M}}. \]  

Serially uncorrelated import price markup shock \( \theta_{t}^M \) satisfies \( \theta_{t}^M = \theta_t^M / (\theta_t^M - 1) \), where the price elasticity of demand for intermediate import goods \( \theta_t^M \) satisfies \( \theta_t^M > 1 \).

**Import Supply.** There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate import good firms indexed by \( m \in [0, 1] \). Intermediate import good firms supply differentiated intermediate import goods, but are otherwise identical.

Each intermediate good importer \( m \) sells shares to domestic credit-unconstrained households at price \( V_{m,t}^M \). Acting in the interests of its shareholders, it maximizes its pre-dividend stock market value:

\[ \Pi_{m,t}^M + V_{m,t}^M = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \lambda_s^{U_s} \Pi_{m,s}^M. \]  

Shares entitle households to dividend payments equal to profits \( \Pi_{m,s}^M \), defined as earnings less fixed cost \( F_s^M \):

\[ \Pi_{m,s}^M = P_{m,s}^M M_{m,s} - \mathcal{E}_s P_{s}^{X,f} M_{m,s} - F_s^M. \]  

Earnings are defined as revenues from sales of differentiated intermediate import good \( M_{m,s} \) at price \( P_{m,s}^M \) minus expenditures on foreign final export good \( M_{m,s} \). The representative intermediate import good firm purchases the foreign final export good and differentiates it. Fixed cost \( F_s^M \) ensures that \( \int_0^1 \Pi_{m,s}^M dm = 0 \).

In an extension of the model of nominal import price rigidity proposed by Monacelli (2005), each period a randomly selected fraction \( 1 - \omega^M \) of intermediate import good firms adjust their price optimally, where \( 0 \leq \omega^M < 1 \). The remaining fraction \( \omega^M \) of intermediate import good firms adjust their price to account for past import price inflation, as well as contemporaneous domestic-currency-denominated foreign output price inflation, according to partial indexation rule.
\[
P_{m,t}^M = \left( \frac{P_{t-1}^M}{P_{t-2}^M} \right)^{1-\mu^M} \left( \frac{\xi_t P_{t}^{Y,f}}{\xi_{t-1} P_{t-1}^{Y,f}} \right)^{\mu^M} \gamma^M \right]^{1-\gamma^M} \times \left( \frac{\tilde{P}_{t-1}^M}{\tilde{P}_{t-2}^M} \right)^{1-\mu^M} \left( \frac{\tilde{\xi}_t \tilde{P}_{t}^{Y,f}}{\tilde{\xi}_{t-1} \tilde{P}_{t-1}^{Y,f}} \right)^{\mu^M} \gamma^M \right]^{1-\gamma^M} \times P_{m,t-1}^M, \quad (92)
\]

where \(0 \leq \gamma^M \leq 1\) and \(0 \leq \mu^M \leq 1\). If the representative intermediate import good firm can adjust its price optimally in period \(t\), then it does so to maximize pre-dividend stock market value (90) subject to intermediate import good demand function (88), and the assumed form of nominal import price rigidity. Since all intermediate import goods adjust their price optimally in period \(t\) solve an identical value maximization problem, in equilibrium they all choose a common price \(P_{t}^M,^*\) given by necessary first-order condition

\[
E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^M)_{s-t} \beta^{s-t} \lambda_s^U \theta_s^M \frac{P_{t}^M,^*}{p_s^M} \gamma^M \left[ \left( \frac{P_{t-1}^M}{P_{s-1}^M} \right)^{1-\mu^M} \left( \frac{\xi_t P_{t}^{Y,f}}{\xi_{s} P_{s}^{Y,f}} \right)^{\mu^M} \right]^{1-\gamma^M} \frac{p_s^M}{p_t^M} \right] \theta_s^M
\]

\[
\frac{P_{t}^M,^*}{p_t^M} = \frac{p_s^M M_s}{E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\omega^M)_{s-t} \beta^{s-t} \lambda_s^U \theta_s^M (\theta_s^M - 1) \left[ \left( \frac{P_{t-1}^M}{P_{s-1}^M} \right)^{1-\mu^M} \left( \frac{\xi_t P_{t}^{Y,f}}{\xi_{s} P_{s}^{Y,f}} \right)^{\mu^M} \right]^{1-\gamma^M} \frac{p_s^M}{p_t^M} \right] \theta_s^M - 1 \right] \frac{p_s^M M_s}{p_t^M} \right]. \quad (93)
\]

Aggregate import price index (89) equals an average of the price set by the fraction \(1 - \omega^M\) of intermediate import good firms that adjust
their price optimally in period $t$, and the average of the prices set by the remaining fraction $\omega^M$ of intermediate import good firms that adjust their price according to partial indexation rule (92):

$$P^M_t = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
(1 - \omega^M)(P^M_{t,*})^{1-\theta^M} \\
+ \omega^M \left\{ \left( \frac{P^M_{t-1}}{P^M_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\mu^M} \left( E_t P^Y_{t,f} \right)^{\mu^M} \gamma^M \right\}^{1-\gamma^M} \\
\times \left[ \left( \frac{\tilde{P}^M_{t-1}}{P^M_{t-2}} \right)^{1-\mu^M} \left( \frac{\tilde{E}_t \tilde{P}^Y_{t,f}}{\tilde{E}_{t-1} \tilde{P}^Y_{t-1,f}} \right)^{\mu^M} \right] P^M_{t-1} \right\}^{1-\theta^M} \frac{1}{1-\theta^M} \right\}^{1-\gamma^M}.
\right. \tag{94}$$

Since those intermediate import good firms able to adjust their price optimally in period $t$ are selected randomly from among all intermediate import good firms, the average price set by the remaining intermediate import good firms equals the value of the aggregate import price index that prevailed during period $t - 1$, rescaled to account for past import price inflation, as well as contemporaneous domestic-currency-denominated foreign output price inflation.

2.5 The Monetary, Fiscal, and Macroprudential Authorities

The government consists of a monetary authority, a fiscal authority, and a macroprudential authority. The monetary authority conducts monetary policy and executes foreign exchange intervention. The fiscal authority conducts fiscal policy and administers capital controls. The macroprudential authority conducts macroprudential policy.

2.5.1 The Monetary Authority

The monetary authority takes offsetting positions in the domestic and foreign interbank markets, transferring profits $\Pi^C_t$ to the fiscal authority,

$$\Pi^C_t = (B^C_{t+1} - (1 + \iota^B_{t-1})B^C_{t-1}^h) + E_t(B^C_{t+1} - (1 + \iota^B_{t-1})B^C_{t}^f), \tag{95}$$
where $B_{t+1}^{C,Bh} + \mathcal{E}_t B_{t+1}^{C,Bf} = 0$. Profits are defined as the increase in net loans $B_{t+1}^{C,Bh}$ from the domestic interbank market net of interest payments at the domestic interbank rate $i_{t-1}^B$, plus the domestic-currency-denominated increase in net loans $B_{t+1}^{C,Bf}$ from the foreign interbank market net of interest payments at the foreign interbank rate $i_{t-1}^{B,f}$. The stock of foreign exchange reserves $R_{t+1}$ satisfies $R_{t+1} = -B_{t+1}^{C,Bf}$, while the foreign exchange reserve ratio $r_{t+1}$ satisfies $r_{t+1} = \mathcal{E}_t R_{t+1}/P_t Y_t$, and foreign exchange intervention $FXI_t$ satisfies $FXI_t = \Delta r_{t+1}$. Changes in foreign exchange reserves are fully sterilized since $\Delta \mathcal{E}_t R_{t+1} = \Delta B_{t+1}^{C,Bh}$.

**Monetary Policy.** The monetary authority implements monetary policy through control of the interbank rate according to a monetary policy rule exhibiting partial adjustment dynamics of the form

$$
i_t^B - \bar{i}_t^B = \rho_i^B (i_{t-1}^B - \bar{i}_{t-1}^B) + (1 - \rho_i^B) \times \left[ \xi_{\pi^C} \mathbb{E}_t (\pi_{t+1}^C - \bar{\pi}_{t+1}^C) + \xi_{Y^G} (\ln Y_t - \ln Y_t^P) \right] + \nu_{t}^{i_B},
$$

(96)

where $0 \leq \rho_i^B < 1$, $\xi_{\pi^C} > 1$, and $\xi_{Y^G} \geq 0$. As specified, the deviation of the interbank rate from its steady-state equilibrium value is inertially increasing in the expected future deviation of consumption price inflation from its target value, as well as the contemporaneous output gap. We define the output gap as the deviation of output from its potential value, which we define as that output level consistent with full utilization of private physical capital and effective labor, given the private physical capital stock and effective labor force. Deviations from this monetary policy rule are captured by mean zero and serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock $\nu_{t}^{i_B}$.

**Foreign Exchange Intervention.** The foreign exchange reserve ratio satisfies a foreign exchange intervention rule that helps stabilize the real exchange rate of the form

$$r_{t+1} - r = -\xi_r (\ln Q_t - \ln \bar{Q}_t) + \nu_{t}^r,
$$

(97)

where $r > 0$, $0 \leq \rho_r < 1$, and $\xi_r \geq 0$. As specified, the deviation of the foreign exchange reserve ratio from its steady-state equilibrium value is decreasing in the contemporaneous deviation of the real
exchange rate from its steady-state equilibrium value. Deviations from this foreign exchange intervention rule are captured by mean zero and serially correlated foreign exchange intervention shock $\nu_t^r$.

### 2.5.2 The Fiscal Authority

The fiscal authority issues domestic-currency-denominated government bonds to domestic households, securing new government borrowing $B_t^{G,G}$. It also levies taxes on corporate earnings at rate $\tau_t^K$, on household labor income at rate $\tau_t^L$, on household consumption expenditures at rate $\tau_t^C$, on cross-border mortgage borrowing at rate $\tau_t^H$, and on cross-border corporate borrowing at rate $\tau_t^F$, generating tax revenues $T_t$. In addition, the fiscal authority receives profit transfer $\Pi_t^C$ from the monetary authority. These sources of funds are summed in government dynamic budget constraint:

$$
C_t^{G,G} + P_t^{G^C} G_t^C + P_t^{G^I} G_t^I + \int_0^1 T_{h,t}^Z dh = B_t^{G,G} + \int_0^1 \tau_t^K (P_{f,t}^Y Y_{f,t} - W_t L_{f,t} - \Phi_{f,t}^F) df + \int_0^1 \tau_t^L \int_0^1 W_{i,t} L_{h,i,t} didh
$$

$$
+ \int_0^1 \tau_t^C P_t^C C_{h,t} dh + \tau_{t-1}^H (1 - \delta_{t}^H) (\alpha^H + \iota_{t-1}^H) \mathcal{E}_t D_{t}^{H,f} + \tau_{t-1}^F (1 - \delta_{t}^F) (\alpha^F + \iota_{t-1}^F) \mathcal{E}_t D_{t}^{F,f} + \Pi_t^C.
$$

(98)

According to this dynamic budget constraint, the fiscal authority services its debt at cost $C_t^{G,G}$. It also purchases public consumption good $G_t^C$ at price $P_t^{G^C}$, and public investment good $G_t^I$ at price $P_t^{G^I}$, accumulating the public capital stock $K_{t+1}^G$ according to $K_{t+1}^G = (1 - \delta_G) K_t^G + G_t^I$ where $0 \leq \delta_G \leq 1$. Finally, the fiscal authority remits household type specific lump-sum transfer payments $\{T_{h,t}^Z\}_{h=0}^1$, which it allocates across non-discretionary transfers $\{T_{h,t}^{Z,N}\}_{h=0}^1$ and discretionary transfers $\{T_{h,t}^{Z,D}\}_{h=0}^1$, that is, $T_{h,t}^Z = T_{h,t}^{Z,N} + T_{h,t}^{Z,D}$. Non-discretionary transfers sum to zero across households, that is, $\int_0^1 T_{h,t}^{Z,N} dh = 0$, while discretionary transfers are targeted at credit-constrained households, that is,
In steady-state equilibrium, non-discretionary transfers equate consumption across credit-constrained and credit-constrained households.

The fiscal authority enters period $t$ with previously accumulated public debt $D_t^G$, which subsequently evolves according to accumulation function

$$D_{t+1}^G = (1 - \alpha^G)D_t^G + B_{t-1}^{G,G}, \tag{99}$$

where $\alpha^G = 1 - \omega^G$, which implies that $0 \leq \alpha^G < 1$. Its debt-service cost satisfies $C_t^{G,G} = (\alpha^G + \eta_{t-1}^{G,E})D_t^G$, reflecting an amortization payment at rate $\alpha^G$ and an interest payment at effective rate $\eta_{t-1}^{G,E}$ on the outstanding stock of public debt. This effective government rate evolves according to

$$\eta_t^{G,E} = \left(1 - \frac{B_{t-1}^{G,G}}{D_t^G}\right)\eta_{t-1}^{G,E} + \frac{B_{t-1}^{G,G}}{D_t^G}\eta_{t-1}^G, \tag{100}$$

as a weighted average of the interest rates applicable to outstanding and new public debt, the latter given by the past government bond yield.

**Fiscal Policy.** Public consumption and investment satisfy countercyclical fiscal expenditure rules exhibiting partial adjustment dynamics of the form

$$\ln G_{t,Z}^Z = \rho^G \ln G_{t-1,Z}^Z - (1 - \rho^G)\xi^Z_G (\ln Y_t - \ln Y_{t,P}^P) + \nu_t^{G,Z}, \tag{101}$$

where $Z \in \{C, I\}$, while $0 \leq \rho^G < 1$ and $\xi^Z_G \geq 0$. As specified, the deviation of public consumption or investment from its steady-state equilibrium value is inertially decreasing in the contemporaneous output gap. Deviations from these fiscal expenditure rules are captured by mean zero and serially correlated public consumption or investment shock $\nu_t^{G,Z}$.

The tax rates applicable to corporate earnings, household labor income, and household consumption expenditures satisfy acyclical fiscal revenue rules of the form

$$\tau_t^Z - \tau^Z = \rho^\tau (\tau_{t-1}^Z - \tau^Z) + \nu_t^Z, \tag{102}$$

where $Z \in \{K, L, C\}$, while $0 < \tau^Z < 1$ and $0 \leq \rho^\tau < 1$. Deviations from these fiscal revenue rules are captured by mean zero and
serially correlated corporate, labor income, or consumption tax rate shock $\nu_t^T$.

Non-discretionary transfers to credit-constrained households satisfy a transfer payment rule that gradually stabilizes the net foreign asset ratio of the form

$$\frac{T_{t}^{C,N}}{P_t^Y Y_t} - \frac{\bar{T}_{t}^{C,N}}{P_t^Y Y_t} = \xi^{T^N} \left( \frac{A_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}^Y Y_{t+1}} - \frac{\bar{A}_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}^Y Y_{t+1}} \right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (103)

where $\xi^{T^N} > 0$. As specified, the deviation of the non-discretionary transfer payment ratio from its steady-state equilibrium value is increasing in the contemporaneous deviation of the net foreign asset ratio from its steady-state equilibrium value. Discretionary transfers to credit-constrained households satisfy a transfer payment rule that gradually stabilizes the public debt ratio of the form

$$\frac{T_{t}^{C,D}}{P_t^Y Y_t} - \frac{\bar{T}_{t}^{C,D}}{P_t^Y Y_t} = -\xi^{T^D} \left( \frac{D_{t+1}^C}{P_{t+1}^Y Y_{t+1}} - \frac{\bar{D}_{t+1}^C}{P_{t+1}^Y Y_{t+1}} \right) + \nu_t^T,$$  \hspace{1cm} (104)

where $\xi^{T^D} > 0$. As specified, the deviation of the discretionary transfer payment ratio from its steady-state equilibrium value is decreasing in the contemporaneous deviation of the public debt ratio from its target value. Deviations from this transfer payment rule are captured by mean zero and serially correlated transfer payment shock $\nu_t^T$.

**Capital Flow Management.** The tax rates applicable to cross-border mortgage and corporate borrowing satisfy capital flow management rules exhibiting partial adjustment dynamics of the form

$$\tau_{t}^Z = \rho^{C} \tau_{t-1}^Z + (1 - \rho^{C}) \xi^{\tau^Z} \left( \ln \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t} D_{t+1}^Z}{P_t^Y} - \ln \frac{\bar{\mathcal{E}}_{t} \bar{D}_{t+1}^Z}{P_t^Y} \right) + \nu_t^Z,$$  \hspace{1cm} (105)

where $Z \in \{H, F\}$, while $\tau_{t}^Z = 0$, $0 \leq \rho^{C} < 1$ and $\xi^{\tau^Z} \geq 0$. As specified, the mortgage or corporate capital control tax rate is inertially increasing in the contemporaneous deviation of the real domestic-currency-denominated value of external mortgage or corporate debt.
from its steady-state equilibrium value. Deviations from these capital flow management rules are captured by mean zero and serially correlated mortgage or corporate capital control shock $\nu_t^Z$. 

2.5.3 The Macroprudential Authority

The regulatory bank capital ratio requirement satisfies a countercyclical capital buffer rule exhibiting partial adjustment dynamics of the form

$$\kappa_{t+1}^R - \kappa^R = \rho^R (\kappa_t^R - \kappa^R) + (1 - \rho^R) \xi^R \times \left( \ln \frac{A_{t+1}^B}{P_{t+1}^Y} - \ln \frac{\bar{A}_{t+1}^B}{\bar{P}_{t+1}^Y} \right) + \nu_t^R, \quad (106)$$

where $0 < \kappa^R < 1$, $0 \leq \rho^R < 1$, and $\xi^R \geq 0$. As specified, the deviation of the bank capital requirement from its steady-state equilibrium value is inertially increasing in the contemporaneous deviation of real bank credit from its steady-state equilibrium value. Deviations from this countercyclical capital buffer rule are captured by mean zero and serially correlated bank capital requirement shock $\nu_t^R$.

The regulatory mortgage and corporate loan-to-value ratio limits satisfy loan-to-value limit rules exhibiting partial adjustment dynamics of the form

$$\phi_t^Z - \phi^Z = \rho^\phi (\phi_{t-1}^Z - \phi^Z) - (1 - \rho^\phi) \xi^\phi \times \left( \ln \frac{D_{t+1}^Z}{P_{t}^Y} - \ln \frac{\bar{D}_{t+1}^Z}{\bar{P}_{t}^Y} \right) + \nu_t^\phi, \quad (107)$$

where $Z \in \{H, F\}$, while $0 < \phi^Z < 1$, $0 \leq \rho^\phi < 1$, and $\xi^\phi \geq 0$. As specified, the deviation of the mortgage or corporate loan-to-value limit from its steady-state equilibrium value is inertially decreasing in the contemporaneous deviation of real mortgage or corporate debt from its steady-state equilibrium value. Deviations from these loan-to-value limit rules are captured by mean zero and serially correlated mortgage or corporate loan-to-value limit shock $\nu_t^\phi$.

These capital controls may be classified as both capital flow management and macroprudential policy measures, as they limit both capital inflows and systemic risk arising from them.
2.6 Market Clearing Conditions

A rational expectations equilibrium in this DSGE model of the world economy consists of state-contingent sequences of allocations for domestic and foreign households, firms, and banks that solve their constrained optimization problems given prices and policies, together with state-contingent sequences of allocations for the domestic and foreign governments that satisfy their policy rules and constraints given prices, with supporting prices such that all markets clear.

Clearing of the final output good market requires that the value of exports $X_t$ equal the value of final output good supply minus demand from households, firms, and the government,

$$P_t^X X_t = P_t^Y (Y_t - C_t^h - I_t^{H,h} - I_t^{K,h} - G_t^{C,h} - G_t^{I,h}), \quad (108)$$

where $X_t = M_t^f$. Clearing of the final import good market requires that the volume of imports $M_t$ equal the volume of demand from households, firms, and the government,

$$M_t = C_t^f + I_t^{H,f} + I_t^{K,f} + G_t^{C,f} + G_t^{I,f}, \quad (109)$$

where $M_t = X_t^f$. In equilibrium, combination of these final output and import good market clearing conditions yields output expenditure decomposition,

$$P_t^Y Y_t = P_t^C C_t + P_t^I I_t + P_t^G G_t + P_t^X X_t - P_t^M M_t, \quad (110)$$

where the price of investment satisfies $P_t^I = P_t^{I_H} = P_t^{I_K}$ while investment satisfies $I_t = I_t^{H} + I_t^{K}$, and the price of public demand satisfies $P_t^G = P_t^{G_C} = P_t^{G_I}$ while public demand satisfies $G_t = G_t^C + G_t^I$.

Clearing of the final mortgage or corporate loan market requires that bank credit supply equal bank credit demand, ultimately from domestic and foreign households or firms,

$$A_{t+1}^{B,Z} = D_{t+1}^{Z,h} + D_{t+1}^{Z,f,f}, \quad (111)$$

where $Z \in \{H,F\}$. In equilibrium, clearing of the final mortgage or corporate loan payment system implies that the mortgage or corporate credit loss rate satisfies

$$\delta_t^Z A_t^{B,Z} = \delta_t^Z D_t^{Z,h} + \delta_t^{Z,f} D_t^{Z,f,f}. \quad (112)$$
The derivation of this result equates the debt service receipts of domestic banks to the debt service payments of domestic and foreign households or firms. To close the model, we assume that the economy has zero net exposure to the foreign interbank market, that is, $B_{t+1}^{B,B} + B_{t+1}^{C,B} = 0$.

Let $A_{t+1}$ denote the net foreign asset position, which equals the sum of the assets less liabilities of households, firms, banks, and the government:

$$A_{t+1} = \int_0^1 A_{b,t+1}^{B,H} db + \int_0^1 A_{b,t+1}^{B,F} db - D_{t+1}^H - D_{t+1}^F. \tag{113}$$

Imposing equilibrium conditions on government dynamic budget constraint (98) reveals that the fiscal deficit $FD_t = D_{t+1}^G - D_t^G$ equals the sum of interest expenditures, the primary fiscal deficit $PD_t = P_t^G G_t + T_t^{C,D} - T_t$, and the cost of holding foreign exchange reserves,

$$D_{t+1}^G - D_t^G = i_{t-1}^G D_t^G + P_t^G G_t + T_t^{C,D} - \tau_t^K (P_t^Y Y_t - W_t L_t) - \tau_t W_t L_t - \tau_t P_t^C C_t - \sum_Z \tau_{t-1}^Z (1 - \delta_t^Z) (\alpha^Z + i_{t-1}^Z \varepsilon_t D_t^{Z,f})$$

$$+ \left[ (1 + i_{t-1}^B) - (1 + i_{t-1}^{B,f}) \frac{\varepsilon_t}{\varepsilon_{t-1}} \right] \varepsilon_{t-1} R_t, \tag{114}$$

where $Z \in \{H,F\}$. Imposing equilibrium conditions on household dynamic budget constraint (5), and combining it with government dynamic budget constraint (114), firm dividend payment definition (32), bank dividend payment definition (56), output expenditure decomposition (110), and mortgage or corporate credit loss rate decomposition (112) reveals that the current account balance $CA_t = A_{t+1} - A_t$ equals the sum of net international investment income and the trade balance $TB_t = P_t^X X_t - P_t^M M_t$,

$$A_{t+1} - A_t = \sum_Z \left[ (1 - \delta_t^Z) (\alpha^Z + i_{t-1}^Z) (A_t^{B,Z} - D_t^{Z,h}) - (1 - \delta_t^Z) (\alpha^Z + i_{t-1}^Z) \varepsilon_t D_t^{Z,f} - \alpha^Z \left( \int_0^1 A_{b,t}^{B,Z} db - D_t^Z \right) \right]$$

$$+ P_t^X X_t - P_t^M M_t, \tag{115}$$
where $Z \in \{H, F\}$. The derivation of this result imposes deposit market clearing condition $B_{t+1}^{H,D} = B_{t+1}^{B,D}$, government bond market clearing conditions $D_{t+1}^G = \sum_{v=1}^t V_{v,t}S_{v,t+1}^G$ and $(1 + v_{t-1}^E)D_t^G = \sum_{v=1}^{t-1} (\Pi_{v,t}^G + V_{v,t}^G)S_{v,t}^G$, stock market clearing conditions $S_{f,t+1}^F = 1$ for all $f \in [0,1]$ and $S_{b,t+1}^B = 1$ for all $b \in [0,1]$, and domestic interbank market clearing condition $B_{t+1}^{B,B} + B_{t+1}^{C,B} = 0$.

3. The Empirical Framework

Estimation, inference, and forecasting are based on an augmented linear state-space representation of an approximate multivariate linear rational expectations representation of this DSGE model of the world economy, expressed as a function of its potentially heteroskedastic structural shocks. This multivariate linear rational expectations representation is derived by analytically linearizing the equilibrium conditions of the DSGE model around a stationary deterministic steady-state equilibrium that abstracts from long-run balanced growth, and consolidating them by substituting out intermediate variables. Its linear state-space representation is augmented with empirically flexible trend component specifications for observed endogenous variables that account for long-run balanced growth while absorbing intermittent structural breaks. It is also augmented with state-dependent conditional heteroskedasticity specifications for structural shocks that generate endogenous risk, by parsimoniously capturing intertemporal dependence of the conditional variances of endogenous variables on their conditional means, yielding a non-linear empirical framework.

3.1 Endogenous Variables

In what follows, $\hat{x}_t$ denotes the cyclical component of variable $x_t$, while $\bar{x}_t$ denotes its trend component, where $x_t = \hat{x}_t + \bar{x}_t$. The relative sizes of the domestic and foreign economies are measured by
their steady-state equilibrium world output shares $w_Y$ and $w_{Y,f}$, where $w_Y + w_{Y,f} = 1$.

### 3.1.1 Cyclical Components

Credit-unconstrained consumption $\ln \hat{C}_t^U$ depends on its past and expected future values, and is driven by the real interbank rate adjusted by the housing, duration, and equity risk premiums, according to Euler equation

$$
\ln \hat{C}_t^U = \frac{\alpha^C}{1 + \alpha^C} \ln \hat{C}_{t-1}^U + \frac{1}{1 + \alpha^C} E_t \ln \hat{C}_{t+1}^U
- \sigma \frac{1 - \alpha^C}{1 + \alpha^C} E_t \left[ (\hat{i}_t^B + \phi_H^C \hat{v}_t^H + \phi_B^C \hat{v}_t^B + \phi_S^C \hat{v}_t^S - \hat{\pi}_t^C) - \frac{1}{1 + \tau^C} \Delta \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \Delta \ln \hat{v}_{t+1}^C \right].
$$

(116)

Credit-unconstrained consumption is also driven by the change in the consumption tax rate. Credit-constrained consumption $\ln \hat{C}_t^C$ satisfies static budget constraint

$$(1 + \tau^C) \frac{C}{Y} \left( \ln \frac{\hat{P}_t^C \hat{C}_t^C}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t} + \frac{1}{1 + \tau^C} \hat{\tau}_t^C \right)
= (1 - \tau^L) \frac{W L}{P^Y Y} \left( \ln \frac{\hat{W}_t \hat{L}_t}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t} - \frac{1}{1 - \tau^L} \hat{\tau}_t^L \right)
+ \frac{1}{\phi^C} \frac{\hat{T}_t^C}{P^Y Y},
$$

(117)

which equates credit-constrained consumption expenditures to household disposable labor income plus transfers.

The unemployment rate depends on its past value, and is driven by employment and the real effective wage, determining the labor force $\ln \hat{N}_t$ according to supply function

$$
\hat{\nu}_t^L = \alpha^L \hat{\nu}_{t-1}^L - (1 - \alpha^L)
\times \left\{ \mu \ln \hat{L}_t \hat{\nu}_t^N - \eta \left[ \ln \frac{\hat{W}_t}{\hat{P}_t^C \hat{A}_t} - \frac{1}{1 - \tau^L} \hat{\tau}_t^L - \frac{1}{1 + \tau^C} \hat{\tau}_t^C \right] \right\}.
$$

(118)
The unemployment rate also depends on the labor income and consumption tax rates. The unemployment rate $\hat{u}_t^L$ satisfies $\hat{u}_t^L = \ln \hat{N}_t - \ln \hat{L}_t$.

The deviation of wage inflation $\hat{\pi}_t^W$ from its partially indexed value depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the contemporaneous and past unemployment rate, according to Phillips curve
\[
\hat{\pi}_t^W - \gamma^L((1 - \mu^L)\hat{\pi}_{t-1}^W + \mu^L(\hat{\pi}_{t-1}^C + \hat{g}_{t-1}^T))
= \beta E_t \left[ \hat{\pi}_{t+1}^W - \gamma^L((1 - \mu^L)\hat{\pi}_t^W + \mu^L(\hat{\pi}_t^C + \hat{g}_t^T)) \right]
- \frac{(1 - \omega^L)(1 - \omega^L\beta)}{\omega^L} \left[ \frac{1}{\eta} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \alpha^L} (\hat{u}_t^L - \alpha^L\hat{u}_{t-1}^L) - \ln \hat{g}_t^L \right) \right].
\] (119)

The partially indexed value of wage inflation depends on its past value, as well as past consumption price inflation and trend productivity growth. The wage $\ln \hat{W}_t$ satisfies $\hat{\pi}_t^W = \ln \hat{W}_t - \ln \hat{W}_{t-1}$.

The price of housing $\ln \hat{V}_t^H$ depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the user cost of housing, according to asset pricing relationship:
\[
\ln \hat{V}_t^H = \beta E_t \ln \hat{V}_{t+1}^H + (1 - \beta)E_t \ln \hat{\Pi}_t^H - (\hat{i}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^H).
\] (120)

The price of housing is also driven by the interbank rate adjusted by the duration and housing risk premiums. The user cost of housing $\ln \hat{\Pi}_t^H$ satisfies
\[
\frac{\Pi_t^H}{\bar{P}Y}\ln \hat{\Pi}_t^H = \ln(\hat{P}_t^H \hat{H}_t) + \frac{A^B,H}{\bar{P}Y} \times \left[ \alpha^H \ln \hat{B}_t^{H,H} -(1 - \delta^H)(\alpha^H + i^H) \ln \hat{C}_t^{H,H} \right]
- \frac{I_t^H}{\bar{Y}} \ln(\hat{P}_t^H \hat{I}_t^H),
\] (121)
where $\frac{\Pi_t^H}{\bar{P}Y} = 1 - \left[ 1 - \frac{\delta^H}{1 + \phi\delta^H(1 + R_t^H)} \left( 1 - (1 - \delta^H)\frac{\alpha^H + i^H}{\alpha^H} \right) \right] \frac{I_t^H}{\bar{Y}}$. New mortgage borrowing $\ln \hat{B}_t^{H,H}$ satisfies $\ln \hat{B}_t^{H,H} = \frac{\hat{i}_t^H}{\phi} + \ln(\hat{Q}_t^H \hat{I}_t^H)$, while mortgage debt service cost $\ln \hat{C}_t^{H,H}$ satisfies
\[
\ln \hat{C}_t^{H,H} = \frac{1 + i^H}{\alpha^H + i^H} \hat{i}_{t-1}^H - \hat{\delta}_t^H + \ln \hat{D}_t^H.
\] (122)
Mortgage debt $\ln \hat{D}_{t+1}^H$ is accumulated from new mortgage borrowing according to $\ln \hat{D}_{t+1}^H = (1 - \alpha^H) \ln \hat{D}_t^H + \alpha^H \ln \hat{B}_{t,^H}^H$.

The deviation of residential investment expenditures from nominal output depends on its past and expected future values, and is driven by the relative shadow price of housing, shadow price of mortgage debt, and regulatory mortgage loan-to-value ratio limit, determining residential investment $\ln \hat{I}_t^H$ according to demand function

$$\ln \hat{P}_t^H \hat{I}_t^H = \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \ln \frac{\hat{P}_{t-1}^I \hat{I}_{t-1}^H}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_{t-1}} + \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} E_t \ln \frac{\hat{P}_{t+1}^I \hat{I}_{t+1}^H}{\hat{P}_{t+1}^Y \hat{Y}_{t+1}} + \frac{1}{\chi^H(1 + \beta)} \left[ \ln \left( \hat{v}_t^H \hat{Q}_t^H \hat{P}_t^I \right) + \phi^H (1 + R^H) \left( \ln \left( \frac{\hat{Q}_t^H}{\hat{P}_t^I} - \frac{\hat{\pi}_t^I}{\phi^H} \right) + \phi^H \hat{R}_t^H \right) \right]. \tag{123}$$

The relative shadow price of housing depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the real interbank rate adjusted by the duration and housing risk premiums, determining the shadow price of housing $\ln \hat{Q}_t^H$ according to Euler equation

$$\ln \frac{\hat{P}_t^I \hat{I}_t^H}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t} = E_t \left[ \beta (1 - \delta^H) \ln \frac{\hat{Q}_{t+1}^H}{\hat{P}_{t+1}^I} - (\hat{\nu}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^C + \hat{\nu}_t^H - \hat{\pi}_{t+1}^I) \
\quad + (1 - \beta (1 - \delta^H)) \ln \frac{\hat{P}_{t+1}^H}{\hat{P}_{t+1}^I} \right]. \tag{124}$$

The relative shadow price of housing is also driven by the relative implicit rental price of housing. The implicit rental price of housing $\ln \hat{P}_t^H$ satisfies

$$\ln \frac{\hat{P}_t^H}{\hat{P}_t^C} = \frac{1}{1 + \tau^C} \hat{\tau}_t^C = -\frac{1}{\varsigma} \ln \frac{\hat{H}_t}{\hat{C}_t}. \tag{125}$$

The shadow price of mortgage debt $\hat{R}_t^H$ depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the interbank rate adjusted by the duration and housing risk premiums, according to Euler equation
\[
\frac{\hat{R}_t^H}{R^H} = E_t \left[ \beta(1 - \alpha^H) \frac{\hat{R}_{t+1}^H}{R^H} - (\hat{\nu}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^H) \right. \\
\left. + (1 - \beta(1 - \alpha^H)) \frac{1 + i^H}{\alpha^H + i^H} \hat{i}_t^{HE} \right], 
\]

(126)

where \( R^H = -\frac{\beta(1-\delta^H)(\alpha^H + i^H)}{1 - \beta(1-\alpha^H)} \). The shadow price of mortgage debt is also driven by the effective mortgage loan rate. The housing stock \( \ln \hat{H}_{t+1} \) is accumulated from residential investment according to \( \ln \hat{H}_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_H) \ln \hat{H}_t + \delta_H \ln(\hat{i}_t^H \hat{I}_t^H) \) \(^3\)

The government bond yield \( \hat{i}_t^G \) depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the interbank rate adjusted by the duration risk premium, according to asset pricing relationship

\[
\hat{i}_t^G = \omega^G \beta E_t \hat{i}_{t+1}^G + \frac{1 - \omega^G \beta}{1 - \omega^G(1 - \omega^G)\beta} (\hat{\nu}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^B). 
\]

(127)

The term premium \( \hat{\mu}_t^B \) depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the duration risk premium, according to

\[
\hat{\mu}_t^B = \omega^G \beta E_t \hat{\mu}_{t+1}^B + \frac{1 - \omega^G \beta}{1 - \omega^G(1 - \omega^G)\beta} \hat{\nu}_t^B. 
\]

(128)

The duration risk premium \( \hat{\nu}_t^B \) may be internationally correlated given \( \hat{\nu}_t^B = \lambda^B \hat{\nu}_t^{B,f} + (1 - \lambda^B) \hat{\nu}_t^B \) where \( 0 \leq \lambda^B \leq 1 \), capturing international bond market contagion.

Output depends on utilized private physical capital and effective employment, determining employment \( \ln \hat{L}_t \) according to production function

\[
\ln \hat{Y}_t = \left( 1 - \vartheta^Y \frac{WL}{PY} \right) \ln(\hat{u}_t^K \hat{K}_t) + \vartheta^Y \frac{WL}{PY} \ln(\hat{A}_t \hat{L}_t). 
\]

(129)

Potential output \( \ln \hat{Y}_t^P \) depends on the private physical capital stock and effective labor force according to

\[
\ln \hat{Y}_t^P = \left( 1 - \vartheta^Y \frac{WL}{PY} \right) \ln \hat{K}_t + \vartheta^Y \frac{WL}{PY} \ln(\hat{A}_t \hat{N}_t). 
\]

(130)

\(^3\)The inclusion of asset risk premiums, exclusion of the mortgage loan default rate, and sign on the mortgage loan-to-value ratio limit in these equations are not microfounded.
The output gap $\ln \hat{Y}_t^G$ satisfies $\ln \hat{Y}_t^G = \ln \hat{Y}_t - \ln \hat{Y}_t^P$. Productivity $\ln \hat{A}_t$ depends on the productivity shifter and public capital intensity according to

$$\ln \hat{A}_t = \phi^A \ln \hat{\nu}_t^A + (1 - \phi^A) \ln \frac{\hat{K}_G}{N_t}.$$  \hfill (131)

The productivity shifter $\ln \hat{\nu}_t^A$ may be internationally correlated given $\ln \hat{\nu}_t^A = \lambda^A \ln \hat{\nu}_t^{A,f} + (1 - \lambda^A) \ln \hat{\nu}_t^A$, where $0 \leq \lambda^A \leq 1$. Trend productivity $\ln \hat{A}_t^T$ satisfies $\ln \hat{A}_t^T = \rho^A T \ln \hat{A}_t^T - 1 + (1 - \rho^A T) \ln \hat{A}_t$, while trend productivity growth $\hat{g}_t^A$ satisfies $\hat{g}_t^A = \ln \hat{A}_t^T - \ln \hat{A}_{t-1}^T$.

The price of equity $\ln \hat{\nu}_t^F$ depends on its expected future value, and is driven by corporate profit, according to asset pricing relationship

$$\ln \hat{\nu}_t^F = \beta^F E_t \ln \hat{\nu}_{t+1}^F + (1 - \beta^F) E_t \ln \hat{\Pi}_{t+1}^F - (\hat{i}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^S).$$  \hfill (132)

The price of equity is also driven by the interbank rate adjusted by the duration and equity risk premiums. New corporate borrowing $\ln \hat{B}_t^{F,F}$ satisfies

$$\ln \hat{B}_t^{F,F} = \hat{\phi}^F \ln \hat{Q}_t^{K} + (1 - \delta^F) \ln \hat{D}_t^F.$$  \hfill (134)
Corporate debt \( \ln \hat{D}_{t+1}^F \) is accumulated from new corporate borrowing according to \( \ln \hat{D}_{t+1}^F = (1 - \alpha^F) \ln \hat{D}_t^F + \alpha^F \ln \hat{B}_t^{F,F} \).

The deviation of business investment expenditures from nominal output depends on its past and expected future values, and is driven by the relative shadow price of private physical capital, shadow price of corporate debt, and regulatory corporate loan-to-value ratio limit, determining business investment \( \ln \hat{I}_t^K \) according to the demand function

\[
\ln \frac{\hat{P}_t \hat{I}_t^K}{\hat{P}_t^L \hat{Y}_t} = \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \ln \frac{\hat{P}_{t-1} \hat{I}_{t-1}^K}{\hat{P}_{t-1}^L \hat{Y}_{t-1}} + \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} E_t \ln \frac{\hat{P}_{t+1} \hat{I}_{t+1}^K}{\hat{P}_{t+1}^L \hat{Y}_{t+1}} + \frac{1}{\chi^K(1 + \beta)} \times \left[ \ln \left( \hat{V}_t^K \hat{Q}_t^K \hat{I}_t^K \right) + \phi^F (1 + R^K) \left( \ln \frac{\hat{Q}_t^K}{\hat{P}_t^L} - \hat{\phi}_t^K \right) + \hat{\phi}_t^K \right].
\]

(135)

The relative shadow price of private physical capital depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the real interbank rate adjusted by the duration and equity risk premiums, determining the shadow price of private physical capital \( \ln \hat{Q}_t^K \) according to Euler equation

\[
\ln \frac{\hat{Q}_t^K}{\hat{P}_t^L} = E_t \left[ \beta(1 - \delta_K) \ln \frac{\hat{Q}_{t+1}^K}{\hat{P}_{t+1}^L} - (\hat{v}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^B + \hat{\nu}_t^S - \hat{\pi}_{t+1}^I) \\
+ (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta_K) \left( \eta^K \ln \hat{u}_{t+1}^K - \frac{1}{1 - \tau^K} \hat{\pi}_{t+1}^K \right) \right].
\]

(136)

The relative shadow price of private physical capital is also driven by the capital utilization and corporate tax rates. The capital utilization rate \( \ln \hat{u}_t^K \) satisfies

\[
\ln \hat{u}_t^K = \frac{1}{1 + \eta^K} \ln \frac{\hat{W}_t \hat{L}_t}{\hat{P}_t^L \hat{K}_t}.
\]

(137)

The shadow price of corporate debt \( \hat{R}_t^K \) depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the interbank rate adjusted by the duration and equity risk premiums, according to Euler equation...
\[
\frac{\hat{R}_t^K}{R^K} = E_t \left[ \beta (1 - \alpha^F) \frac{\hat{R}_{t+1}^K}{R^K} - (\hat{i}^B_t + \hat{i}^B + \hat{i}^S_t) \\
+ (1 - \beta (1 - \alpha^F)) \left( 1 + \frac{i^F}{\alpha^F + i^F} \right) \right],
\]

(138)

where \( R^K = -\frac{\beta(1-\delta^F)(\alpha^F+i^F)}{1-\beta(1-\alpha^F)} \). The shadow price of corporate debt is also driven by the effective corporate loan rate. The private physical capital stock \( \ln \hat{K}_{t+1} \) is accumulated from business investment according to \( \ln \hat{K}_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_K) \ln \hat{K}_t + \delta_K \ln (\hat{p}^{IK}_t \hat{f}_t^K) \).

The deviation of output price inflation \( \hat{\pi}_t^Y \) from its partially indexed value depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the labor income share, according to Phillips curve

\[
\hat{\pi}_t^Y - \gamma^Y \hat{\pi}_{t-1}^Y = \beta E_t (\hat{\pi}_{t+1}^Y - \gamma^Y \hat{\pi}_t^Y) + \frac{(1 - \omega^Y)(1 - \omega^Y \beta)}{\omega^Y} \\
\times \left( \ln \hat{W}_t \hat{L}_t + \ln \hat{\theta}_t^Y \right).
\]

(139)

The partially indexed value of output price inflation depends on its past value. The price of output \( \ln \hat{P}_t^Y \) satisfies \( \hat{\pi}_t^Y = \ln \hat{P}_t^Y - \ln \hat{P}_{t-1}^Y \).

Domestic mortgage or corporate debt \( \ln \hat{D}^{Z, h}_{t+1} \) depends on total mortgage or corporate debt, as well as the deviation of the mortgage or corporate loan rate from its effective value, according to demand function

\[
\ln \hat{D}^{Z, h}_{t+1} = \ln \hat{D}^{Z}_{t+1} - \psi^B \frac{1 + i^Z}{\alpha^Z + i^Z} (\hat{\tau}_t^Z - \hat{i}_t^Z).
\]

(140)

where \( Z \in \{H, F\} \). The domestic-currency-denominated value of external mortgage or corporate debt depends on total mortgage or corporate debt, determining external mortgage or corporate debt \( \ln \hat{D}^{Z, f}_{t+1} \) according to demand function

\[
\ln (\hat{E}_t \hat{D}^{Z, f}_{t+1}) = \\
\ln \hat{D}^{Z}_{t+1} - \psi^B \times \left[ \hat{\tau}_t^Z + \frac{1 + i^Z}{\alpha^Z + i^Z} \hat{i}^Z_t + E_t \Delta \ln \hat{E}_{t+1} - \frac{1 + i^Z}{\alpha^Z + i^Z} \hat{i}^{ZE}_t \right].
\]

(141)

\(^4\)The exclusion of the corporate loan default rate and sign on the corporate loan-to-value ratio limit in these equations are not microfounded.
The domestic-currency-denominated value of external mortgage or corporate debt also depends on the deviation of the foreign mortgage or corporate loan rate from its effective value, adjusted by the mortgage or corporate capital control tax and nominal currency depreciation rates. The effective mortgage or corporate loan rate \( \hat{i}_t^E \) depends on the mortgage or corporate loan rate according to

\[
\frac{1 + i^E_t}{\alpha^E + i^E_t} = (1 - \phi^B Z) \frac{1 + i^E_t}{\alpha^E + i^E_t} + \phi^B \left[ i^E_t + \frac{1 + i^E_t}{\alpha^E + i^E_t} \hat{i}_t^f + E_t \Delta \ln \hat{e}_{t+1} \right],
\]

where \( \phi^B Z = \frac{E D^f Y Y}{D^E} \) with \( \phi^B w Y A B, P Y \) and \( \phi^B w Y A B, P Y \). The effective mortgage or corporate loan rate also depends on the foreign mortgage or corporate loan rate, adjusted by the mortgage or corporate capital control tax and nominal currency depreciation rates.

The money stock \( \ln \hat{M} \) satisfies \( \ln \hat{A} = (1 - \kappa R) \ln \hat{M} + \kappa R \ln \hat{K} \), while bank credit \( \ln \hat{A} \) depends on contemporaneous mortgage and corporate credit according to

\[
\frac{A^B}{P Y Y} \ln \hat{A}_{t+1} = \frac{A^{B, H}}{P Y Y} \ln \hat{A}^{B, H}_{t+1} + \frac{A^{B, F}}{P Y Y} \ln \hat{A}^{B, F}_{t+1},
\]

where \( \frac{A^B}{P Y Y} = \frac{A^{B, H}}{P Y Y} + \frac{A^{B, F}}{P Y Y} \) with \( \frac{A^{B, H}}{P Y Y} = \frac{1}{\alpha^H + \kappa R} \frac{I^H}{1 + \phi^H (1 + R^H)} \) and \( \frac{A^{B, F}}{P Y Y} = \frac{1}{\alpha^F + \phi^F (1 + R^K)} \frac{I^K}{1 + \phi^F (1 + R^K)} \). New mortgage or corporate lending \( \ln \hat{B}^{B, Z} \) satisfies \( \ln \hat{A}^{B, Z}_{t+1} = (1 - \alpha^Z) \ln \hat{A}^{B, Z}_{t+1} + \alpha^Z \ln \hat{B}^{B, Z}_{t+1} \), while mortgage or corporate loan income \( \ln \hat{C}^{B, Z} \) satisfies

\[
\ln \hat{C}^{B, Z}_{t+1} = \frac{1 + i^Z}{\alpha^Z + i^Z} \hat{i}^Z_{t-1} + \ln \hat{A}^{B, Z}_{t+1},
\]

where \( Z \in \{ H, F \} \). Mortgage or corporate credit \( \ln \hat{A}^{B, Z}_{t+1} \) depends on domestic and foreign external mortgage or corporate debt according to

\[
\ln \hat{A}^{B, Z}_{t+1} = (1 - \phi^B Z) \ln \hat{D}^{B, h}_{t+1} + \phi^B \ln \hat{D}^{B, f, f}_{t+1}.
\]

Bank-retained earnings \( \ln \hat{I}^B \) depends on its past and expected future values, and is driven by the relative shadow price of bank capital, according to

\[
\ln \hat{I}^B = \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \ln \hat{I}^B_{t-1} + \beta \frac{1}{1 + \beta} E_t \ln \hat{I}^B_{t+1} + \frac{1}{\chi^B (1 + \beta)} \ln \frac{\hat{Q}^B}{P^Y}. \quad \text{(145)}
\]
The relative shadow price of bank capital depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the interbank rate, determining the shadow price of bank capital \( \ln \hat{Q}_t^B \) according to Euler equation

\[
\ln \frac{\hat{Q}_t^B}{P_t^Y} = \beta E_t \ln \frac{\hat{Q}_{t+1}^B}{P_{t+1}^Y} - \hat{i}_t^B - (1 - \beta) \frac{\eta^B}{\kappa^R} (\hat{\kappa}_{t+1} - \hat{\kappa}_{t+1}^R). \tag{146}
\]

The relative shadow price of bank capital is also driven by the deviation of the bank capital ratio from its required value. The bank capital ratio \( \hat{\kappa}_{t+1} \) satisfies

\[
\hat{\kappa}_{t+1} = \kappa^R (\ln \hat{K}_{t+1}^B - \ln \hat{A}_{t+1}^B). \tag{147}
\]

The bank capital stock \( \ln \hat{K}_{t+1}^B \) is accumulated from retained earnings given credit losses according to

\[
\ln \hat{K}_{t+1}^B = (1 - \delta^B_{t})(\ln \hat{K}_t^B - \hat{\delta}^B_t) + \delta^B_t \ln \hat{I}_t^B. \tag{148}
\]

The financial gap \( \ln \hat{F}_t \) depends on real non-financial private-sector debt, as well as the relative prices of housing and equity, according to

\[
\ln \hat{F}_t = \phi^F_B \ln \frac{\hat{D}_{t+1}^P}{P_t^Y} + \phi^H_F \ln \frac{\hat{V}_{t+1}^H}{P_t^Y} + \phi^F_F \ln \frac{\hat{V}_t^F}{P_t^Y}, \tag{149}
\]

where non-financial private-sector debt \( \ln \hat{D}_{t+1}^P \) satisfies

\[
A^B_{t+1} \ln \hat{D}_{t+1}^P = A^{B,H}_{t+1} \ln \hat{D}_{t+1}^H + A^{B,F}_{t+1} \ln \hat{D}_{t+1}^F. \tag{150}
\]

The mortgage or corporate loan default rate \( \hat{\delta}^Z_t \) responds inertially to the output and financial gaps according to

\[
\hat{\delta}^Z_t = \rho^C \hat{\delta}^Z_{t-1} - (1 - \rho^C) \zeta^Z (\ln \hat{Y}_t^G + \zeta^F \ln \hat{F}_t) + \hat{\nu}^Z_t. \tag{151}
\]

The effective mortgage or corporate loan default rate \( \hat{\delta}^{ZE}_t \) satisfies

\[
\hat{\delta}^{ZE}_t = (1 - \phi^B_Z) \hat{\delta}^Z_t + \phi^B_Z \hat{\delta}^{Z,f}_t. \tag{152}
\]

The bank capital destruction rate \( \hat{\delta}^B_t \) depends on the effective mortgage and corporate loan default rates according to

\[
\hat{\delta}^B_t \kappa^R \frac{A^B}{P^YY} \left[ 1 - \delta^B \hat{\delta}^B_t + \ln \hat{K}_t^B \right] = \sum Z \delta^Z (\alpha^Z + i^Z) \frac{A^{B,Z}}{P^YY} \left[ 1 + i^Z \hat{\delta}^Z_{t-1} + \frac{1 - \delta^Z}{\delta^Z} \hat{\delta}^{ZE}_t + \ln \hat{A}_t^{B,Z} \right], \tag{153}
\]

where \( \delta^B \kappa^R \frac{A^B}{P^YY} = \delta^H (\alpha^H + i^H) \frac{A^{B,H}}{P^YY} + \delta^F (\alpha^F + i^F) \frac{A^{B,F}}{P^YY} \). The bank capital destruction rate also depends on the bank capital buffer and credit risk exposures.
The change in the mortgage or corporate loan rate $\hat{i}_t$ depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the interbank rate and mortgage or corporate loan rate, according to Phillips curves

$$\Delta \hat{i}_t = \beta E_t \Delta \hat{i}_{t+1} + \frac{(1 - \omega^C)(1 - \omega^C \beta)}{\omega^C} \times \left\{ \frac{\hat{\vartheta}^Z}{\beta(1 - \delta^Z)(1 + \hat{i}^Z)} \left[ \hat{i}^B_{t-1} - \eta^B (1 - \beta) \left( \hat{\kappa}_t - \frac{1 + \eta^B}{\eta^B} \hat{\kappa}^R_t \right) \right] + \frac{\alpha^Z + i^Z}{1 + i^Z} \left[ \hat{s}^Z_E + \frac{\delta^Z}{1 - \delta^Z} \ln \hat{Q}^B_t + \ln \hat{\vartheta}^Z_t \right] - \hat{i}_t \right\},$$

(150)

where $\hat{\vartheta}^Z = \frac{\beta(1 - \delta^Z)(\alpha^Z + i^Z)}{1 + \kappa^R}(1 - \beta (1 - \alpha^Z))$. The change in the mortgage or corporate loan rate is also driven by the bank capital ratio and its required value, as well as the effective mortgage or corporate loan default rate and relative shadow price of bank capital.

The interbank rate $\hat{i}^B_t$ responds inertially to consumption price inflation and the output gap according to monetary policy rule

$$\hat{i}^B_t = \rho^B \hat{i}^B_{t-1} + (1 - \rho^B) \left( \xi^C \hat{\pi}^C_t \hat{\kappa}^C_{t+1} + \xi^Y \hat{Y}^G_t \right) + \hat{\nu}^B_t.$$  

(151)

The foreign exchange reserve ratio $\hat{r}_{t+1}$ responds to the real exchange rate according to foreign exchange intervention rule

$$\hat{r}_{t+1} = -\hat{\xi}^r \ln \hat{Q}_t + \hat{\nu}^r_t.$$  

(152)

Foreign exchange intervention $\hat{FXI}_t$ satisfies $\hat{FXI}_t = \Delta \hat{r}_{t+1}$, while the foreign exchange reserve stock $\ln \hat{R}_{t+1}$ satisfies $\hat{r}_{t+1} = r(\ln \hat{E}_t + \ln \hat{R}_{t+1} - \ln \hat{P}^Y_t - \ln \hat{Y}_t)$.

Public consumption or investment $\ln \hat{G}^Z_t$ responds inertially to the output gap according to fiscal expenditure rule

$$\ln \hat{G}^Z_t = \rho^G \ln \hat{G}^Z_{t-1} - (1 - \rho^G) \xi^{GZ} G^Z_0 \ln \hat{Y}^G_t + \hat{\nu}^{GZ}_t,$$

(153)

where $Z \in \{C, I\}$. The public capital stock $\ln \hat{K}^G_{t+1}$ is accumulated from public investment according to $\ln \hat{K}^G_{t+1} = (1 - \delta^G) \ln \hat{K}^G_t + \delta_C \ln \hat{G}^I_t$. The corporate, labor income, or consumption tax rate $\hat{\tau}^Z_t$ satisfies fiscal revenue rule

$$\hat{\tau}^Z_t = \rho^\tau \hat{\tau}^Z_{t-1} + \hat{\nu}^\tau^Z_t,$$

(154)
where $Z \in \{K, L, C\}$. The mortgage or corporate capital control tax rate $\hat{\tau}_t^Z$ responds inertially to the real domestic-currency-denominated value of external mortgage or corporate debt according to capital flow management rule

$$\hat{\tau}_t^Z = \rho^{\tau^C} \hat{\tau}_{t-1}^Z + (1 - \rho^{\tau^C}) \xi^{\tau^Z} \ln \frac{\hat{E}_t \hat{D}_{t+1}^{Z,f}}{\hat{P}_t^Y} + \nu_t^{\tau^Z}, \quad (155)$$

where $Z \in \{H, F\}$. The non-discretionary transfer payment ratio $\hat{T}_{C,N}^{\tau} \hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t$ satisfies

$$\frac{\hat{T}_{C,N}^{\tau}}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t} \hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t = \xi^{\tau^N} \hat{A}_{t+1} + \nu_t^{\tau^N} \hat{D}^{Z,f}_{t+1} + \nu_t^{\tau^N}. \quad (156)$$

The regulatory bank capital ratio requirement $\hat{\kappa}_{t+1}^R$ responds inertially to real bank credit according to countercyclical capital buffer rule

$$\hat{\kappa}_{t+1}^R = \rho^{\kappa^R} \hat{\kappa}_t^R + (1 - \rho^{\kappa^R}) \xi^{\kappa^R} \ln \frac{\hat{A}_t^B}{\hat{P}_t^Y} + \nu_t^{\kappa^R}. \quad (156)$$

The regulatory mortgage or corporate loan-to-value ratio limit $\hat{\phi}_t^Z$ responds inertially to real mortgage or corporate debt according to loan-to-value limit rule

$$\hat{\phi}_t^Z = \rho^{\phi} \hat{\phi}_{t-1}^Z - (1 - \rho^{\phi}) \xi^{\phi^Z} \ln \frac{\hat{D}_t^Z}{\hat{P}_t^Y} + \nu_t^{\phi^Z}, \quad (157)$$

where $Z \in \{H, F\}$.

The nominal exchange rate $\ln \hat{E}_t$ depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the international interbank rate differential, according to uncovered interest parity condition

$$\ln \hat{E}_t = E_t \ln \hat{E}_{t+1} - (\hat{i}_t^B - \hat{i}_t^{B,f}) + \gamma^B \hat{r}_{t+1} - \xi^E \hat{A}_{t+1}^E \hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t + \nu_t^E. \quad (158)$$

The nominal exchange rate is also driven by the foreign exchange reserve and net foreign asset ratios. The real exchange rate $\ln \hat{Q}_t$ satisfies

$$\ln \hat{Q}_t = \ln \hat{E}_t + \ln \hat{P}_t^{Y,f} - \ln \hat{P}_t^Y. \quad (159)$$

The deviation of export price inflation $\hat{\pi}_t^X$ from its partially indexed value depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the price of output relative to exports, according to Phillips curve
\[
\pi_t^X - \gamma^X ((1 - \mu^X)\pi_{t-1}^X + \mu^X \Delta \ln(\hat{\pi}_t^Y)) \\
= \beta E_t \left[\pi_{t+1}^X - \gamma^X ((1 - \mu^X)\pi_t^X + \mu^X \Delta \ln(\hat{\pi}_{t+1}^Y))\right] \\
+ \frac{(1 - \omega^X)(1 - \omega^X \beta)}{\omega^X} \left(\ln \frac{\hat{P}_t^Y}{\hat{P}_t^X} + \ln \hat{\theta}_t^X\right). \quad (159)
\]

The partially indexed value of export price inflation depends on its past value, as well as contemporaneous domestic-currency-denominated foreign output price inflation. The price of exports \(\ln \hat{P}_t^X\) satisfies \(\hat{\pi}_t^X = \ln \hat{P}_t^X - \ln \hat{P}_{t-1}^X\).

The deviation of import price inflation \(\hat{\pi}_t^M\) from its partially indexed value depends on its expected future value, and is driven by the domestic-currency-denominated foreign price of exports relative to imports, according to Phillips curve

\[
\hat{\pi}_t^M - \gamma^M ((1 - \mu^M)\hat{\pi}_{t-1}^M + \mu^M \Delta \ln(\hat{\pi}_{t+1}^Y)) \\
= \beta E_t \left[\hat{\pi}_{t+1}^M - \gamma^M ((1 - \mu^M)\hat{\pi}_t^M + \mu^M \Delta \ln(\hat{\pi}_{t+1}^Y))\right] \\
+ \frac{(1 - \omega^M)(1 - \omega^M \beta)}{\omega^M} \left(\ln \frac{\hat{\pi}_{t+1}^M}{\hat{\pi}_t^M} + \ln \hat{\theta}_t^M\right). \quad (160)
\]

The partially indexed value of import price inflation depends on its past value, as well as contemporaneous domestic-currency-denominated foreign output price inflation. The price of imports \(\ln \hat{P}_t^M\) satisfies \(\hat{\pi}_t^M = \ln \hat{P}_t^M - \ln \hat{P}_{t-1}^M\).

The price of absorption \(\ln \hat{P}_t^Z\) depends on the price of output, as well as the relative price of imports, according to

\[
\ln \frac{\hat{P}_t^Z}{\hat{P}_t^Y} = \ln \hat{P}_t^Y + \phi^M Z \ln \frac{\hat{P}_t^M}{\hat{P}_t^Y}, \quad (161)
\]

where \(Z \in \{C, I, G\}\). Absorption price inflation \(\hat{\pi}_t^Z\) satisfies \(\hat{\pi}_t^Z = \ln \hat{P}_t^Z - \ln \hat{P}_{t-1}^Z\). Imports \(\hat{M}_t\) depend on private consumption, private investment, and public demand according to demand function
\[
\vartheta X \vartheta M M Y \ln \hat{M}_t \vartheta M M = \phi^M C Y \left( \ln \hat{C}_t - \psi^M \ln \frac{\hat{P}^M}{\hat{P}^C} \right) \\
+ \phi^I^G I Y \left( \ln \hat{I}_t - \psi^M \ln \frac{\hat{P}^M}{\hat{P}^I} \right) + \phi^G G Y \left( \ln \hat{G}_t - \psi^M \ln \frac{\hat{P}^M}{\hat{P}^G} \right),
\]

(162)

where \( \vartheta X \vartheta M M Y = \phi^M C Y + \phi^I^G I Y + \phi^G G Y \) with \( w^Y \vartheta M M Y = w^Y, f^M Y T \). Imports also depend on the corresponding relative prices of imports. Exports \( \ln \hat{X}_t \) satisfy \( \ln \hat{X}_t = \ln(\hat{\nu}^X M f_t) \).

Nominal output depends on consumption expenditures, investment expenditures, government expenditures, export revenues, and import expenditures, determining output \( \ln \hat{Y}_t \) according to market clearing condition

\[
\ln(\hat{P}^C \hat{C}_t) = \ln(\hat{P}^I \hat{I}_t) + \ln(\hat{P}^G \hat{G}_t) \\
+ \vartheta X \vartheta M M Y \ln \frac{\hat{P}^X \hat{X}_t}{\hat{P}^M \hat{M}_t},
\]

(163)

where \( \vartheta^C + \frac{I}{Y} + \frac{G}{Y} = 1 \). Private consumption \( \ln \hat{C}_t \) satisfies \( \ln \hat{C}_t = (1 - \phi^C) \ln \hat{C}_U + \phi^C \ln \hat{C}_C \), while private investment \( \ln \hat{I}_t \) satisfies \( \frac{I}{Y} \ln \hat{I}_t = \frac{I^H}{Y} \ln \hat{I}^H + \frac{I^K}{Y} \ln \hat{I}^K \) with \( \frac{I}{Y} = \frac{I^H}{Y} + \frac{I^K}{Y} \), and public demand \( \ln \hat{G}_t \) satisfies \( \frac{G}{Y} \ln \hat{G}_t = \frac{G^C}{Y} \ln \hat{G}^C + \frac{G^I}{Y} \ln \hat{G}^I_t \) with \( \frac{G}{Y} = \frac{G^C}{Y} + \frac{G^I}{Y} \).

The fiscal deficit ratio \( \frac{\hat{F} \hat{D}_t}{\hat{P}^Y \hat{Y}_t} \) depends on public debt service cost, the primary fiscal deficit ratio, and the central bank profit transfer according to dynamic budget constraint

\[
\frac{\hat{F} \hat{D}_t}{\hat{P}^Y \hat{Y}_t} = \frac{1 - \omega^G(1 - \omega^G) \beta}{\omega^G \beta} \frac{D^G}{P^Y Y} \hat{G}^E \\
+ \left( \frac{1 - \omega^G(1 - \omega^G) \beta}{\omega^G \beta} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{\hat{D}_{t-1}^G}{P^Y_{t-1} Y_{t-1}} - \frac{D^G}{P^Y Y} \ln \frac{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t}{\hat{P}_{t-1}^Y \hat{Y}_{t-1}} \right) \\
+ \frac{\hat{P} \hat{D}_t}{\hat{P}^Y \hat{Y}_t} + \frac{r}{\beta} \left( \hat{\xi}_{t-1}^B - \hat{\xi}_{t-1}^{B,f} - \ln \frac{\hat{E}_t}{\hat{E}_{t-1}} \right).
\]

(164)

\(^5\)The inclusion of shocks in these equations is not microfounded.
The effective government rate $\hat{i}^G_{t+1}$ satisfies $\hat{i}^G_{t+1} = \omega \hat{i}^G_t + (1 - \omega)\hat{i}^G_{t-1}$. The primary fiscal deficit ratio $\hat{PD}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}$ depends on the government expenditure, discretionary transfer payment, and tax revenue ratios according to

$$\hat{PD}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t} = \frac{G_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t} \ln \frac{\hat{G}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{Y}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}} + \hat{T}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t} - \hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}. \tag{165}$$

The transfer payment ratio $\hat{T}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}$ satisfies $\hat{T}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t} = \frac{\hat{T}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t} + \hat{T}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}$. The tax revenue ratio $\hat{T}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}$ depends on the corporate, labor income, and consumption tax rates, as well as the mortgage and corporate capital control tax rates, according to

$$\frac{\hat{T}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}} = \frac{\hat{G}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t} \ln \frac{\hat{Y}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{Y}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}} - \hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}. \tag{166}$$

The tax revenue ratio also depends on the corporate, labor income, and consumption tax bases. The public debt ratio $\hat{D}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}$ satisfies

$$\frac{\hat{D}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}} = \left( \frac{\hat{D}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t} - \hat{D}_{t-1}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{P}_{t-1}^{\text{Y}Y_t}} \right).$$

The current account balance ratio $\hat{CA}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}$ depends on net international investment income and the trade balance ratio according to dynamic budget constraint

$$\frac{\hat{CA}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}} = \sum_{Z} \frac{A_{t}^{B,Z} \ln \frac{\hat{Y}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}{\hat{Y}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}}} {\hat{P}_{t}^{\text{Y}Y_t}} \left\{ (1 - \delta^Z)(\alpha^Z + i^Z) \right\} \times \left\{ \phi^B_{Z} \left[ \left( \frac{1 + i^Z}{\alpha^Z + i^Z} \hat{i}^Z_{t-1} - \hat{i}^Z_{t-1} + \ln \hat{D}_{t}^{h} \right) \right] \right\}.$$
\[
\begin{align*}
-\left(\frac{1}{\alpha^Z + iZ} - \delta_t + \ln(\hat{\mathcal{E}}_t \hat{D}_t^{Z,f})\right) + \ln \frac{\hat{A}_t^{B,Z}}{\hat{D}_t^{Z,h}}
\end{align*}
\]
\[
-\alpha^Z \ln \frac{\hat{A}_t^{B,Z}}{\hat{D}_t^{Z}} \right) \right) + \frac{\hat{T}\hat{B}_t}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t},
\end{align*}
\]

where \(Z \in \{H, F\}\). The trade balance ratio \(\frac{\hat{T}\hat{B}_t}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t}\) satisfies \(\frac{\hat{T}\hat{B}_t}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t} = \partial^X \partial^M M \frac{\hat{P}_t^X \hat{X}_t}{\hat{P}_t^M \hat{M}_t}\), while the net foreign asset ratio \(\frac{\hat{A}_t^{+1}}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t}\) satisfies \(\frac{\hat{C}_A_t}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t} = \frac{\hat{A}_t^{+1}}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_t} - \frac{\hat{A}_t}{\hat{P}_t^Y \hat{Y}_{t-1}}\).

### 3.1.2 Trend Components

The changes in the trend components of the price of output \(\ln \hat{P}_t^Y\), output \(\ln \hat{Y}_t\), price of consumption \(\ln \hat{P}_t^C\), consumption \(\ln \hat{C}_t\), investment \(\ln \hat{I}_t\), exports \(\ln \hat{X}_t\), imports \(\ln \hat{M}_t\), price of housing \(\ln \hat{V}_t^H\), price of equity \(\ln \hat{V}_t^F\), bank credit \(\ln \hat{A}_t^B\), nominal exchange rate \(\ln \hat{C}_t\), wage \(\ln \hat{W}_t\), and employment \(\ln \hat{L}_t\) follow stationary first-order autoregressive processes

\[
\Delta \bar{x}_t = (1 - \rho)\mu_x + \rho \Delta \bar{x}_{t-1} + \bar{\varepsilon}^x_t, \quad \bar{\varepsilon}^x_t | \mathcal{I}_{t-1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \bar{h}^x),
\]

where \(\bar{x}_t \in \{\ln \hat{P}_t^Y, \ln \hat{Y}_t, \ln \hat{P}_t^C, \ln \hat{C}_t, \ln \hat{I}_t, \ln \hat{X}_t, \ln \hat{M}_t, \ln \hat{V}_t^H, \ln \hat{V}_t^F, \ln \hat{A}_t^B, \ln \hat{C}_t, \ln \hat{W}_t, \ln \hat{L}_t\}\), with corresponding unconditional means \(\mu_x \in \{\pi, g + n, \pi, g + n, g + n, g + n, g + n, g + n, \pi + g, \pi + g + n, \pi - \pi_f, \pi + g, n\}\) and innovations \(\bar{\varepsilon}^x_t \in \{\bar{\varepsilon}^{P_Y}_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^Y_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^{P_C}_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^C_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^I_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^X_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^M_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^V_H^f, \bar{\varepsilon}^{V_F}_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^{A_B}_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^C_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^W_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^L_t\}\) having unconditional variances \(\bar{h}^x \in \{\sigma^2_{P_Y}, \sigma^2_{Y}, \sigma^2_{P_C}, \sigma^2_{C}, \sigma^2_{I}, \sigma^2_{X}, \sigma^2_{V_H}, \sigma^2_{V_F}, \sigma^2_{A_B}, \sigma^2_{C}, \sigma^2_{W}, \sigma^2_{L}\}\). These trend components converge asymptotically at a common speed determined by \(\rho\) to a long-run balanced-growth path featuring constant inflation at rate \(\pi\), productivity growth at rate \(g\), and population growth at rate \(n\). In parallel, the changes in the trend components of the interbank rate \(\bar{i}_t^B\), government bond yield \(\bar{i}_t^G\), and unemployment rate \(\bar{u}_t^L\) follow stationary first-order autoregressive processes with zero unconditional means

\[
\Delta \bar{x}_t = \rho \Delta \bar{x}_{t-1} + \bar{\varepsilon}^x_t, \quad \bar{\varepsilon}^x_t | \mathcal{I}_{t-1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \bar{h}^x),
\]

where \(\bar{x}_t \in \{\bar{i}_t^B, \bar{i}_t^G, \bar{u}_t^L\}\), with corresponding innovations \(\bar{\varepsilon}^x_t \in \{\bar{\varepsilon}^{i_B}_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^{i_G}_t, \bar{\varepsilon}^{u_L}_t\}\) having unconditional variances \(\bar{h}^x \in \{\sigma^2_{i_B}, \sigma^2_{i_G}, \sigma^2_{u_L}\}\).
These trend components converge asymptotically at the same speed to a long-run balanced-growth path featuring constant interest and unemployment rates. As an identifying restriction, all innovations are assumed to be contemporaneously uncorrelated.

3.2 Exogenous Variables

All structural shocks follow stationary first-order autoregressive or serially uncorrelated processes, driven by conditionally normally distributed heteroskedastic or homoskedastic innovations. All structural shocks follow stationary first-order autoregressive or stationary first-order autoregressive processes driven by conditionally normally distributed heteroskedastic innovations.

3.2.1 Conditional Means

The productivity ln $\hat{\nu}_t^A$, labor supply ln $\hat{\nu}_t^N$, private consumption demand ln $\hat{\nu}_t^C$, residential investment demand ln $\hat{\nu}_t^I$, business investment demand ln $\hat{\nu}_t^K$, export demand ln $\hat{\nu}_t^X$, import demand ln $\hat{\nu}_t^M$, duration risk premium $\hat{\nu}_t^B$, housing risk premium $\hat{\nu}_t^H$, equity risk premium $\hat{\nu}_t^S$, and foreign currency liquidity $\hat{\nu}_t^E$ shocks follow stationary first-order autoregressive processes driven by conditionally normally distributed heteroskedastic innovations

$$\hat{\nu}_t^Z = \rho_Z \hat{\nu}_{t-1}^Z + \varepsilon_t^Z, \varepsilon_t^Z | \mathcal{I}_{t-1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \hat{\sigma}_t^Z),$$ \hspace{1cm} (170)$$

where $\hat{\nu}_t^Z \in \{ \ln \hat{\nu}_t^A, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^N, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^C, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^I, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^K, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^X, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^M, \hat{\nu}_t^B, \hat{\nu}_t^H, \hat{\nu}_t^S, \hat{\nu}_t^E \}$, with corresponding autoregressive coefficients $\rho_Z \in \{ \rho_A, \rho_N, \rho_C, \rho_I, \rho_I, \rho_P, \rho_M, \rho_B, \rho_H, \rho_S, \rho_E \}$ and innovations $\varepsilon_t^Z \in \{ \hat{\varepsilon}_t^A, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^N, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^C, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^I, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^K, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^X, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^M, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^B, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^H, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^S, \hat{\varepsilon}_t^E \}$ having conditional variances $\hat{\sigma}_t^Z \in \{ \hat{\sigma}_t^A, \hat{\sigma}_t^N, \hat{\sigma}_t^C, \hat{\sigma}_t^I, \hat{\sigma}_t^K, \hat{\sigma}_t^X, \hat{\sigma}_t^M, \hat{\sigma}_t^B, \hat{\sigma}_t^H, \hat{\sigma}_t^S, \hat{\sigma}_t^E \}$. Furthermore, the output price markup ln $\hat{\nu}_t^Y$, wage markup ln $\hat{\nu}_t^L$, export price markup ln $\hat{\nu}_t^X$, import price markup ln $\hat{\nu}_t^M$, and monetary policy $\hat{\nu}_t^B$ shocks follow serially uncorrelated processes driven by conditionally normally distributed homoskedastic innovations

$$\hat{\nu}_t^Z = \varepsilon_t^Z, \varepsilon_t^Z | \mathcal{I}_{t-1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \hat{\sigma}_t^Z),$$ \hspace{1cm} (171)$$

where $\hat{\nu}_t^Z \in \{ \ln \hat{\nu}_t^Y, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^L, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^X, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^M, \hat{\nu}_t^B \}$, with corresponding innovations $\varepsilon_t^Z \in \{ \varepsilon_t^A, \varepsilon_t^N, \varepsilon_t^C, \varepsilon_t^I, \varepsilon_t^K, \varepsilon_t^X, \varepsilon_t^M, \varepsilon_t^B \}$ having unconditional variances $\sigma_t^Z \in \{ \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2, \sigma_t^2 \}$. Finally, the mortgage loan markup ln $\hat{\nu}_t^H$, corporate loan markup ln $\hat{\nu}_t^F$, mortgage loan...
default $\nu_t^H$, corporate loan default $\nu_t^F$, absorption price $\ln \hat{\nu}_t^P$, foreign exchange intervention $\nu_t^I$, public consumption demand $\nu_t^C$, public investment demand $\nu_t^I$, corporate tax rate $\nu_t^C$, labor income tax rate $\nu_t^L$, consumption tax rate $\nu_t^C$, transfer payment $\nu_t^T$, bank capital requirement $\nu_t^R$, mortgage loan-to-value limit $\nu_t^H$, corporate loan-to-value limit $\nu_t^F$, mortgage capital control $\nu_t^H$, and corporate capital control $\nu_t^F$ shocks follow stationary first-order autoregressive processes driven by conditionally normally distributed homoskedastic innovations

$$\hat{\nu}_t^Z = \rho_Z \hat{\nu}_{t-1}^Z + \xi_t^Z, \xi_t^Z | \mathcal{I}_{t-1} \sim N(0, \hat{\nu}_t^Z),$$  \hspace{1cm} \text{(172)}$$

where $\nu_t^Z \in \{\ln \hat{\nu}_t^H, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^F, \nu_t^H, \ln \hat{\nu}_t^P, \nu_t^I, \nu_t^C, \nu_t^G, \nu_t^I, \nu_t^L, \nu_t^C, \nu_t^T, \nu_t^R, \nu_t^H, \nu_t^F, \nu_t^H, \nu_t^F\}$, with corresponding autoregressive coefficients $\rho_Z \in \{\rho_{C, C}, \rho_{O, C}, \rho_{C, C}, \rho_{P, P}, \rho_{P, C}, \rho_{G, G}, \rho_{P, T}, \rho_{T, T}, \rho_{T, \rho}, \rho_{K, \rho}, \rho_{O, \rho}, \rho_{O, C}, \rho_{T, C}\}$ and innovations $\xi_t^Z \in \{\xi_t^H, \xi_t^F, \xi_t^P, \xi_t^T, \xi_t^C, \xi_t^G, \xi_t^I, \xi_t^L, \xi_t^R, \xi_t^H, \xi_t^F\}$ having unconditional variances $\hat{\nu}_t^Z \in \{\hat{\sigma}_C^2, \hat{\sigma}_P^2, \hat{\sigma}_C^2, \hat{\sigma}_C^2, \hat{\sigma}_P^2, \hat{\sigma}_O^2, \hat{\sigma}_G^2, \hat{\sigma}_C^2, \hat{\sigma}_P^2, \hat{\sigma}_O^2, \hat{\sigma}_C^2\}$. As an identifying restriction, all innovations are assumed to be contemporaneously uncorrelated.

### 3.2.2 Conditional Variances

The conditional variances of the productivity $\hat{h}_t^A$, labor supply $\hat{h}_t^N$, consumption demand $\hat{h}_t^C$, investment demand $\hat{h}_t^I$, export demand $\hat{h}_t^X$, and import demand $\hat{h}_t^M$ shocks are log-linear functions of the past changes in and levels of the domestic and foreign output gaps

$$\ln \hat{h}_t^Z = \ln \hat{\sigma}_Z^2 - \lambda^M (\psi_{\Delta Y} \Delta \ln \hat{Y}_{t-1}^G - \psi_Y \ln \hat{Y}_{t-1}^G)$$

$$- \left(1 - \lambda^M\right) (\psi_{\Delta Y} \Delta \ln \hat{Y}_{t-1}^G - \psi_Y \ln \hat{Y}_{t-1}^G),$$  \hspace{1cm} \text{(173)}$$

where $Z \in \{A, N, C, I, X, M\}$, while $0 < \lambda^M < 1$. If $\psi_{\Delta Y} > 0$, then the conditional variances of these macroeconomic shocks are higher during a domestic or foreign business cycle contraction than during an expansion, while if $\psi_Y > 0$, then they are higher when domestic or foreign capacity pressures are elevated than when they are subdued. In parallel, the conditional variances of the duration risk premium $\hat{h}_t^B$, housing risk premium $\hat{h}_t^H$, equity risk premium $\hat{h}_t^S$,
and foreign currency liquidity $\hat{h}_t^E$ shocks are log-linear functions of the past changes in and levels of the domestic and foreign financial gaps

\[
\ln \hat{h}_t^Z = \ln \hat{\sigma}_Z^2 - \lambda_F (\psi_{DF} \Delta \ln \hat{F}_{t-1} - \psi_F \ln \hat{F}_{t-1}) - (1 - \lambda_F) (\psi_{DF} \Delta \ln \hat{F}_{t-1} - \psi_F \ln \hat{F}_{t-1}),
\]

where $Z \in \{B, H, S, E\}$, while $0 \leq \lambda_F \leq 1$. If $\psi_{DF} > 0$, then the conditional variances of these financial shocks are higher during a domestic or foreign financial cycle downturn than during an upturn, while if $\psi_F > 0$, then they are higher when domestic or foreign financial vulnerabilities are elevated than when they are subdued. These log-linear functional forms ensure positive conditional variances $\hat{h}_t^Z$, which converge asymptotically to unconditional variances of $\hat{\sigma}_Z^2$, given that the lagged output and financial gaps are stationary predetermined endogenous variables with zero unconditional means.

4. Estimation, Inference, and Forecasting

We interpret our linearized DSGE model with state-dependent conditional heteroskedasticity as a representation of the joint probability distribution of the data, and estimate a restricted version of it using the Bayesian maximum-likelihood procedure documented in Adrian and Vitek (2020). This restricted version of the model consolidates or eliminates those structural shocks that are weakly identified by our macrofinancial time-series data sets. Given the parameter estimates, we then conduct scenario analysis using the unrestricted version of the model.

4.1 Estimation

The set of parameters associated with our heteroskedastic linearized DSGE model is partitioned into two subsets. Those parameters that enter into the conditional mean function of its augmented linear state-space representation are calibrated, whereas those that enter into its conditional variance function are estimated. Most calibrated
and all estimated parameters are subject to cross-economy equality restrictions.⁶

4.1.1 Calibrated Parameters

The calibrated values of steady-state equilibrium parameters are set to match observed data, or lie within the range of existing empirical estimates. All steady-state equilibrium great ratios are set to their sample average values for the economy under consideration, or are derived from these given steady-state equilibrium relationships. In steady-state equilibrium, the import share of private investment \( \phi_M^I \) is set to 1.25 times that of private consumption \( \phi_C^M \) and public demand \( \phi_G^M \). The steady-state equilibrium annualized depreciation rate of the housing stock \( \delta_H \) is set to 5.0 percent, while that of the private physical capital stock \( \delta_K \) is set to 10.0 percent, and that of the public capital stock \( \delta_G \) is set to 7.5 percent. In steady-state equilibrium, the annualized mortgage \( i_H^M \) and corporate \( i_F^M \) loan rates are set to 4.0 and 6.0 percent, while the annualized mortgage \( \alpha_H^M \) and corporate \( \alpha_F^M \) loan amortization rates are set to 2.5 and 5.0 percent, and the annualized mortgage \( \delta_H^M \) and corporate \( \delta_F^M \) loan default rates are set to 1.0 and 2.0 percent, respectively. Finally, the output \( \vartheta_Y \), export \( \vartheta_X \), and import \( \vartheta_M \) price markup parameters are all set to imply steady-state equilibrium price markups of 25 percent.

The calibrated values of behavioral parameters lie within the range of estimates reported in the existing empirical literature where available, and are differentiated across the advanced versus emerging market economies under consideration where appropriate. For example, the habit persistence in consumption \( \alpha_C^H \) and labor supply \( \alpha_L^H \) parameters are both set to 0.8, while the subjective discount factor \( \beta \) is set to imply a steady-state equilibrium annualized interbank rate of 2.0 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption \( \sigma \) is set to 1.0, while the intratemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply \( \eta \) is set to 0.5. In addition, the share of credit-constrained households \( \phi_C \) is set to 20 percent in the advanced economies under consideration, versus 25 percent in the emerging market economies. Furthermore, the adjustment cost parameters for

⁶For a complete statement of the parameter values, see Adrian, Gaspar, and Vitek (2022).
residential $\chi^H$ and business $\chi^K$ investment are both set to 3.0. The partial indexation parameters for output price $\gamma^Y$, wage $\gamma^L$, export price $\gamma^X$, and import price $\gamma^M$ determination are all set to 0.8. In addition, the nominal rigidity parameters for output price $\omega^Y$ and wage $\omega^L$ determination are both set to imply average reoptimization intervals of eight quarters in the advanced economies under consideration, versus six quarters in the emerging market economies. Furthermore, the nominal rigidity parameters for export $\omega^X$ and import $\omega^M$ price determination are both set to imply average reoptimization intervals of six quarters, while the financial friction parameter for nominal mortgage and corporate loan rate determination $\omega^B$ is set to imply an average adjustment interval of four quarters. The intratemporal elasticities of substitution in import $\psi^M$ and external bank credit $\psi^B$ demand are both set to 0.5. Finally, the international bond and stock market contagion coefficients $\lambda^B$ and $\lambda^S$ are set to 40 and 50 percent in the advanced economies under consideration, versus 60 and 75 percent in the emerging market economies, respectively.

The calibrated values of policy rule parameters also lie within the range of estimates reported in the existing empirical literature where available. In the monetary policy rule, the response coefficient on consumption price inflation $\xi^\pi^C$ is set to 2.0, while that on the output gap $\xi^Y^G$ is set to 0.5 at the annual frequency. In the foreign exchange intervention rule, the steady-state equilibrium foreign exchange reserve ratio $r$ is set to its sample average value for the economy under consideration, while the response coefficient on the real exchange rate $\xi^r$ is set to 0.1 at the annual frequency. In the fiscal expenditure rules, the response coefficients for public consumption $\xi^G^C$ and investment $\xi^G^I$ with respect to the output gap are both set to 1.0. In the fiscal revenue rules, the steady-state equilibrium corporate $\tau^K$, labor income $\tau^L$, and consumption $\tau^C$ tax rates are set to their sample average values for the economy under consideration. In the countercyclical capital buffer rule, the steady-state equilibrium bank capital ratio $\kappa^R$ is set to 5.0 percent, while the response coefficient on real bank credit $\xi^\kappa^R$ is set to 0.1. In the loan-to-value limit rules, the steady-state equilibrium mortgage $\phi^H$ and corporate $\phi^F$ loan-to-value ratio limits are both set to 80 percent, while the response coefficients on real mortgage $\xi^\phi^H$ and corporate $\xi^\phi^F$ debt
are both set to 0.5. Finally, in the capital flow management rules, the response coefficients on the real domestic-currency-denominated value of external mortgage $\xi^{rH}$ and corporate $\xi^{rF}$ debt are both set to 0.1 at the annual frequency.

The calibrated values of trend component parameters are set to match observed data, or lie within a plausible range. The common speed of convergence parameter $\rho$ is set to imply a half-life of deviations from the long-run balanced growth path of 10 years. Along this balanced-growth path, the constant inflation $\pi$, productivity growth $g$, and population growth $n$ rates are set to their sample average values for the economy under consideration.

### 4.1.2 Estimated Parameters

Estimation of the restricted version of our heteroskedastic linearized DSGE model is based on the levels of a total of 31 endogenous variables observed for four pairs of economies over the sample period 2001:Q1 to 2019:Q4. Each pair of economies combines a small open advanced or emerging market economy with the United States, which is taken to represent the rest of the world. This choice is motivated by our focus on the global financial cycle, but the rest of the world could alternatively be represented by another systemic economy such as the euro area, depending on the application. The small open advanced economies under consideration are Korea and Switzerland, while the small open emerging market economies are South Africa and Thailand. These economies have experienced volatile capital flows, span a wide range of structural characteristics, and satisfy our data availability requirements.

The observed macroeconomic and financial market variables under consideration are the gross domestic product price deflator, real gross domestic product, the headline consumer price index, real private consumption, real private investment, real exports, real imports, the nominal policy interest rate, a benchmark long-term nominal government bond yield, a house price index, an equity price index, credit to the non-financial private sector, the nominal bilateral exchange rate, a nominal wage index, the unemployment rate, and employment. The macroeconomic variables are all seasonally adjusted. The nominal wage index is derived from observed labor income and employment. For Switzerland and the United States,
the estimated shadow nominal policy interest rate substitutes for the observed nominal policy interest rate, to account for the effects of unconventional monetary policy at the effective lower bound. All data were obtained from the Global Data Source (GDS) database compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) where available, and from databases produced by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) or Haver Analytics otherwise.

The restricted version of our model consolidates or eliminates those structural shocks that are weakly identified by our macrofinancial time-series data sets. In particular, we consolidate the residential and business investment demand shocks into an investment demand shock, the public consumption and investment demand shocks into a public demand shock, and the mortgage and corporate loan-to-value limit shocks into a loan-to-value limit shock. In addition, we eliminate the mortgage and corporate loan markup shocks; the mortgage and corporate loan default shocks; the export and import price markup shocks; the foreign exchange intervention shock; the corporate, labor income, and consumption tax rate shocks; the transfer payment shock; the bank capital requirement shock; and the mortgage and corporate capital control shocks.

We estimate this restricted version of our model based on effective sample period 2001:Q3 to 2019:Q4. The data are very informative regarding many of the estimated parameters that enter into the conditional variance function, as evidenced by substantial updates from prior to posterior. The prior means of the slope parameters associated with our state-dependent conditional heteroskedasticity mechanism are aligned with the estimated posterior modes reported for different economies in Adrian and Vitek (2020). The posterior modes of these slope parameters exhibit substantial economy-specific deviations around these common prior means.

4.2 Inference

Our estimated DSGE model generates output and financial gap estimates, which summarize the business and financial cycles. As shown in Figure 1, our output gap estimates indicate abrupt synchronized business cycle contractions during the global financial crisis (GFC) in all of the economies under consideration, followed by recoveries of varying intensity. These business cycle dynamics reflect reinforcing
Figure 1. Business and Financial Cycles

Note: Decomposes smoothed estimates of the output gap ■ into contributions from the capital utilization ■ and unemployment ■ rate gaps. Also decomposes smoothed estimates of the financial gap ■ into contributions from the debt ■, house price ■, and equity price ■ gaps.
fluctuations in capital and labor utilization. In parallel, our financial gap estimates indicate synchronized financial cycle downturns during the GFC, followed by upturns that lag behind the business cycle recoveries. These financial cycle dynamics reflect reinforcing credit cycle dynamics and asset price adjustments.

Our historical decompositions of consumption price inflation and output growth yield economically plausible explanations of their evolution over time, as shown in Figure 2. Those of consumption price inflation attribute deviations from trend rates primarily to macroeconomic shocks—in particular, to price and wage markup shocks. In parallel, our historical decompositions of output growth attribute business cycle dynamics around trend growth rates primarily to macroeconomic and financial shocks—in particular, to demand and risk premium shocks. Consistent with conventional views, these historical decompositions identify adverse demand and risk premium shocks in the United States as the primary drivers of the business cycle contractions that occurred during the GFC. Finally, they identify policy shocks as countercyclical mitigants of these business cycle contractions, particularly in the advanced economies under consideration.

4.3 Forecasting

Our sequential dynamic forecasts of consumption price inflation and output growth track their observed realizations reasonably accurately, as shown in Figure 3. We measure the dynamic forecasting performance of our estimated DSGE model relative to that of a random walk in sample at the 1- to 12-quarter horizons on the basis of the logarithm of the $U$ statistic due to Theil (1966), which equals the ratio of root mean squared prediction errors. We find that the model dominates a random walk in terms of predictive accuracy for consumption price inflation and output growth, for all of the economies under consideration. Indeed, over the holdout sample period 2005:Q2 to 2019:Q4, the root mean squared prediction error is 19 to 40 percent lower for consumption price inflation, and 40 to 46 percent lower for output growth, on average across horizons.

Policymakers are often concerned with the risks surrounding their central forecasts. In our model, these risks vary systematically

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7The output gap satisfies $\ln \hat{Y}_t^G = (1 - \vartheta^Y W L Y) \ln \hat{u}_t^K - \vartheta^Y W L Y \hat{u}_t^L$. 
**Figure 2. Historical Decompositions**

![Graphs of Consumption Price Inflation and Output Growth for Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand.]

**Note:** Decomposes observed consumption price inflation or output growth as measured by the seasonal logarithmic difference of the consumption price level or output into the sum of a trend component and contributions from domestic macroeconomic, foreign macroeconomic, domestic financial, foreign financial, domestic policy, foreign policy, and world terms of trade shocks.
Figure 3. Sequential Dynamic Forecasts

Note: Depicts observed consumption price inflation or output growth ■ as measured by the seasonal difference of the logarithm of the consumption price level or output versus sequential dynamic forecasts □.
with respect to the phase and position of the domestic and global business and financial cycles. As shown in Figure 4, the entire conditional distribution of output growth, and not just its central tendency, evolves over time. Indeed, both the location and scale of the conditional distribution of output growth shift in response to changes in domestic and global macroeconomic and financial conditions and vulnerabilities. Moreover, these shifts are negatively correlated, generating conditional distributions that are skewed to the downside, particularly at times of domestic or global macrofinancial stress. In contrast, the conditional distribution of consumption price inflation is roughly symmetric.

Consistent with the key stylized facts of growth at risk documented in Adrian and Vitek (2020), in our model the conditional lower quantile of output growth is more volatile than its conditional mean, which in turn is more volatile than its conditional upper quantile, as shown in Figure 5. This reflects the strong dependence of output growth dynamics on demand and risk premium shocks, which are conditionally heteroskedastic. Given the specification of our state-dependent conditional heteroskedasticity mechanism, adverse demand and risk premium shocks not only reduce the conditional mean of output growth but also raise its conditional variance, and vice versa. This generates a negative correlation between the conditional mean and variance of output growth, which ranges from −0.14 to −0.49 across the economies under consideration. In contrast, for consumption price inflation the conditional lower and upper quantiles are roughly equally volatile in our model. This reflects the strong dependence of consumption price inflation dynamics on price and wage markup shocks, which are conditionally homoskedastic.

5. Policy Analysis

Having verified that our estimated DSGE model yields economically plausible historical decompositions and reasonably accurate sequential dynamic forecasts of consumption price inflation and output growth, we proceed to conduct policy analysis using it. In particular, we quantify its monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macroprudential policy, and capital flow management transmission mechanisms with impulse responses. We then jointly
Figure 4. Conditional Distributions

Note: Depicts the one-year-ahead predicted probability density function of consumption price inflation or output growth, estimated using a normal kernel based on a Monte Carlo simulation with 100,000 replications.
Figure 5. Conditional Quantiles

Note: Depicts observed consumption price inflation or output growth as measured by the seasonal difference of the logarithm of the consumption price level or output versus the one-year-ahead predicted mean and 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles. The quantiles are estimated based on a Monte Carlo simulation with 100,000 replications.
optimize the response coefficients of the simple instrument rules governing the conduct of these policies. Finally, we examine the jointly optimized responses of these policies under global financial cycle upturn and downturn scenarios, with and without policy space constraints.

In what follows, note that under the parameterization of our model, Korea and Switzerland have well-anchored inflation expectations, whereas South Africa and Thailand have less well-anchored inflation expectations, as reflected in the values of the nominal rigidity parameters for output price $\omega^Y$ and wage $\omega^L$ determination. Furthermore, Switzerland and Thailand have relatively high trade openness, whereas Korea and South Africa have relatively low trade openness, as reflected in the value of the steady-state equilibrium import ratio $M/Y$. Finally, Switzerland and South Africa have the largest unhedged foreign-currency-denominated mortgage and corporate external debt exposures, while Korea and Thailand have the smallest, as reflected in the values of the steady-state equilibrium external debt ratios $\mathcal{E}D^H,f/P^Y Y$ and $\mathcal{E}D^F,f/P^Y Y$, respectively.\(^8\)

5.1 Policy Transmission Mechanisms

Our estimated DSGE model features extensive interactions among its monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macroprudential policy, and capital flow management transmission mechanisms. We quantify these policy transmission mechanisms and interactions with impulse responses.

5.1.1 Monetary Policy

A monetary easing through an interbank rate cut lowers bank lending rates and raises asset prices, as shown in Figure A.1 of Appendix

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\(^8\)Calibration of the mortgage and corporate external debt exposures is based on the Locational Banking Statistics and Debt Securities Statistics databases compiled by the BIS. The mortgage external debt exposures capture cross-border bank credit to households, while the corporate external debt exposures capture cross-border bank credit to and international debt securities issued by non-financial firms. We assume that these observed non-financial private-sector external debt exposures are entirely foreign currency denominated, and that they are 75 percent currency hedged for Switzerland versus 25 percent for the other small open economies under consideration, motivated by Du and Schreger (2021).
A. The resultant loosening of financial conditions stimulates private domestic demand—in particular, residential and business investment. The currency depreciates in nominal and real terms, slightly increasing exports and moderately offsetting the rise in imports. Output expands more than potential, and the output gap rises while the unemployment rate falls, associated with higher price and wage inflation. The currency depreciation also increases import price inflation, amplifying and accelerating the rise in consumption price inflation. Quantitatively, lowering the interbank rate by 1 percentage point boosts consumption price inflation by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point peak after two to four quarters, and output by 0.3 to 0.4 percent peak after three to four quarters, across the economies under consideration. Bank credit rises with mortgage and corporate debt. The fiscal deficit ratio of the consolidated public sector initially falls, reflecting a valuation gain on foreign exchange reserves held by the central bank, contributing to the reduction in the public debt ratio. The current account balance ratio also falls, reflecting higher import expenditures, reducing the net foreign asset ratio.

5.1.2 Foreign Exchange Intervention

A foreign exchange intervention through reserve sales appreciates the currency, slightly decreasing exports and moderately raising imports, as shown in Figure A.2 of Appendix A. Quantitatively, lowering the foreign exchange reserve ratio by 1 percentage point appreciates the currency by 1.5 percent on impact in nominal and real terms, consistent with the empirical estimates of Adler, Lisack, and Mano (2019). Output contracts more than potential, and the output gap falls while the unemployment rate rises, associated with lower price and wage inflation. The currency appreciation also reduces import price inflation, amplifying and accelerating the fall in consumption price inflation. The central bank cuts the interbank rate to mitigate the falls in consumption price inflation and the output gap, stimulating private domestic demand—in particular, residential and business investment. Bank credit eventually rises

\footnote{The panel regression on which these empirical estimates are based covers a wide sample of advanced and emerging market economies, including all of the small open economies under consideration in this paper.}
with mortgage and corporate debt, while external debt falls due to a valuation effect. The fiscal deficit ratio of the consolidated public sector initially increases, reflecting a valuation loss on foreign exchange reserves held by the central bank, contributing to the rise in the public debt ratio. The current account balance ratio eventually falls, reflecting lower export receipts and higher import expenditures, reducing the net foreign asset ratio.

5.1.3 Fiscal Policy

A public consumption or investment based fiscal stimulus boosts public demand, while raising the fiscal deficit and public debt ratios, as shown in Figure A.3 or Figure A.4 of Appendix A. Output expands more than potential, and the output gap rises while the unemployment rate falls, associated with higher price and wage inflation. Quantitatively, the peak output multiplier for a public-consumption-based fiscal stimulus ranges from 0.7 to 1.0, while that for a public-investment-based fiscal stimulus ranges from 0.7 to 1.1, across the economies under consideration. But the expansionary effects of the public-investment-based fiscal stimulus are far more persistent, reflecting the productivity gains from building up the public capital stock. To stabilize consumption price inflation and output, the central bank hikes the interbank rate, and the currency appreciates in real terms. Private domestic demand initially rises as output expands, then falls as financial conditions tighten. Substitution from domestic to external mortgage and corporate debt occurs. The current account balance ratio falls, reflecting higher import expenditures, reducing the net foreign asset ratio.

5.1.4 Macroprudential Policy

A macroprudential tightening through a countercyclical capital buffer increase widens bank lending spreads, enabling banks to accumulate capital through retained earnings, as shown in Figure A.5 of Appendix A. The increases in real mortgage and corporate loan rates reduce residential and business investment. Output contracts more than potential, and the output gap falls while the unemployment rate rises, associated with lower price and wage inflation. The
central bank cuts the interbank rate to mitigate the falls in consumption price inflation and the output gap. Bank credit falls with mortgage and corporate debt, while substitution from domestic to external debt occurs. The fiscal deficit ratio increases, reflecting lower nominal output, raising the public debt ratio. The current account balance ratio also increases, reflecting lower import expenditures, raising the net foreign asset ratio.

In response to a macroprudential tightening through a mortgage or corporate loan-to-value limit reduction, residential or business investment falls, as shown in Figure A.6 or Figure A.7 of Appendix A. The associated reduction in mortgage or corporate debt lowers bank credit. Output contracts more than potential, and the output gap falls while the unemployment rate rises, associated with lower price and wage inflation. The central bank cuts the interbank rate to mitigate the falls in consumption price inflation and the output gap. The fiscal deficit ratio increases, reflecting lower nominal output, raising the public debt ratio. The current account balance ratio also increases, reflecting lower import expenditures, raising the net foreign asset ratio.

5.1.5 Capital Flow Management

Capital flow management through a mortgage or corporate capital control tightening raises the cost of cross-border mortgage or corporate borrowing, as shown in Figure A.8 or Figure A.9 of Appendix A. Bank credit rises as households or firms substitute from external to domestic mortgage or corporate debt, whereas residential or business investment falls. Output contracts more than potential, and the output gap falls while the unemployment rate rises, associated with lower price and wage inflation. The central bank cuts the interbank rate to mitigate the falls in consumption price inflation and the output gap. The currency depreciates only slightly in real terms, because raising the tax rate applicable to cross-border mortgage or corporate borrowing alters the composition of capital inflows without reducing the total much, consistent with the empirical findings of Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2018). The fiscal deficit ratio falls, reflecting higher capital control revenues, reducing the public debt ratio. The current account balance ratio increases, reflecting lower import expenditures, raising the net foreign asset ratio.
5.2 Optimized Policy Rules

Suppose that the government has preferences defined over inflation and output stabilization objectives, as well as instrument smoothing objectives, represented by intertemporal loss function

\[ L_t = (1 - \beta)E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \ell(\hat{\pi}_s^C, \ln \hat{Y}_s^G, \hat{z}_s), \]  

(175)

where \( \hat{z}_s = (\hat{i}_s, \hat{r}_{s+1}, \ln \hat{G}_s^C, \ln \hat{G}_s^I, \hat{\kappa}_s^R, \hat{\phi}_s^H, \hat{\phi}_s^F, \hat{\tau}_s^H, \hat{\tau}_s^F). \) The policy instruments under consideration are the interbank rate, the foreign exchange reserve ratio, public consumption and investment, the bank capital ratio requirement, the mortgage and corporate loan-to-value ratio limits, and the mortgage and corporate capital control tax rates. For fiscal policy, we abstract from the tax rates and transfer payments, because in practice these policy instruments are linked to automatic fiscal stabilizers, and are rarely used to provide fiscal stimulus.

The intratemporal loss function quadratically penalizes the deviations of consumption price inflation from target and output from potential, as well as the deviations of the policy instruments from their steady-state equilibrium values,

\[ \ell(\hat{\pi}_s^C, \ln \hat{Y}_s^G, \hat{z}_s) = (\hat{\pi}_s^C)^2 + \lambda_0 (\ln \hat{Y}_s^G)^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \lambda_i (\hat{z}_{i,s})^2, \]  

(176)

where \( \lambda_i \geq 0 \) for all \( i = 0, \ldots, N. \) As specified, this intratemporal loss function does not represent an independent financial stability objective, which is instead internalized in the inflation and output stabilization objectives. Note that its conditional mean depends on the conditional means and variances of its arguments:

\[ E_t \ell(\hat{\pi}_s^C, \ln \hat{Y}_s^G, \hat{z}_s) = \left[ (E_t \hat{\pi}_s^C)^2 + Var_t(\hat{\pi}_s^C) \right] \]  

\[ + \lambda_0 \left[ (E_t \ln \hat{Y}_s^G)^2 + Var_t(\ln \hat{Y}_s^G) \right] + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \lambda_i \left[ (E_t \hat{z}_{i,s})^2 + Var_t(\hat{z}_{i,s}) \right]. \]  

(177)

By making the conditional variances of all endogenous variables state dependent, our endogenous risk mechanism has the potential to alter the optimal conduct of policy under quadratic loss, by
capturing intertemporal risk-return policy trade-offs. For example, stimulating the economy with monetary easing builds up financial vulnerabilities in our framework, which makes drawing large shocks more likely under our state-dependent conditional heteroskedasticity mechanism, which further puts growth at risk if such shocks tighten financial conditions. As shown in Adrian and Vitek (2020), accounting for this macrofinancial feedback loop calls for accompanying monetary easing with more aggressive macroprudential tightening, to enhance the resilience of the banking sector to financial vulnerabilities while leaning against their buildup.

Suppose that the government minimizes its intertemporal loss function under long-run commitment to its policy rules with respect to their response coefficients, subject to the structure of the world economy as represented by the rest of our estimated DSGE model. Note that this constrained minimization problem takes as given our postulated functional dependence of policy instruments on intermediate targets. We consider a flexible inflation-targeting regime with a dual mandate, and set the weight on output fluctuations $\lambda_0$ to 0.50. To account for instrument smoothing, we set the weights on the policy instruments under consideration $\lambda_i$ to 1.00 for all $i = 1, \ldots, N$. We evaluate the intertemporal loss function by forecasting the means and variances of its annualized arguments out 25 years, conditional on the estimated state of the world economy. Under long-run commitment, we then average this intertemporal loss function across all historical states, to eliminate its dependence on initial conditions. Finally, we numerically minimize this average intertemporal loss function, jointly with respect to the response coefficients of the relevant policy rules, subject to inequality constraints on them.

The optimized policy rule response coefficients are all positive, as shown in Table 1. This absence of corner solutions implies that all of the policies under consideration should be systematically used to help stabilize inflation and output in our framework, on average across states of the world economy. Across the economies under consideration, monetary policy should respond aggressively to expected future consumption price inflation and moderately to the output gap. Indeed, our optimized monetary policy rules are similar to that advocated by Taylor (1993). In the pursuit of inflation and output stabilization objectives, foreign exchange intervention should
Table 1. Optimized Policy Rule Response Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Type</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monetary Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{\pi C}$</td>
<td>1.6663</td>
<td>1.5050</td>
<td>1.4337</td>
<td>1.7387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{Y G}$</td>
<td>0.8447 / $S$</td>
<td>0.1787 / $S$</td>
<td>0.6652 / $S$</td>
<td>0.3137 / $S$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Exchange Intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{r}$</td>
<td>0.0258$S$</td>
<td>0.0036$S$</td>
<td>0.0481$S$</td>
<td>0.0032$S$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{G C}$</td>
<td>1.6330</td>
<td>0.9694</td>
<td>1.6255</td>
<td>1.3297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{G I}$</td>
<td>1.5909</td>
<td>0.9079</td>
<td>1.6179</td>
<td>1.2938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macropudential Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{R R}$</td>
<td>0.0166</td>
<td>0.0094</td>
<td>0.0161</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{R H}$</td>
<td>0.0854</td>
<td>0.0438</td>
<td>0.0481</td>
<td>0.0439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{R F}$</td>
<td>0.0723</td>
<td>0.0560</td>
<td>0.0889</td>
<td>0.0503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Flow Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{r H}$</td>
<td>0.0182 $f(\alpha^H, i^H)$</td>
<td>0.0124 $f(\alpha^H, i^H)$</td>
<td>0.0171 $f(\alpha^H, i^H)$</td>
<td>0.0109 $f(\alpha^H, i^H)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{r F}$</td>
<td>0.0205 $f(\alpha^F, i^F)$</td>
<td>0.0189 $f(\alpha^F, i^F)$</td>
<td>0.0178 $f(\alpha^F, i^F)$</td>
<td>0.0111 $f(\alpha^F, i^F)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The parameterization is a function of the seasonal frequency $S$, evaluated at $S = 4$. Also, $f(\alpha^Z, i^Z) = \frac{1 + i^Z}{\alpha^Z + i^Z} \frac{1}{S}$ for $Z \in \{H, F\}$.

respond mildly to the change in the real exchange rate, by adjusting the foreign exchange reserve ratio in response to its level. This finding is consistent with Lama and Medina (2020), who also rationalize leaning against real exchange rate changes through foreign exchange intervention under a flexible inflation-targeting regime. Fiscal policy should respond moderately to the output gap, by adjusting public consumption and investment over the business cycle. Macropudential policy should respond mildly to real bank credit, by adjusting the countercyclical capital buffer over the credit cycle. It should also respond mildly to real mortgage and corporate debt, by adjusting the mortgage and corporate loan-to-value ratio limits. Finally, capital flow management should respond mildly to real external mortgage and corporate debt, by adjusting the mortgage and corporate capital control tax rates.

While the absence of corner solutions implies in principle that all of the policies under consideration should systematically respond to all shocks in our continuous framework, in practice the prescribed adjustments to policy instrument settings will often fall short of
conventional discrete response thresholds. For example, monetary policy responses through interbank rate adjustments are conventionally measured in 25 basis point increments. If comparable thresholds are applied to the other policy instruments under consideration, then the magnitudes of our optimized policy rule response coefficients imply that foreign exchange intervention, macroprudential policy, and capital flow management responses will rarely be warranted in practice. Indeed, they will only be warranted in response to large changes in the relevant intermediate targets, which tend to arise from sequences of large mutually reinforcing shocks.

The substantial variation in the optimized policy rule response coefficients across economies reflects differences in their calibrated structural characteristics and estimated shock exposures. A general principle that emerges from examining these patterns is that economies with larger international trade and financial exposures should more actively use foreign exchange intervention and capital flow management. Intuitively, foreign exchange intervention tends to be more effective at stabilizing inflation and output in economies with higher trade openness due to stronger exchange rate pass-through and expenditure switching. In parallel, capital flow management tends to be more effective at stabilizing economies with larger unhedged external foreign-currency-denominated debt exposures due to more sensitive financial conditions and vulnerabilities, which influence growth at risk. Indeed, this calibrated structural characteristic is strongly associated with the optimized intensity of capital flow management in our framework.

This general principle is conditional on foreign exchange intervention and capital flow management being effective. Its application in practice is also conditional on their response thresholds being crossed. In our model, foreign exchange intervention affects the real exchange rate under our assumption that \( \gamma^B > 0 \), which ensures that the foreign currency liquidity regulation cost drives a wedge into the uncovered interest parity condition, indicative of a shallow foreign exchange market. Capital flow management affects capital inflows if non-financial private-sector external debt exposures exist, which in our model are foreign currency denominated and unhedged. If foreign exchange intervention or capital flow management do not affect these intermediate targets, then the intertemporal loss function does not trade off inflation and output stabilization benefits from using
Table 2. Global Financial Cycle
Upturn Scenario Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layer 1: Asset Prices</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Term Premium, Duration Risk Premium Shocks</td>
<td>−50 Basis Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Price of Housing, Housing Risk Premium Shocks</td>
<td>+5 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Price of Equity, Equity Risk Premium Shocks</td>
<td>+10 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Exchange Rate, Foreign Currency Liquidity Shocks</td>
<td>+5 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layer 2: Bank Credit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage Loan Spread, Mortgage Loan Markup Shocks</td>
<td>−50 Basis Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Loan Spread, Corporate Loan Markup Shocks</td>
<td>−100 Basis Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layer 3: Confidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Consumption, Private Consumption Demand Shocks</td>
<td>+0.5 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Investment, Residential Investment Demand Shocks</td>
<td>+2.0 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Investment, Business Investment Demand Shocks</td>
<td>+2.0 Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All scenario assumptions apply to the rest of the world and are expressed as deviations from baseline at the annual frequency, with effects phased in over two years.

them against instrument smoothing costs, driving the corresponding optimized policy rule response coefficients to zero.

5.3 Optimized Policy Responses

We now examine how the policy mix should be adjusted in response to global financial cycle upturns and downturns, with and without policy space constraints. This scenario analysis is conditional on our jointly optimized monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macroprudential policy, and capital flow management rules. To focus on differences in the optimized policy responses across the small open economies under consideration, we consider stylized scenarios based on harmonized assumptions. In reality, greater differentiation across the advanced versus emerging market economies may be expected, reflecting phenomena that we abstract from such as safe-haven capital inflows to government bond markets in the former group at times of stress.

5.3.1 Global Financial Cycle Upturn Scenario

Our global financial cycle upturn scenario assumes a gradual loosening of financial conditions and rise in confidence in the rest of the world, as detailed in Table 2. In particular, the compression of
duration, housing, and equity risk premiums reduces the government bond yield and raises the prices of housing and equity. In addition, higher foreign currency liquidity appreciates the currency of the small open economy. Furthermore, the compression of mortgage and corporate loan markups narrows the mortgage and corporate loan spreads. Finally, higher confidence among households and firms further raises private domestic demand.

Under our global financial cycle upturn scenario, looser financial conditions and higher confidence stimulate private domestic demand, in particular residential and business investment, as shown in Figure B.1 of Appendix B. This gradual loosening of financial conditions mainly reflects a lower government bond yield and higher price of equity. These asset price adjustments are transmitted from the rest of the world to the small open economy under consideration via international bond and stock market contagion effects, which are stronger for the emerging market economies. Output initially expands more than potential, and the output gap rises while the unemployment rate falls, associated with higher output price and wage inflation. But consumption price inflation falls due to appreciation of the currency, which reduces import price inflation. It also induces expenditure switching from exports to imports, mitigating the output expansion. Nevertheless, exports rise substantially, driven by higher private domestic demand in the rest of the world. Finally, financial vulnerabilities build up, reflected in higher bank credit, as well as higher mortgage and corporate debt, in particular external corporate debt.

Under this global financial cycle upturn scenario, if the economy under consideration has well-anchored inflation expectations and relatively low trade openness, then the central bank can look through the temporary fall in consumption price inflation, and hikes the interbank rate to stabilize output. In contrast, if the economy has less well-anchored inflation expectations and relatively high trade openness, then the central bank initially cuts the interbank rate to raise consumption price inflation to target, amplifying the output expansion. Nevertheless, foreign exchange intervention limits the need for a procyclical interbank rate cut, with the central bank leaning against the currency appreciation through reserve purchases, mitigating the fall in consumption price inflation. In addition, countercyclical fiscal consolidation by the government helps stabilize
output, through lower public consumption and investment expenditures. Furthermore, macroprudential tightening leans against the buildup of financial vulnerabilities, through a higher countercyclical capital buffer, as well as lower mortgage and corporate loan-to-value limits. Finally, capital flow management leans against the buildup of external corporate debt, through a corporate capital control tightening.

Quantitatively, monetary policy plays the primary role in stabilizing consumption price inflation and output under this global financial cycle upturn scenario. Foreign exchange intervention plays a supporting role in raising consumption price inflation to target, through reserve purchases to depreciate the currency. The destabilizing effect of foreign exchange intervention on output is offset by fiscal policy, through expenditure-based fiscal consolidation which reinforces expenditure switching from imports to exports. In addition, automatic fiscal stabilizers are allowed to operate fully, further mitigating the output expansion. While macroprudential policy and capital flow management have much smaller effects on the conditional means of consumption price inflation and the output gap, they help maintain macroeconomic stability by safeguarding financial stability, by leaning against the buildup of financial vulnerabilities that put growth at risk. In economies with relatively large financial exposures, this significantly mitigates the buildup of bank credit, as well as mortgage and corporate debt—in particular, external corporate debt.

5.3.2 Global Financial Cycle Downturn Scenario

Our global financial cycle downturn scenario is qualitatively symmetric to our global financial cycle upturn scenario, but is quantitatively more severe. It assumes an abrupt tightening of financial conditions and fall in confidence in the rest of the world, as detailed in Table 3. In particular, the decompression of duration, housing, and equity risk premiums raises the government bond yield and reduces the prices of housing and equity. In addition, lower foreign currency liquidity depreciates the currency of the small open economy.

\(^{10}\)For the constrained scenario simulation results, see Adrian, Gaspar, and Vitek (2022).
Table 3. Global Financial Cycle Downturn Scenario Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layer 1: Asset Prices</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Term Premium, Duration Risk Premium Shocks</td>
<td>+100 Basis Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Price of Housing, Housing Risk Premium Shocks</td>
<td>-10 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Price of Equity, Equity Risk Premium Shocks</td>
<td>-20 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Exchange Rate, Foreign Currency Liquidity Shocks</td>
<td>-10 Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layer 2: Bank Credit</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage Loan Spread, Mortgage Loan Markup Shocks</td>
<td>+100 Basis Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Loan Spread, Corporate Loan Markup Shocks</td>
<td>+200 Basis Points</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layer 3: Confidence</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Consumption, Private Consumption Demand Shocks</td>
<td>-1.0 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Investment, Residential Investment Demand Shocks</td>
<td>-4.0 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Investment, Business Investment Demand Shocks</td>
<td>-4.0 Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All scenario assumptions apply to the rest of the world and are expressed as deviations from baseline at the annual frequency, with effects phased in over one year.

Furthermore, the decompression of mortgage and corporate loan markups widens the mortgage and corporate loan spreads. Finally, lower confidence among households and firms further reduces private domestic demand.

Under our global financial cycle downturn scenario, tighter financial conditions and lower confidence depress private domestic demand, in particular residential and business investment, as shown in Figure B.2 of Appendix B. This abrupt tightening of financial conditions mainly reflects a higher government bond yield and lower price of equity, transmitted via international bond and stock market contagion effects. Output initially contracts more than potential, and the output gap falls while the unemployment rate rises, associated with lower output price and wage inflation. But consumption price inflation rises due to depreciation of the currency, while expenditure switching from imports to exports mitigates the output contraction. Nevertheless, exports fall substantially, driven by lower private domestic demand in the rest of the world. Finally, financial vulnerabilities unwind, reflected in lower bank credit, as well as lower mortgage and corporate debt, in particular external corporate debt.

Under this global financial cycle downturn scenario, if the economy under consideration has well-anchored inflation expectations and relatively low trade openness, then the central bank can look
through the temporary rise in consumption price inflation, and cuts the interbank rate to stabilize output. In contrast, if the economy has less well-anchored inflation expectations and relatively high trade openness, then the central bank initially hikes the interbank rate to reduce consumption price inflation to target, amplifying the output contraction. This prediction is consistent with the empirical finding of Vegh and Vuletin (2013), that many emerging market economies tend to respond to capital outflow surges with procyclical monetary policy tightening. Nevertheless, foreign exchange intervention limits the need for a procyclical interbank rate hike, with the central bank leaning against the currency depreciation through reserve sales, mitigating the rise in consumption price inflation. This use of foreign exchange intervention during a financial cycle downturn parallels Adrian et al. (2021), who emphasize the resultant monetary autonomy gain. In addition, countercyclical fiscal stimulus by the government helps stabilize output, through higher public consumption and investment expenditures. Furthermore, macroprudential easing helps support bank credit supply through a lower countercyclical capital buffer, as well as bank credit demand through higher mortgage and corporate loan-to-value limits. Finally, capital flow management limits the retrenchment of cross-border corporate borrowing, through a corporate capital control easing.

Quantitatively, monetary policy plays the primary role in stabilizing consumption price inflation and output under this global financial cycle downturn scenario.\footnote{For the constrained scenario simulation results, see Adrian, Gaspar, and Vitek (2022).} Foreign exchange intervention plays a supporting role in reducing consumption price inflation to target, through reserve sales to appreciate the currency. The destabilizing effect of foreign exchange intervention on output is offset by fiscal policy, through expenditure-based fiscal stimulus. In addition, automatic fiscal stabilizers are allowed to operate fully, further mitigating the output contraction. While macroprudential policy and capital flow management have much smaller effects on the conditional means of consumption price inflation and the output gap, they help maintain macroeconomic stability by safeguarding financial stability, by supporting domestic bank credit supply, as well as domestic and cross-border bank credit demand.
6. Conclusion

Recurrent capital inflow and outflow surges—often associated with global financial cycle upturns and downturns—confront policymakers in small open advanced and emerging market economies with complex policy trade-offs. To maintain macroeconomic and financial stability amid volatile capital flows, these policymakers have developed toolkits spanning some combination of monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, fiscal policy, macroprudential policy, or capital flow management. Optimally adjusting such a high-dimensional policy mix in response to shocks while internalizing trade-offs requires an IPF.

This paper develops and estimates a medium-scale heteroskedastic linearized DSGE model of the world economy, disaggregated into a pair of asymmetric economies, to help support the IPF. Our model integrates the full range of policies used to cope with recurrent capital inflow and outflow surges. Applying it to four small open advanced and emerging market economies, our optimal policy analysis broadly supports their observed tendency to respond to global financial cycle upturns and downturns with eclectic policy mix adjustments. We find that economies with larger international trade and financial exposures should more actively use foreign exchange intervention and capital flow management, under some conditions. We illustrate this general principle by simulating global financial cycle upturn and downturn scenarios using our model, conditional on our optimized policy rules. When unconstrained, monetary policy plays the primary role in stabilizing consumption price inflation and output. Foreign exchange intervention enhances monetary autonomy through a supporting role in stabilizing consumption price inflation, while its destabilizing effect on output under these scenarios is offset by fiscal policy. Finally, macroprudential policy and capital flow management lean against financial developments that put growth at risk.

Our policy analysis framework is subject to important caveats. Notably, the specification of our endogenous risk mechanism is not derived from microeconomic foundations, so its slope coefficients may not be invariant to policy rule changes, exposing our policy analysis to the critique due to Lucas (1976). In addition, the frequent use of foreign exchange intervention and capital flow management
can change structural characteristics of the financial markets on which these policies operate, altering their transmission mechanisms. While adopted from the inflation-targeting literature, the loss function that we use is inconsistent with our model, as choosing the response coefficients of our policy rules to minimize it does not maximize the welfare of the representative household. Furthermore, these policy rules restrict the functional dependence of policy instruments on intermediate targets to postulated simple linear relationships, so their policy prescriptions may depart from the unconstrained optimum. Finally, jointly optimizing these policy rules disregards institutional realities that may preclude such a high degree of policy coordination in practice. Despite these caveats, we view our model as a useful approximation to reality—and our policy analysis framework as a powerful tool—to help guide policymakers in adjusting their policy mix to cope with capital flow surges in an integrated way.
Appendix A. Transmission Mechanisms

Figure A.1. Monetary Easing: Interbank Rate Cut

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a monetary policy shock that reduces the interbank rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.1. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a monetary policy shock that reduces the interbank rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a monetary policy shock that reduces the interbank rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.2. Foreign Exchange Intervention: Reserve Sales

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a foreign exchange intervention shock that reduces the foreign exchange reserve ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.2. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a foreign exchange intervention shock that reduces the foreign exchange reserve ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.2. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a foreign exchange intervention shock that reduces the foreign exchange reserve ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.3. Fiscal Stimulus: Public Consumption Increase

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a public consumption demand shock that raises the primary fiscal deficit ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.3. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a public consumption demand shock that raises the primary fiscal deficit ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.3. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a public consumption demand shock that raises the primary fiscal deficit ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.4. Fiscal Stimulus: Public Investment Increase

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a public investment demand shock that raises the primary fiscal deficit ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.4. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a public investment demand shock that raises the primary fiscal deficit ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.4. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a public investment demand shock that raises the primary fiscal deficit ratio by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.5. Macroprudential Tightening: Countercyclical Capital Buffer Increase

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a bank capital requirement shock that raises the bank capital ratio requirement by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.5. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a bank capital requirement shock that raises the bank capital ratio requirement by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.5. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a bank capital requirement shock that raises the bank capital ratio requirement by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.6. Macroprudential Tightening: Mortgage Loan to Value Limit Reduction

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a mortgage loan to value limit shock that reduces the mortgage loan to value ratio limit by 10 percentage points. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.6. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a mortgage loan to value limit shock that reduces the mortgage loan to value ratio limit by 10 percentage points. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.6. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a mortgage loan to value limit shock that reduces the mortgage loan to value ratio limit by 10 percentage points. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.7. Macropudential Tightening: Corporate Loan to Value Limit Reduction

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a corporate loan to value limit shock that reduces the corporate loan to value ratio limit by 10 percentage points. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.7. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a corporate loan to value limit shock that reduces the corporate loan to value ratio limit by 10 percentage points. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.7. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a corporate loan to value limit shock that reduces the corporate loan to value ratio limit by 10 percentage points. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.8. Capital Flow Management: Mortgage Capital Control Tightening

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a mortgage capital control shock that raises the mortgage capital control tax rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.8. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a mortgage capital control shock that raises the mortgage capital control tax rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.8. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a mortgage capital control shock that raises the mortgage capital control tax rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure A.9. Capital Flow Management: Corporate Capital Control Tightening

**Note:** Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a corporate capital control shock that raises the corporate capital control tax rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure A.9. (Continued)

Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a corporate capital control shock that raises the corporate capital control tax rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Note: Depicts impulse responses for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ to a corporate capital control shock that raises the corporate capital control tax rate by 1 percentage point. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Appendix B. Scenario Simulation Results

Figure B.1. Global Financial Cycle Upturn Scenario

Note: Depicts simulation results for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ under our global financial cycle upturn scenario. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure B.1. (Continued)

Note: Depicts simulation results for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ under our global financial cycle upturn scenario. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure B.1. (Continued)

Note: Depicts simulation results for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ under our global financial cycle upturn scenario. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
Figure B.2. Global Financial Cycle Downturn Scenario

Note: Depicts simulation results for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ under our global financial cycle downturn scenario. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure B.2. (Continued)

Note: Depicts simulation results for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ under our global financial cycle downturn scenario. All variables are annualized, where applicable.

(continued)
Figure B.2. (Continued)

Note: Depicts simulation results for Korea ■, South Africa ■, Switzerland ■, and Thailand ■ under our global financial cycle downturn scenario. All variables are annualized, where applicable.
References


