Monetary Policy and COVID-19*

Michał Brzoza-Brzezina, a Marcin Kolasa, a,b and Krzysztof Makarski a,c
a SGH Warsaw School of Economics
b International Monetary Fund
c FAME|GRAPE

We study the macroeconomic effects of the COVID-19 epidemic in a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium setup with nominal rigidities. First, we evaluate various containment policies and show that they allow to dramatically reduce the welfare cost of the disease. Then we investigate the role that monetary policy, in its capacity to manage aggregate demand, should play during the epidemic. According to our results, treating the observed output contraction as a standard recession leads to a bad policy, irrespective of the underlying containment measures. We evaluate how monetary policy should resolve the trade-off between stabilizing the economy and containing the epidemic. We find that containment policies and monetary policy are complementary. If no administrative restrictions are implemented, the second motive prevails, and, despite the deep recession, optimal monetary policy is contractionary. Conversely, if sufficient containment measures are introduced, central bank interventions should be expansionary and help stabilize economic activity.

JEL Codes: E1, E5, E6, H5, I1, I3.

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1. Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic poses an unprecedented challenge for both health and economic policy. The two are strongly interrelated, as policies that aim at mitigating the spread of the disease, like various forms of lockdown or isolation, have mostly negative consequences for economic activity. Furthermore, governments in many countries applied fiscal stimuli of unprecedented scale to prevent persistent loss of production potential, a wave of bankruptcies, financial instability, and an increase in economic inequality. These efforts were strongly supported by ultra-loose monetary policy, which included sharp cuts of nominal interest rates and large-scale purchases of government debt by central banks. These actions were much needed, as they probably helped avoid a complete breakdown of the economic system. However, their direct and indirect effect on aggregate demand, and hence on the intensity of economic interactions by agents, might also have had a non-negligible effect on the pandemic dynamics.

This non-standard and unexplored dimension of macroeconomic stabilization policies poses a considerable challenge to the theory and practice of economics, especially that there is minimal past experience with economic interventions during an epidemic. In particular, it is far from obvious how monetary policy should react beyond its efforts to preserve financial stability and (possibly) support financing appropriately calibrated fiscal packages. A typical central bank reaction to a recession is to provide monetary stimulus, thus minimizing the drop in economic activity. However, engineering an aggregate demand expansion can prove counterproductive in times of the pandemic since the recession reflects, to a large extent, an intentional and desired reduction in economic activity. This results from the actions of agents who want to decrease the risk of catching the disease, and of policymakers who impose lockdowns and other measures to contain the virus. Therefore, optimal aggregate demand management must resolve a trade-off between addressing aggregate demand externalities due to nominal rigidities, which typically call for a policy stimulus during recessions, and agents’ failure to internalize the impact of their actions on pandemics, which may suggest an opposite reaction. Prominent policymakers and economists have raised doubts of this nature (see, e.g., Bullard 2020 and Kaplan, Moll, and
Violante 2020). However, to our knowledge, a quantitative analysis of this dilemma in a monetary policy context is still missing, and this is where we see our main contribution.

Against this backdrop, we propose a quantitative analytical framework that connects two modeling concepts. The first is a standard microfounded business cycle model that allows discussing the effects of monetary policy in its capacity to manage aggregate demand. The second is an epidemic modeling setup that allows simulating a pandemic resembling COVID-19. We thus obtain a natural platform that enables experimenting with different policy options and evaluating their welfare effects, including a two-way relationship between economic activity and the spread of the pandemic. Four findings stand out in the context of monetary policy. First, if no administrative restrictions are in place, then monetary policy should, in fact, be contractionary, i.e., cool down the economy, flatten the infection curve, and thus save lives. This indicates that, under a laissez-faire approach to the pandemic, New Keynesian aggregate demand externalities are less important than externalities associated with agents’ reactions to the pandemic.

Second, if the authorities introduce sufficiently tough lockdowns, aggregate demand management considerations come back to the forefront, and optimized monetary policy becomes expansionary. Hence, our findings support the stimulative reaction adopted by most central banks.

Third, irrespective of the containment measures in place, monetary policy should not follow the strategy of reacting to the pandemic-driven recession with the usual strength that is appropriate over the standard business cycle. Given the deep contraction in economic activity, such policy always results in a very strong monetary expansion, generating a positive (welfare-relevant) output gap, increasing the death toll, and lowering welfare. Fourth, the policy frontier between stabilizing the economy and reducing the death toll is flat for monetary policy compared with administrative containment measures. This means that central bank actions are not efficient at fighting COVID-19, but can relatively effectively limit the economic consequences of lockdowns if they are introduced on an appropriate scale.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how our study relates to the existing literature. In Section 3, we
present our theoretical framework. Section 4 discusses the calibration. In Section 5, we present our main results. Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review

Our study is most closely related to the literature that attempts to model optimal epidemic policies and their economic consequences. Several papers use stylized frameworks to study the trade-off between lives saved due to lockdowns and economic costs associated with them. Atkeson (2020) compares several scenarios of suppressing the disease through social distancing. Alvarez, Argente, and Lippi (2020) formulate a simple planning problem to design an optimal lockdown limiting the spread of the disease. Acemoglu et al. (2020) extend their framework to account for multiple age groups. Finally, Favero, Ichino, and Rustichini (2020) study optimal lockdowns in a stylized economy with multiple sectors and age groups.

An increasing body of the literature implements general equilibrium models to study the optimal public policy response to the pandemic. Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020b) modify the standard SIR (susceptible, infected, recovered) setup by making the probability of infection explicitly dependent on economic decisions made by optimizing agents. They study trade-offs between public health and the economic cost of the pandemic. Jones, Philippon, and Venkateswaran (2020) employ a similar framework to study optimal mitigation policies in a pandemic. Glover et al. (2020) introduce a quantitative model to examine the interaction between macro-mitigation and micro-redistribution to find that optimal mitigation involves a mixture of such policies. Azzimonti et al. (2020) study infection dynamics and reopening scenarios in a heterogeneous sectors and household network model. Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2020) argue that the government policy must face trade-offs between lives and livelihoods and over who should bear the burden of the economic costs. The view that there is a trade-off between health and the economy is challenged by Bodenstein, Corsetti, and Guerrieri (2020), who show that social distancing measures can reduce large upfront costs of the pandemic and slow down its spread. Krueger, Uhlig, and Xie (2021) argue that endogenous shifts in private consumption behavior across sectors
of the economy can act as a potent mitigation mechanism during an epidemic or when the economy is reopened after a temporary lockdown.

In contrast to the considerable effort of modeling optimal containment policies, the question of how monetary policy should behave during an epidemic has not received much attention so far. Levin and Sinha (2020) use a simple New Keynesian framework to find that forward guidance has only tenuous net benefits. Lepetit and Fuentes-Albero (2021) study the effects of an unanticipated decline in the interest rate to conclude that monetary policy is likely to be ineffective at the height of the pandemic. Still, it should help sustain the recovery in economic activity once the virus starts dissipating. Vásconez, Damette, and Shanafelt (2021) augment the DSGE-SIR model with a financial sector as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). They find that while standard monetary policy has a negligible effect on GDP during pandemics, unconventional monetary policy has the potential to lessen total losses in GDP. However, in contrast to our paper, neither of these studies focuses on the optimal response of monetary policy nor considers the fact that boosting economic activity can affect the spread of the disease.

On the modeling front, our paper connects two streams of the literature. First, we build on the most popular way of modeling epidemics. It draws from the seminal contribution of Kermack and McKendrick (1927) and its extension for the presence of asymptomatic infected agents (Prem et al. 2020). Second, we integrate this modified SIR framework, A-SIR, with the workhorse New Keynesian business cycle model (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1999). Our complete framework is most similar to Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020a), who show that a DSGE model with a SIR component has the desired features to study macroeconomic processes during an epidemic. However, our framework features important extensions. First, as mentioned above, we allow some infected agents to be carriers of the disease but experience no symptoms and be unaware of their infection. This modification makes the model more realistic and challenges public policy, since the isolation of all infected individuals is not feasible. Second, we allow agents to borrow from each other so that credit market conditions affect agents’ balance sheets.
3. Model

As discussed above, our model connects an epidemic framework with a standard New Keynesian setup. From the epidemic perspective, agents belong to one of the following groups: susceptible, infected (symptomatic or asymptomatic), or recovered (from being formerly symptomatic or asymptomatic). Regarding their economic activity, they decide on consumption and labor supply and can borrow from each other. Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive environment and set prices in a staggered fashion, which means that monetary policy can affect real allocations. Additionally, the government conducts epidemic containment policy, and the monetary authority sets the interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule. Below we present the framework in more detail.

3.1 Epidemic Model: A-SIR

We modify the classic SIR model along two dimensions. First, following Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020b), we make probabilities of being infected depend on economic activity. Second, following Prem et al. (2020), infected people are either symptomatic and asymptomatic. The asymptomatic infected are less infectious than the symptomatic infected. Our baseline model abstracts away from the invention of vaccines against the coronavirus. Hence, it can be thought of as describing the COVID-19 pandemic during its early phase, i.e., before the vaccines became widely available. However, we also check the robustness of our findings to an alternative assumption about the introduction of vaccinations.

There are five types of individuals in the economy: susceptible $S_t$, infected asymptomatic $A_t$, infected symptomatic $I_t$, formerly asymptomatic recovered $V_t$, and formerly symptomatic recovered $R_t$. Since infected asymptomatic individuals have no infection symptoms, they behave the same as susceptible individuals, as do formerly asymptomatic infected. Before the pandemic, all agents are assumed to be identical. Once the virus starts spreading, agents become heterogeneous in whether, when, and how they contract the disease, which has consequences for their economic decisions.

There are three channels through which infection spreads. First, susceptible can be infected while consuming, with the probability of
infection depending on their individual consumption level $c_t^S$, aggregate consumption of symptomatic infected $I_t c_t^I$, and aggregate consumption of asymptomatic infected $A_t c_t^A$. Since there is evidence that asymptomatic infected are less infectious than symptomatic, we introduce a parameter $0 \leq \kappa < 1$ to account for that. We also allow for possible isolation of symptomatic infected individuals by scaling their infectiousness with parameter $0 \leq \zeta \leq 1$. Second, susceptible agents can be infected while working with the probability of infection, depending on their individual hours worked $n_t^S$, and aggregate hours worked by asymptomatic infected $A_t n_t^A$. We assume that symptomatic infected either do not work or work remotely, so they do not transmit the disease via the labor channel. Finally, the infection can spread through other channels (like kindergartens, schools, family meetings, etc.), with the probability depending on the number of infected people, both symptomatic and asymptomatic, and on variable $\nu_t$, which depends on the lockdown measures in place. Summing up, susceptible individual $i$ can become infected (with symptoms or not) with probability $\nu_{I,t}(i)$ that is given by the following formula:

$$\nu_{I,t}(i) = \nu_c c_t^S(i) (\zeta I_t c_t^I + \kappa A_t c_t^A) + \nu_n n_t^S(i) \kappa A_t n_t^A + \nu_t (I_t + \kappa A_t),$$

(1)

where $\nu_c, \nu_n > 0$ are constants controlling the relative importance of consumption and labor channels in transmitting the virus.

Since asymptomatic infected individuals experience no symptoms, they do not realize that they are infected. Therefore, while making their decisions, susceptible, asymptomatic infected, and formerly asymptomatic recovered behave the same. We call this group supposedly susceptible and their mass is $\tilde{S}_t = S_t + A_t + V_t$. Each group member could be susceptible, asymptomatic infected, or formerly asymptomatic recovered, and knows the probabilities of belonging to each category. The evolution of susceptible individuals is given by the following equation:

$$S_{t+1} = (1 - \nu_{I,t}) S_t.$$

(2)

\footnote{Obviously, $\nu_c, \nu_n$, and $\nu_t$ must be such that $0 \leq \nu_{I,t} \leq 1$ at every time $t$. We check in all our simulations that this is indeed the case.}
When an individual becomes infected, he or she is symptomatic with probability \( \rho \) and asymptomatic with probability \( 1 - \rho \). Infected asymptomatic recover with probability \( \varpi_R \). Infected symptomatic die with probability \( \varpi_{D,t} \) and recover with probability \( \varpi_R - \varpi_{D,t} \). The evolution of symptomatic infected, asymptomatic infected, formerly asymptomatic infected, and recovered agents is then given by the following equations:

\[
I_{t+1} = (1 - \varpi_R)I_t + \rho \varpi_{I,t}S_t \tag{3}
\]
\[
A_{t+1} = (1 - \varpi_R)A_t + (1 - \rho) \varpi_{I,t}S_t \tag{4}
\]
\[
V_{t+1} = V_t + \varpi_R A_t \tag{5}
\]
\[
R_{t+1} = R_t + (\varpi_R - \varpi_{D,t})I_t. \tag{6}
\]

Finally, the number of deceased \( D_t \) evolves according to

\[
D_{t+1} = D_t + \varpi_{D,t}I_t. \tag{7}
\]

3.2 Supposedly Susceptible Individuals

As we mentioned above, this group consists of susceptible, asymptomatic infected, and formerly asymptomatic recovered individuals. The probability that a supposedly susceptible agent \( i \) becomes symptomatic infected \( \tilde{\omega}_{I,t}(i) \) equals

\[
\tilde{\omega}_{I,t}(i) = \rho \varpi_{I,t}(i) \frac{S_t}{S_t}. \tag{8}
\]

Each period, agents choose consumption \( \tilde{c}_t(i) \), labor supply \( \tilde{n}_t(i) \), and nominal bond holdings \( \tilde{B}_{t+1}(i) \) that pay a nominal interest rate \( \mathcal{I}_t \). Their expenditure is financed with labor income that earns a nominal wage \( W_t \), bond holdings from the previous period \( \tilde{B}_t(i) \), and lump-sum real transfers from the government \( \Gamma_t \). For simplicity, we assume that profits from the firms are also collected by the government and transferred to households as a part of \( \Gamma_t \). Supposedly susceptible agents face the following budget constraint:

\[
(1 + \tau_{c,t})P_t \tilde{c}_t(i) + \tilde{B}_{t+1}(i) = (1 - \tau_{n,t})W_t \tilde{n}_t(i) + \mathcal{I}_{t-1}\tilde{B}_t(i) + P_t \Gamma_t, \tag{9}
\]
where $\tau_{c,t}$ denotes the consumption tax rate and $\tau_{n,t}$ the labor income tax rate. We use these taxes to model administrative restrictions on economic activity (lockdowns).

The recursive problem of the supposedly susceptible household is given by

$$
\tilde{U}_t(\tilde{b}_t(i)) = \max_{\tilde{c}_t(i),\tilde{n}_t(i),\tilde{B}_{t+1}(i),\tilde{\omega}_{I,t}(i)} \log \tilde{c}_t(i) + \theta \log (1 - \tilde{n}_t(i)) + \beta (1 - \tilde{\omega}_{I,t}(i)) \tilde{U}_{t+1}(\tilde{b}_{t+1}(i))
$$

subject to the probability of becoming infected (8) and the budget constraint (9), where $\tilde{b}_t = \tilde{B}_t/P_{t-1}$ denotes real bond holdings.

The aforementioned problem results in the following first-order conditions:

$$
\frac{1}{\tilde{c}_t} = \tilde{\lambda}_{S,t}(1 + \tau_{c,t}) - \tilde{\lambda}_{\omega,t} \rho S_t \tilde{\omega}_c (\zeta I_t c_l + \kappa A_t \tilde{c}_t)
$$

$$
\frac{\theta}{1 - \tilde{n}_t} = \tilde{\lambda}_{S,t}(1 - \tau_{n,t}) w_t + \tilde{\lambda}_{\omega,t} \rho S_t \tilde{\omega}_n \kappa A_t \tilde{n}_t
$$

$$
\tilde{\lambda}_{\omega,t} = \beta [U_{I,t+1}(\tilde{b}_{t+1}) - \tilde{U}_{t+1}(\tilde{b}_{t+1})]
$$

$$
\tilde{\lambda}_{S,t} = \beta [(1 - \tilde{\omega}_{I,t}) \tilde{\lambda}_{S,t+1} + \tilde{\omega}_{I,t} \lambda_{I,t+1}] \frac{I_t}{\pi_{t+1}},
$$

where $\tilde{\lambda}_{\omega,t}$ and $\tilde{\lambda}_{S,t}/P_t$ are the Lagrangian multipliers on (8) and (9), respectively, $\lambda_{I,t}/P_t$ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint of symptomatically infected agents that we define in Equation (15) below, $w_t = W_t/P_t$ is the real wage, and we have omitted individual indices $i$ for better clarity. The first two conditions show that supposedly susceptible individuals, while deciding how much to consume and work, take into account the risk of becoming infected during these activities. The pandemic hence endogenously limits their labor supply and consumption. The last term of the first two equations denotes the loss of utility due to infection multiplied by the risk of getting infected during the respective activity. The third equation stipulates that the Lagrangian multiplier $\tilde{\lambda}_{\omega,t}$ equals the discounted utility loss due to infection. The fourth equation is the Euler equation.
3.3 Symptomatic Infected Individuals

We assume that, to a certain degree, infected individuals can work remotely, but their productivity is lowered by factor $0 \leq \xi \leq 1$. They choose consumption $c_I^t(i)$, labor supply $n_I^t(i)$, and bond holdings $B_{I,t+1}(i)$. Their return on bond holding equals $\mathcal{I}_t/(1 - \varpi_{D,t})$ to account for the fact that a fraction $\varpi_{D,t}$ of infected dies each period. Their budget constraint is as follows:

$$
(1 + \tau_{c,t})P_t c_I^t(i) + B_{I,t+1}(i) = W_t \xi n_I^t(i)
+ \mathcal{I}_{t-1} B_t^I(i)/(1 - \varpi_{D,t-1}) + P_t \Gamma_t.
$$

(15)

The recursive problem of the infected household is given by

$$
U_I^t(b_{t}^I(i)) = \max_{c_{I}^t(i), n_{I}^t(i), B_{I,t+1}(i)} \log c_{I}^t(i) + \theta \log(1 - n_{I}^t(i))
+ \beta(1 - \varpi_R)U_{I,t+1}(b_{t+1}^I(i))
+ \beta(\varpi_R - \varpi_{D,t})U_{R,t+1}(b_{t+1}^I(i)) + \beta \varpi_{D,t} U_D
$$

(16)

subject to the budget constraint (15), and where $U_D$ denotes disutility associated with dying. Omitting individual indices, the first-order optimality conditions can be written as

$$
\frac{1}{c_{I}^t} = \lambda_{I,t}(1 + \tau_{c,t})
$$

(17)

$$
\frac{\theta}{1 - n_{I,t}} = \xi \lambda_{I,t} \varpi_t
$$

(18)

$$
\lambda_{I,t} = \beta[(1 - \varpi_R)\lambda_{I,t+1} + (\varpi_R - \varpi_{D,t})\lambda_{R,t+1}]\frac{\mathcal{I}_t}{\pi_{t+1}(1 - \varpi_{D,t})},
$$

(19)

where $\lambda_{R,t}/P_t$ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint of symptomatic recovered agents defined in Equation (20) below.

3.4 Symptomatic Recovered Individuals

The recovered individuals are not at risk of getting infected, so they are not afraid of it anymore. Their problem is exactly as if there was
no epidemic. They choose consumption $c^R_t(i)$, labor supply $n^R_t(i)$, and bond holdings $B_{t+1}(i)$. Their budget constraint is as follows:

$$
(1 + \tau_{c,t})P_t c^R_t(i) + B^R_{t+1}(i) = (1 - \tau_{n,t})W_t n^R_t(i) \\
+ I_{t-1} B^R_t(i) + P_t \Gamma_t. \quad (20)
$$

The recursive problem of the recovered household is given by

$$
U^R_t(b^R_t(i)) = \max_{c^R_t(i), n^R_t(i), B^R_{t+1}(i)} \log c^R_t(i) \\
+ \theta \log(1 - n^R_t(i)) + \beta U^R_{t+1}(b^R_{t+1}(i)) \quad (21)
$$

subject to the budget constraint (20). Standard first-order conditions follow.

### 3.5 Firms

Retail firms maximize profit in a perfectly competitive framework. They buy intermediate goods $y_t(\iota)$ at price $P_t(\iota)$ from their producers indexed by $\iota$ and combine them into final goods $y_t$, which they sell to households at a price $P_t$. They maximize the following profits:

$$
P_t y_t - \int_{\iota \in [0, 1]} P_t(\iota) y_t(\iota) d\iota \quad (22)
$$

subject to the technological constraint

$$
y_t = \left[ \int_{\iota \in [0, 1]} y_t(\iota)^{-1/\varepsilon} d\iota \right]^{\varepsilon^{-1}}. \quad (23)
$$

Solving this problem, we get the following equation describing the demand for intermediate goods:

$$
y_t(\iota) = \left( \frac{P_t(\iota)}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} y_t, \quad (24)
$$

and from the zero-profit condition follows the formula for the aggregate price level,

$$
P_t = \left[ \int_{\iota \in [0, 1]} P_t(\iota)^{1-\varepsilon} d\iota \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}. \quad (25)
$$
We assume that each intermediate good firm $\iota$ operating in a monopolistically competitive environment produces its product $y_t(\iota)$ with the following technology:

$$y_t(\iota) = Zn_t(\iota),$$  \hspace{1cm} (26)

where $n_t(\iota)$ denotes labor demand by firm $\iota$ and $Z > 0$ is the level of productivity. Since the total cost is $w_t n_t(\iota)$, production function (26) implies the following expression for the marginal cost:

$$mc_t = \frac{w_t}{Z},$$  \hspace{1cm} (27)

which is the same for all firms.

Each period, an intermediate good firm receives a signal to adjust prices with probability $1 - \delta$ and resets the price to $\tilde{P}_t(\iota)$ to maximize the sum of discounted profits

$$\max_{\tilde{P}_t(\iota), \{y_{t+j}(\iota)\}} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \delta)^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} \left( \frac{\tilde{P}_t(\iota)}{P_{t+j}} - mc_{t+j} \right) y_{t+j}(\iota)$$  \hspace{1cm} (28)

subject to demand function (24). Absent the signal, the price remains unchanged, $P_{t+1}(\iota) = P_t(\iota)$. The discount factor $\Lambda_{t,t+j}$ is computed as a weighted average of marginal utility of consumption across all types of households.

### 3.6 Government, Central Bank, and the Health-Care System

The government uses the consumption and labor tax rates $\tau_{c,t}$ and $\tau_{n,t}$ to restrict market activity and slow down the spread of the virus. Since the collected revenue is rebated to households, these taxes discourage agents from consuming and working, but do not directly affect their average income. Additionally, the government transfers firms’ profits to households. As our model describes a one-sector economy, the fiscal authority does not supply rescue packages to industries and workers that are hit most, as was the case in many countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Hence, we implicitly assume that appropriate income redistribution is in place and that it is financed without creating market distortions (e.g., with lump-sum taxes). Thus, we abstract from income inequality and
focus on the aggregate demand management mandate of central banks. The budget of the government can then be assumed to be balanced every period, leading to the following constraint:

\[ \tau_{c,t} P_t c_t + \tau_{n,t} W_t n_t + P_t y_t - W_t n_t = (\hat{S}_t + I_t + R_t) \Gamma_t, \]  

(29)

where aggregate consumption \( c_t \) and labor \( n_t \) will be defined below.

We assume a simple but operational rule for lockdown policies, which relates the tax rates to the number of infected agents,

\[ \tau_{c,t} = \Phi_c I_t \]

(30)

\[ \tau_{n,t} = \Phi_n I_t, \]

(31)

where \( \Phi_c, \Phi_n > 0 \). Additionally, we assume that the lockdown policy affects transmission via the third channel,

\[ \omega_t = \omega (1 - \tau_{c,t}) \Phi_\omega, \]

(32)

where \( \omega, \Phi_\omega > 0 \). This reflects the observation that consumption lockdowns (closures of shops or ski lifts) were usually introduced simultaneously with non-economic restrictions (e.g., closures of schools).

We assume that the central bank conducts monetary policy according to a Taylor-type rule that responds to the deviation of inflation from the steady state, responds to the output gap, and possibly allows for reaction to the number of infected agents

\[ \frac{I_t}{\bar{I}} = \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\bar{\pi}} \right)^{\Phi_\pi} \left( \frac{y_t}{y^f_t} \right)^{\Phi_y} \exp(I_t) \Phi_I, \]

(33)

where \( \Phi_\pi, \Phi_y, \Phi_I \geq 0 \) and \( y^f_t \) denotes the flexible-price level of output.

Following the epidemic literature, we assume that the probability of dying depends on the strain put by the pandemic on the healthcare system. We assume a piecewise linear relationship to reflect the notion that the probability increases in the number of infected, but levels off beyond a certain point,

\[ \varpi_{D,t} = \min \left[ \left( 1 + \frac{I_t}{\nu_0} \right) \varpi_D, \nu_1 \varpi_D \right], \]

(34)

where \( \nu_0, \nu_1 > 0 \).
3.7 Market Clearing

At the beginning of the epidemic, there is measure one of agents. We denote the set of agents that are supposedly susceptible at time $t$ as $S_t$, symptomatically infected as $I_t$, and symptomatically recovered as $R_t$. Then the final good market clearing can be written as

$$\int_{i \in S_t} \tilde{c}_t(i) di + \int_{i \in I_t} c^I_t(i) di + \int_{i \in R_t} c^R_t(i) di \equiv c_t = y_t. \quad (35)$$

The labor market clearing condition has the following form:

$$\int_{i \in S_t} \tilde{n}_t(i) di + \int_{i \in I_t} n^I_t(i) di + \int_{i \in R_t} n^R_t(i) di \equiv n_t = \int_{\iota \in [0,1]} n_t(\iota) d\iota. \quad (36)$$

Substituting from (26) and (24), we get the aggregate production function,

$$\Delta_t y_t = z_t n_t, \quad (37)$$

where price dispersion $\Delta_t$ is given by

$$\Delta_t = \int_{\iota \in [0,1]} \left( \frac{P_t(\iota)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} d\iota. \quad (38)$$

Finally, assets by agent type evolve according to

$$\tilde{S}_{t+1} \tilde{B}_{t+1} = (1 - \tilde{\omega}_{I,t}) \int_{i \in S_t} \tilde{B}_{t+1}(i) di$$

$$I_{t+1} B^I_{t+1} = (1 - \omega_R) \int_{i \in I_t} B^I_{t+1}(i) di + \tilde{\omega}_{I,t} \int_{i \in S_t} \tilde{B}_{t+1}(i) di \quad (39)$$

$$R_{t+1} B^R_{t+1} = \int_{i \in R_t} B^R_{t+1}(i) di + (\omega_R - \omega_{D,t}) \int_{i \in I_t} B^I_{t+1}(i) di$$

and bond market clearing requires

$$\tilde{S}_t \tilde{B}_t + I_t B^I_t + R_t B^R_t = 0. \quad (40)$$
4. Calibration

Our model embeds the pandemic block into an otherwise fairly standard quantitative business cycle setup. To calibrate the former, we draw on the epidemiological literature and particularly on the most recent papers dealing directly with the COVID-19 disease. The parameterization of the macroeconomic block is based on the vast DSGE literature. A complete list of parameter values is given in Table 1.

We start with the pandemic block. To calibrate the parameters controlling the spread of disease via consumption, labor, and other activities, we follow Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020c) and set them such that, absent containment measures, each of the two economic channels accounts for one-sixth of the transmission and about two-thirds of the population become infected before the pandemic dies out. The targeted relative role of transmission channels is based on evidence on the influenza pandemic described by Ferguson et al. (2006), combined with information from the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Time Use Survey. The terminal share of the population that either recovers or dies is consistent with the estimated herd immunity levels of 60–70 percent, as implied by standard models; see, e.g., Gomes et al. (2020) or Prem et al. (2020).

As in Atkeson (2020), we assume that it takes 18 days (i.e., 7/18 periods in our weekly model) to either recover or die from the disease, which is also consistent with more recent estimates reported by Zhou et al. (2020). This, together with the infection fatality rate of 0.6 percent suggested by cross-country and meta-studies (Ioannidis 2020; O’Driscoll et al. 2020), brings us to our calibrated value of basic death probability. The share of symptomatic agents in all infected is calibrated at 0.6, reflecting a compromise between a wide range of estimates reported in the COVID-19 medical literature (Oran and Topol 2020; Wells et al. 2020; Yanes-Lane et al. 2020). The relative infectiousness of asymptomatically infected is also subject to high uncertainty, so we use the value of 0.5, consistent with a meta-study by Byambasuren et al. (2020), corrected upwards by recent evidence from Bi et al. (2020). The relative productivity of infected agents is set to 0.8. Following Ferguson et al. (2020) and Wilde et al. (2021), we assume that mortality doubles when the number of infected exceeds 1 percent of the population. Parameters of
Table 1. Baseline Parameters Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varpi_c$</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>Parameter Governing Infection through Consumption Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varpi_n$</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td>Parameter Governing Infection through Labor Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varpi$</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>Parameter Governing Infection through Other Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varpi_R$</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>Probability of Becoming Removed (Either Death or Recovery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varpi_D$</td>
<td>$7/18 \cdot 0.006$</td>
<td>Basic Probability of Dying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Probability of Being Symptomatic Conditional on Infection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Infectiousness of Asymptomatic Relative to Symptomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Non-isolation of Infected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Relative Productivity of Infected Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U_d$</td>
<td>$-3.863$</td>
<td>Disutility of Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu_0$</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>Parameter Governing Capacity Constraint on Health-Care System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu_1$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Parameter Governing Capacity Constraint on Health-Care System</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$0.99^{1/13}$</td>
<td>Discount Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>1.447</td>
<td>Weight on Labor in Utility</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Z$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon$</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Elasticity of Substitution between Product Varieties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>$0.75^{1/13}$</td>
<td>Calvo Probability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_\pi$</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Interest Rate Reaction to Inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_y$</td>
<td>$0.5/52$</td>
<td>Interest Rate Reaction to Output Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_I$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Interest Rate Reaction to Infected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_c$</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>Consumption Channel Lockdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_n$</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Work Channel Lockdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_\omega$</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Elasticity of Other Activities Channel to Lockdown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
function (34) are set to extrapolate these assumptions, simultane-
ously setting a maximum mortality rate of $3 \cdot \omega_D$.

The parameters related to the macroeconomic part of the model
are standard for the business cycle literature. We use well-established
values, converting them to weekly frequency wherever appropriate. Our calibration of the discount factor is based on its standard
value of 0.99 used in quarterly models. The weight on leisure in
utility targets 40 percent of time spent at work-related activities. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs is set
to obtain the product markup of 20 percent. The degree of price
stickiness is chosen by expressing the standard value of quarterly
Calvo probability of 0.75 in weekly units. The parameters describ-
ing the interest rate feedback to inflation and the output gap in
the monetary policy reaction function are set to 1.5 and 0.5 (con-
vverted to weekly), respectively, as postulated by the standard Taylor
rule.

Finally, we set the disutility associated with dying and the three
parameters related to lockdowns ($U_D, \Phi_c, \Phi_n, \text{ and } \Phi_\omega$). We pro-
ceed as follows. First, we calculate the fallout of GDP in Sweden,
a country where relatively weak administrative containment meas-
ures have been applied. Keeping $\Phi_c = \Phi_n = 0$, we set the disutility
of dying such that the model implied recession matches the one in
the data. In other words, we assume that the recession in Sweden
was driven by private-sector decisions (which clearly depend on the
fear of dying). Then we move to calibrate the lockdown param-
eters. To this end we calculate lost output, the change in inflation,
and the death rate in the euro area. Then $\Phi_c, \Phi_n, \text{ and } \Phi_\omega$ are set
jointly to match these values given the disutility of death calculated
earlier.\footnote{Both in Sweden and in the euro area, we calculate the average difference
between output in the period 2020:Q1–2021:Q1 and an extrapolated trend of
real GDP growth (calculated over the previous 20 years). For Sweden the fall-
out is 3.4 percent and for the euro area 6.5 percent. To calculate the change in
the inflation rate in the euro area, we subtract average inflation in the period
2020:Q1–2021:Q1 from average inflation in 2019 (inflation declines by 0.78 per-
cent). The death rate is calculated as the ratio of excess deaths to total population
and amounts to approximately 0.23 percent (Institute for Health Metrics and
Evaluation 2021).}
5. Simulation Results

We are now ready to use our model to analyze the macroeconomics effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. We proceed as follows. First, we study the interplay between epidemic and economic developments and how various health-care policies (lockdowns, isolation of infected, etc.) affect the outcomes. Then we discuss the role of monetary policy, focusing both on normative and positive aspects. Our solution method relies on deterministic simulations that take into account the whole nonlinear structure of the model. Since our preferences are homothetic, we can aggregate behavior within each group. Moreover, we use a linear Taylor expansion to evaluate value functions at arguments off the equilibrium paths. The resulting equilibrium conditions expressed in terms of aggregates are listed in the online appendix (available at http://www.ijcb.org).

5.1 The Epidemic and Containment Measures

We start by constructing and feeding into our model several stylized scenarios based on different assumptions about containment measures introduced by the authorities. The scenarios are not intended to provide a precise reflection of the measures or developments in any particular country. Our goal is instead to encompass the wide range of approaches adopted across the world. These scenarios help us explain how our model works and, in particular, how it manages the interplay between the epidemic and economic developments. They will also serve us as benchmarks upon which we will later test various monetary policy strategies.

A useful starting point is a laissez-faire or no-containment-measures scenario, under which the authorities do not impose any containment measures on the economy, i.e., $\Phi_c = \Phi_n = 0$ (solid thick blue line in Figure 1). We calibrated it to match the decline of GDP.

---

3While dealing with the pandemic, various countries adopted a wide range of different policies. On the one extreme, Sweden relied for some time on voluntary recommendations. On the other, several countries, e.g., Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand, implemented zero COVID policies. However, most countries adopted strategies that can be placed between these two approaches, introducing mandatory lockdowns that differed in severity.

4For figures in color, see the online version of the paper at http://www.ijcb.org.
Figure 1. Epidemic Containment Policies

Note: Horizontal axis in weeks, vertical in percent.
observed in Sweden. The only administrative restrictions consist of subjecting visibly infected agents to sick leave. However, in contrast to usual sick leave procedures, but in line with the COVID pandemic practice, we assume that agents can work from home, albeit with lower productivity, as described in Section 4. As the epidemic develops and the number of infected agents increases, the economy starts to contract. This happens for several reasons. First, as described above, infected agents are assumed less productive, so income falls. More importantly, however, a large fraction of the remaining society are aware that the risk of getting infected via work and consumption channels increases. This applies not only to susceptible agents but also to asymptptomatically infected and asymptptomatically recovered, as they do not know that they cannot fall ill anymore. These groups limit their consumption and work effort, and, as they are much more populous than infected, this is the main reason behind the contraction. Over the first year of the pandemic, output declines by approximately 4.1 percent and inflation by 0.3 percent. Total, final fatalities amount to approximately 0.61 percent of the population.

5.1.1 Output and Fatalities

Let us now move to the scenarios that assume some health-care policy intervention. It should be explained upfront that these policies are generally successful in limiting the fatality rate since they allow to flatten the infection curve and limit the strain on the health-care system. Furthermore, the considered containment measures have also the potential to improve welfare. This is because agents do not fully internalize the cost of the epidemic. In particular, infected agents do not take into account that their individual consumption and work activities affect the spread of the disease. This externality has been described in the epidemic and economic literature, so we limit ourselves to a brief mentioning (e.g., Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt 2020b).

Our baseline policy scenario is our calibrated lockdown, and we present it with the solid thin red line in Figure 1. We designed it to match the experience of the euro-area countries. Under this scenario, the authorities impose administrative measures discouraging economic activity. As discussed in Section 4, we implement this policy using taxes on consumption and labor income, which are assumed
to respond to the evolution in the number of visibly infected. The lockdown is much more costly for the economy than the laissez-faire variant discussed above, as output declines on average by 6.7 percent during the first year. However, not surprisingly, limiting contacts in the population reduces the number of fatalities sharply. Ultimately, the death ratio amounts to slightly less than 0.26 percent of the population. These results are in line with empirical evidence on the impact of lockdown on economic activity and the spread of the virus (including, among others, Alfano and Ercolano 2020; Mendoza et al. 2020; Castex, Dechter, and Lorca 2021).

Another containment measure we consider is total isolation of the visibly infected agents, which we implement by assuming $\zeta = 0$. As a consequence, they spread the disease neither via work nor via the consumption channel. While many countries made efforts to introduce such a policy, we decided not to make it our baseline scenario. Due to practical problems with widespread testing, contact tracking, and delays between the incubation and the test result, it seems doubtful whether this policy has historically played a role similar to that implied by our model. We test two variants: one under which this is the only containment policy (dashed yellow line in Figure 1), and one when it is coupled with the economy-wide lockdown policy described above (dash-dotted purple line in Figure 1). Pure isolation is relatively uncostly, as output declines by only 1.29 percent in the first year. However, it is less successful on the epidemic front than the lockdown, as it only limits the death toll to 0.42 percent of the population. In contrast, the mix of isolation and lockdown is highly successful in containing the pandemic (fatalities amount to 0.16 percent) at a relatively small economic cost (3.39 percent output decline).

Finally, we consider a much stricter lockdown than the one introduced historically (dotted green line in Figure 1). We implement it by multiplying the baseline values of $\Phi_c$ and $\Phi_n$ by three. This scenario can be conceptually related (but has not been formally calibrated) to countries imposing zero COVID policies, like Vietnam, Malaysia, or New Zealand. The economy has been frozen for over two years, but the policy limits the ultimate death toll to slightly below 0.17 percent. Such a scenario can be considered attractive in the context of vaccine development, which we abstract from in our model, as the policy has by far the lowest death toll after six quarters, a
period after which vaccinations have become relatively widespread in developed countries.

5.1.2 Inflation

An interesting feature of our simulations is the behavior of inflation. While output and hours worked always contract in response to the pandemic, inflation either declines, increases, or remains barely affected, depending on the introduced containment measures. This finding squares nicely with the empirical observation that inflation in most countries declined only moderately (despite the huge economic slump), and in some countries even increased during the pandemic.

How can the differentiated reaction of inflation be explained? The outcome depends on the relative response of consumption demand and labor supply. Both decline during the pandemic, but while the former pushes inflation down, the latter puts upward pressure on prices. The strongest deflationary effect occurs under the baseline scenario. Recall that we calibrated the model to match the declining inflation rate. However, it is interesting to note that this implied a stronger lockdown on consumption than on labor. In contrast, under the laissez-faire scenario, inflation is almost flat. This is because, if left on their own, agents reduce consumption and work effort to a similar degree, leaving the aggregate demand and supply effects roughly balanced. The strongest inflationary effect occurs when infected agents are being isolated. As isolation largely reduces the risk of becoming infected via the consumption channel (some risk remains due asymptomatic agents), supposedly susceptible households now become less afraid of consuming, which raises the inflationary pressure.

5.1.3 Welfare

We conclude this part of our analysis by calculating the model-consistent cost of the epidemic. The calculation is based on aggregate welfare as defined in Equation (10), evaluated at time 0, which is the period when the first infected agent appears. We compare welfare under the epidemic with welfare in a non-epidemic world, and express the difference in percent of steady-state consumption that a susceptible agent would be ready to forego to avoid the epidemic.
Table 2 presents the findings. The laissez-faire scenario generates the highest welfare cost. It amounts to 1.24 percent of lifetime consumption, several orders of magnitude higher than the usual estimates of business cycle fluctuation costs. This number can be reduced to various degrees by the containment policies described above. For instance, the baseline lockdown cuts the cost by more than half. The most restrictive policies, namely strict lockdown and the mix of lockdown and isolation, are even more successful: the welfare cost declines to about one-quarter of that under the laissez-faire scenario.

5.2 Monetary Policy

Let us now move to monetary policy, especially to the fundamental question of its role during the pandemic. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, central banks worldwide assumed an expansionary policy stance (Cantú et al. 2021). This manifested itself in the form of deep interest rate cuts and subsequent rounds of quantitative easing. An essential goal of these interventions was to avoid a collapse of the economic and financial system and alleviate pressure on the governments implementing huge rescue plans to prevent a wave of bankruptcies and an increase in economic inequality. Our framework is too simple to address all of these multiple motives appropriately. It does, however, allow us to capture the role of central banks as powerful institutions responsible for aggregate demand management.

What we want to highlight is that the character of the COVID-19 recession is different from standard. Falling inflation and output usually call for a monetary policy easing. However, the pandemic recession is a mixture of endogenous reactions and administrative policy measures intended to limit social and economic interactions, and hence the spread of the pandemic. From this perspective, an accommodative monetary policy stance could be counterproductive because it could accelerate the epidemic and bring about more fatalities. In particular, our goal is to evaluate the relative role of two key externalities shaping the pandemic scenario. The first one is the standard New Keynesian aggregate demand externality associated with nominal rigidities, suggesting monetary accommodation in response to a contraction in economic activity. The second externality reflects
**Table 2. Cost of the Epidemic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Baseline Monetary Policy</th>
<th>Standard Monetary Policy</th>
<th>Optimized Monetary Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare Cost</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Welfare Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Containment Measures</td>
<td>1.240%</td>
<td>0.606%</td>
<td>1.247%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation of Infected</td>
<td>0.845%</td>
<td>0.418%</td>
<td>0.850%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockdown (Baseline)</td>
<td>0.555%</td>
<td>0.263%</td>
<td>0.564%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict Lockdown</td>
<td>0.383%</td>
<td>0.169%</td>
<td>0.456%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockdown and Isolation</td>
<td>0.333%</td>
<td>0.162%</td>
<td>0.339%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The welfare cost of the epidemic is expressed in percent of lifetime consumption. Baseline monetary policy refers to the calibration presented in Table 1. Optimized monetary policy responds additionally to the number of symptomatic infected agents. Standard monetary policy responds to inflation (like baseline case) but to output deviations from trend rather than from its level under flexible prices.
agents’ failure to internalize the effects of their actions on the spread of the disease. Which of these two is stronger will then be reflected in whether monetary policy should take a contractionary or expansionary stance during the pandemic.

Our policy simulations attempt to shed light on these issues. To this end, we impose on each of the scenarios described before two types of monetary policy. First, we show what would happen if the monetary authorities reacted to the deviation of output not from its flexible-price level (as we have assumed so far) but from the steady state. This alternative formulation, which we will refer to as standard monetary policy, is more common in central bank practice, as the natural (flexible-price) level output is unobservable. Second, we design monetary policy optimized for the pandemic world. To this end, we search for the monetary policy rule parameter $\Phi$ that maximizes the social welfare function (10). While such an approach does not produce a globally optimal policy in our model, we believe that relating the interest rate to the number of infected agents realistically captures the idea of reacting to the pandemic while keeping the rule operational.

Figures 2–6 and Table 2 document our findings. Let us start with the standard monetary reaction function (dashed red line). As this rule does not take into account the strongly negative effect of the pandemic on the natural level of output, the implied monetary policy stance is clearly more expansionary than under our baseline specification relying on the flexible-price-based output gap, which under all scenarios considered is much closer to the steady state than GDP. The difference is weakest in the variant of isolation (Figure 5), as in this case the recession is relatively shallow, and strongest (at least in the first year of the pandemic) for the baseline scenario (Figure 4). The problem with applying this standard monetary reaction in times of pandemic becomes quite evident if we consider its implications for fatalities. In a sense, monetary policy partly crowds out the effort of other authorities to limit the pandemic. Due to monetary stimulus, output declines less (as a matter of fact, it even increases initially), but the number of fatalities goes up. These observations are complemented by the findings reported in Table 2, which additionally presents the welfare effects. Not only in the baseline, but also in the remaining containment policy scenarios, using the standard monetary policy reaction is detrimental for welfare. To keep
Figure 2. Baseline, Standard, and Optimized Monetary Policy—No Containment Measures Introduced

Note: Horizontal axis in weeks, vertical in percent.
Figure 3. Baseline, Standard, and Optimized Monetary Policy under Baseline Lockdown

Note: Horizontal axis in weeks, vertical in percent.
Figure 4. Baseline, Standard, and Optimized Monetary Policy with Strict Lockdown

Note: Horizontal axis in weeks, vertical in percent.
Figure 5. Baseline, Standard, and Optimized Monetary Policy with Isolation

Note: Horizontal axis in weeks, vertical in percent.
Figure 6. Baseline, Standard, and Optimized Monetary Policy with Isolation and Lockdown

Note: Horizontal axis in weeks, vertical in percent.
things in proportion, it needs to be stated clearly that, in relative terms, these effects are not large, but the direction is unequivocal.

These findings raise the question of whether monetary policy can be useful at all in such exceptional circumstances as the pandemic. To provide an answer, we run our second experiment and look for an optimized reaction of interest rates to the number of visibly infected agents. The first column of the optimized policy panel in Table 2 collects the optimized reaction parameters. Clearly, they all differ from zero, which means that policy has some role to play. However, the optimized central bank behavior depends strongly on the underlying containment policy. When the containment is absent or weak (isolation), the optimized $\Phi_I$ is positive, meaning that monetary policy reaction to the pandemic should, in fact, be contractionary. Stepping out of its usual shoes, the central bank attempts to support the fight against the pandemic and its fatal consequences. The effects can be observed in Figures 2 and 5 (dotted black line). In both cases, the real interest rate is raised sharply, generating a deeper recession. The resulting decrease in economic activity limits the spread of the disease and helps lower the number of fatalities.

Things become different when a sufficiently strong containment policy is in place. Under the remaining scenarios, the optimized monetary policy turns out to be more expansionary (although to a relatively small degree) than in normal times—the coefficient on the number of infected in the monetary policy rule is negative. This is documented in Figures 3, 4, and 6, which show a deeper decline in the real interest rates under optimized policy, with positive effects for output and inflation. This means that when public authorities care sufficiently for containing the epidemic, monetary policy can focus on its standard goal, which is to reduce the externality that arises due to price stickiness. Given that this externality implies that recessions and deflation are costly, the optimized monetary policy takes an expansionary stance.

It is worth noting that all these findings also hold when we consider an extension of our model in which we allow for the introduction of vaccines against the virus. To implement this variant, we first note that, in the case of COVID-19, the main effect of the vaccines was to bring down the mortality risk. We consider the following scenario, roughly reflecting the experience of euro-area countries. The vaccines start being introduced one year after the start of the
pandemic, and it takes one additional month before they begin to work, so during this initial period, the death rate in our model is still given by Equation (34). Over the next three quarters, the mortality rate is corrected by a proportionality coefficient initialized at unity and then linearly declines to 0.3, stabilizing at this level thereafter. The results are summarized in Table 3. If we compare them with the results of the no-vaccination version of the model presented in Table 2, no material differences emerge.

All in all, how monetary policy should behave during the pandemic is far from trivial due to a trade-off between stabilizing the economy and containing the epidemic, which in turn depends on the containment policies in place. In what follows, we take a closer look at this trade-off.

5.3 The Trade-Offs

Policymakers always face multiple objective dilemmas, and they should be used to resolving them. However, at least for monetary policy, the trade-off discussed here differs dramatically from the usual one. As we already stressed, if monetary policy attempts to stabilize the economy during the pandemic, it affects the number of social interactions, the number of infections, and, unfortunately, fatalities. Thus, monetary policy during the COVID-19 pandemic probably faces the nastiest trade-off ever. We now study what this trade-off looks like and how it compares with that faced by containment policies.

Figure 7 shows the efficient policy frontiers for monetary and lockdown policies. On the horizontal axis, we show the cumulative consumption loss during the first two years of the epidemic. On the vertical axis, we present the percentage of deceased agents. The solid thick blue line plots the frontier for lockdown policies, defined as the efficient combinations of coefficients $\Phi_c$ and $\Phi_n$ in equations (30) and (31), assuming that monetary policy follows the baseline Taylor rule (33) with $\Phi_I = 0$. The dash-dotted yellow and the dashed red lines plot the efficient trade-offs for monetary policy (various levels of $\Phi_I$) under the laissez-faire and baseline lockdown scenarios, respectively.

The first thing to note is that in all cases, a trade-off exists—saving lives occurs at an economic cost of foregone consumption. However, there is a striking difference between the effectiveness of
**Table 3. Cost of the Epidemic (with vaccination)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Baseline Monetary Policy</th>
<th>Standard Monetary Policy</th>
<th>Optimized Monetary Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare Cost</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Welfare Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Containment Measures</td>
<td>1.239%</td>
<td>0.606%</td>
<td>1.247%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation of Infected</td>
<td>0.836%</td>
<td>0.414%</td>
<td>0.841%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockdown (Baseline)</td>
<td>0.507%</td>
<td>0.238%</td>
<td>0.519%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict Lockdown</td>
<td>0.282%</td>
<td>0.115%</td>
<td>0.352%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockdown and Isolation</td>
<td>0.279%</td>
<td>0.134%</td>
<td>0.285%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The welfare cost of the epidemic is expressed in percent of lifetime consumption. Baseline monetary policy refers to the calibration presented in Table 1. Optimized monetary policy responds additionally to the number of symptomatic infected agents. Standard monetary policy responds to inflation (like baseline case) but to output deviations from trend rather than from its level under flexible prices.
lockdowns and monetary policy. The former has a much steeper profile, meaning that lives can be saved at a lower economic cost. The reason is relatively simple—lockdowns are assumed to reduce the transmission via all three contagion channels, including social contacts (school closures, family-meeting restrictions, etc.). In contrast, monetary policy works only by affecting transmission via consumption and work. Consequently, lockdowns are much more efficient in containing the disease.

Nevertheless, as mentioned before, even for monetary policy, a trade-off exists: a monetary expansion (contraction) raises (reduces) the number of fatalities. This is more the case when no containment measures are in place: the dashed red line is slightly steeper than the yellow dash-dotted one. It is the consequence of the higher probability of dying because of limited health-care capacity in the laissez-faire scenario.

What are the implications of the relatively flat monetary policy trade-off? Monetary policy is not a good tool to help contain the epidemic, as a meaningful reduction in fatalities would require engineering a very deep recession. However, every coin has two sides,
and this is also the case here. The relatively flat trade-off, especially when other containment policies are in place, means that a monetary expansion is not very harmful. From this perspective, central banks have some freedom to support economic growth at a relatively small cost. This explains why, under some scenarios, optimized monetary policy is expansionary.

What do all these experiments tell us about monetary policy in times of pandemics? Abstracting away from fiscal or financial stability considerations, the optimal monetary policy stance depends on whether sufficient containment measures have been introduced. If this is the case, then monetary policy is free to act in its usual role of stabilizing the business cycle, providing monetary stimulus to an economy that suffers a deep recession. Otherwise, the monetary policy stance should be even contractionary, as the life-saving motive dominates. Clearly, the latter situation is a third-best option since, as we have shown, central bank instruments are better suited to steering the economy than decreasing the number of fatalities. This means that saving lives can be brought about only at a considerable economic cost.

All of this brings us to a conclusion related to the motives that we abstracted away so far. Since the health cost of a monetary expansion is relatively small, central banks are probably well suited to offer the necessary support to the fiscal authority that introduces packages helping survive those businesses that are particularly affected by the introduced lockdowns. Formalizing this conclusion would, however, require a different modeling strategy, and we leave this issue for further research.

6. Conclusions

After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, monetary policy has been eased in many countries to an unprecedented degree. However, at the same time, several economists have pointed out that in the pandemic, central banks face a new trade-off, one between stabilizing the economy and containing the epidemic. While the latter is obviously not the standard goal of central banks, they must be aware that under these very special circumstances, monetary policy
actions have an impact on the epidemic and its (possibly fatal) consequences. Our paper investigates this trade-off and its implications for monetary policy. To this end, we construct a model that draws from the epidemic modeling literature and the macroeconomic business cycle literature. More precisely, we connect a SIR-type model with a standard New Keynesian framework. It allows to speak not only about the pandemic (and potential containment measures) but also about macroeconomic effects and monetary policy.

Our simulations explain the moderate reactions of inflation to the epidemic visible in the data. This happens because aggregate (consumption) demand responses are similar to aggregate (labor) supply reactions. Hence, as in the data, despite the unprecedented recession, inflation changes only slightly. Moreover, the direction of inflation reaction depends, i.a., on the containment measures applied. In our framework, containment measures are relatively efficient in containing the epidemic. In particular, lockdowns can largely reduce the spread of the disease and the number of fatalities, and substantially lower the welfare cost of the epidemic. However, their impact on inflation is relatively small and depends on the particular measures introduced.

The pandemic creates new challenges to stabilization policy. Some of them required a massive and unconventional response from central banks to prevent financial turmoil and create favorable market conditions for fiscal packages aimed at protecting the most affected industries and households. Our model abstracts from these considerations, implicitly assuming well-functioning financial markets and appropriate safety nets in place provided by the state without creating significant market distortions. Consequently, the only relevant source of economic heterogeneity among households in our model is their health history.

Under these conditions, the implications for monetary policy during the pandemic are that it should not react to a sharp deviation of output from trend as it typically does when faced with standard business cycles. Such policy reduces welfare irrespective of the underlying containment measures. The trade-off faced by the central bank is relatively flat: a decrease in the number of fatalities that can be achieved with monetary policy happens at a relatively large economic cost. This means that, not surprisingly, monetary policy is not a good tool to contain the epidemic, especially when compared
with lockdowns. The flip side of this coin is that the side effects of expansionary monetary policy in the form of changes in fatalities are relatively small, so the monetary policy may have some freedom to support the economy (or the fiscal side). Nevertheless, such side effects do exist, and they are higher if containment measures are absent. As a consequence, monetary policy should be contractionary if appropriate containment measures are not in place. Conversely, if sufficiently tough measures have been introduced, monetary policy should be eased to support the economy.

References


