

The Limits of Central Bank Forward Guidance under Learning*

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This paper investigates the effectiveness of central bank forward guidance while relaxing two standard macroeconomic assumptions: rational expectations and frictionless financial markets. The results show that the addition of financial frictions amplifies the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance. During a period of economic crisis, output under rational expectations displays more favorable responses to forward guidance than under adaptive learning. These differences are exacerbated when compared with a similar analysis without financial frictions. Thus, monetary policymakers should consider the way in which expectations and credit frictions are modeled when examining the effects of forward guidance.

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1. Introduction

The conventional monetary policy tool of lowering overnight interest rates was exhausted when the zero lower bound (ZLB) on U.S. short-term nominal interest rates was effectively reached during the 2007–09 global financial crisis. Central banks around the world responded by pursuing “unconventional” monetary policies to stimulate their economies. One of these alternative tools was forward guidance, where the central bank communicates to the public

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information about the future path of the policy rate. For instance, the Federal Reserve issued forward guidance in the September 2012 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statement: “The Committee also . . . anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015.” In addition, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Woodford (2012) argue that communication on the future path of interest rates can have stimulative economic effects. Standard New Keynesian models (e.g., Woodford 2003) predict agents being forward looking when making current-period decisions. If households and firms expect higher interest rates in response to future expansions, economic activity today may be limited. However, if a central bank communicates a low policy rate through part of the expansion, output today will not be as constrained.

The effectiveness of forward guidance hinges on two key channels—financial markets and expectations—that are largely overlooked in previous related forward guidance literature. The addition of credit frictions in macroeconomic models is not a standard assumption. Frictionless financial markets are largely assumed for simplicity and not to model realistic features of an economy. However, this absence removes the prominent role of credit frictions in the macroeconomy and a key medium through which forward guidance influences the economy. In addition, the way in which private-sector expectations about macroeconomic variables (e.g., output and inflation) respond to forward guidance defines a key channel through which this unconventional monetary policy operates. The standard way to model expectations in macroeconomic models is the rational expectations hypothesis. However, this expectations formation scheme makes strong assumptions about the amount of knowledge agents possess when constructing forecasts. Therefore, it is natural to investigate the effectiveness of forward guidance when agents construct forecasts through a more realistic theory of expectations formation.

This paper studies the effectiveness of forward guidance in an environment where credit market frictions persist and rational expectations has been replaced by an adaptive learning rule similar to one proposed by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001). In particular, the economic environment is based on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s dynamic stochastic

general equilibrium (FRBNY DSGE) model presented in both Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) and Del Negro et al. (2013). The model adds to a standard DSGE model both financial frictions and central bank communication about the future path of interest rates. A standard monetary policy rule is augmented with anticipated shocks as in Laséen and Svensson (2011). The anticipated shocks represent future changes from a normal interest rate rule that the central bank communicates to agents today. The shocks are also included to model time-contingent forward guidance in which the central bank communicates to the public a forward guidance completion date.

Agents are assumed to form expectations of future macroeconomic variables via two options: the rational expectations hypothesis or a popular alternative called adaptive learning. Rational expectations is a strong assumption. Agents form expectations based on the true model of the economy, as they know the model's deep parameters, structure of the model, beliefs of other agents, and distribution of the error terms. A popular alternative to rational expectations is adaptive learning in which agents behave as real-life economists (see, for instance, Evans and Honkapohja 2013). Adaptive learning agents formulate forecasts of future endogenous variables by creating an econometric model using variables based on the solution found under rational expectations. They estimate the parameters of the model using ordinary least squares and appropriately adjust their forecasts to new data each period.¹

The inclusion of financial frictions follows Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) and adds a realistic feature. The new components model the borrowing and lending of funds seen in the real economy by adding two types of agents to a standard medium-scale DSGE model: banks and entrepreneurs. Banks take in deposits from households and lend to entrepreneurs. The latter type of agents use these funds to purchase capital and rent it to intermediate goods producers. Banks charge entrepreneurs a premium over the riskless interest rate, as there is

¹When they construct forecasts each period, adaptive learning agents do not take into account that they will be updating their expectations in the future. They believe their forecasts to be optimal in each period. The reader can refer to Krepes (1998) for additional description on anticipated utility.

a possibility they may default. This “spread” fluctuates based on entrepreneurs’ leverage and an idiosyncratic shock that affects the perceived riskiness of entrepreneurs by banks. If riskiness increases, entrepreneurs have a harder time receiving funds and, thus, are constrained in the amount of capital they can funnel to the production side of the economy. The spread or riskiness shock captures how the financial sector contributed to the Great Recession. Del Negro et al. (2013) explain that spread shocks caused about half the decrease in U.S. output during the Great Recession.

The results show that the addition of financial frictions amplifies the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements. These outcomes are first shown under impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to forward guidance shocks. For instance, output’s response to forward guidance is stronger under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. The results are also presented during a period of economic crisis (e.g., a recession). The central bank responds to the recession by communicating to the public that the nominal interest rate will equal zero throughout the forward guidance horizon. This exercise shows that the effects of forward guidance are larger under rational expectations relative to adaptive learning. Specifically, the value of output is higher under rational expectations than under adaptive learning throughout the forward guidance horizon. In addition, when the effect of financial frictions in the model is reduced, the “wedge” that existed between the responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance diminishes. This result is shown by comparing impulse responses when varying the parameter that governs the elasticity of the spread with respect to leverage of entrepreneurs. For instance, the disparity of the impulse responses of output between rational expectations and adaptive learning dampens as this parameter decreases.

The reasons for the differences arise from the amount of knowledge that agents are assumed to hold and the financial frictions present in the FRBNY DSGE model. Under rational expectations, agents base their expectations of future macroeconomic variables on the true model of the economy. Thus, rational expectations agents compute precise expectations about how forward guidance statements affect future macroeconomic variables. However, adaptive learning agents are not endowed with this level of knowledge.

Instead, they estimate the effects of forward guidance using their econometric model of the economy. In addition, the inclusion of a financial sector magnifies the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning agents. The adaptive learning agents must estimate how forward guidance will alleviate the recession by forecasting not only future variables concerning households and firms but also the financial sector. This creates more errors by the adaptive learning agents relative to their rational expectations counterparts. These previous reasons create bigger differences between the two types of expectations assumptions.

Overall, the results of the paper suggest a main finding for monetary policymakers: the effects of forward guidance depend on the manner in which expectations and financial frictions are modeled. Under the assumption of rational expectations, forward guidance produces more favorable values of output than under adaptive learning. When including credit frictions, these differences are magnified.

1.1 Previous Literature

This paper contributes to the growing literature on forward guidance. The seminal work by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) explains the importance of the expectations channel on the economy. The path of short-term interest rates affects long-term interest rates and asset prices, and thus the management of interest rate expectations is pertinent for a central bank. McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016) explain that the extreme responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance found in standard macroeconomic models depend on the assumption of complete markets. The addition of precautionary savings into a macroeconomic model limits the effectiveness of forward guidance at the ZLB. The results from Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) and Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2015) display unusually large responses of the macroeconomic variables to forward guidance relative to the data. Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) label this outcome “the forward guidance puzzle.” This present paper suggests that the unusually large responses may be due to the rational expectations assumption employed in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012), and a more realistic

expectation formation assumption (e.g., adaptive learning) produces results that better match the data.

The current paper follows recent literature examining the effectiveness of forward guidance. De Graeve, Ilbas, and Wouters (2014) study the effects of forward guidance through a different lens than the expectations channel. They find that the effects of this unconventional monetary policy tool vary depending on the type of forward guidance and the underlying reasons for implementing it (e.g., monetary stimulus or sign of future economic crisis). Levin et al. (2010) explain that the power of forward guidance is sensitive to the type of structural shock affecting the economy. Swanson and Williams (2014) show that Federal Reserve forward guidance statements influence the economy by affecting medium- and longer-term interest rates. Kool and Thornton (2015) test the effectiveness of forward guidance across four countries: New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. They find that forward guidance helped market participants forecast future short-term yields. In addition, Cole (2015) examines the effects of forward guidance across rational expectations and adaptive learning assumptions, but utilizes a DSGE model without financial frictions. The present paper shows that the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance are amplified when a DSGE model is expanded to include a financial sector.

This paper fits into the literature on expectation formation and policy. Caputo, Medina, and Soto (2011) use a DSGE model with adaptive learning and a financial accelerator as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). They find that the financial accelerator model with adaptive learning leads to large business cycle fluctuations, but a central bank that aggressively responds to inflation can limit the volatility in output and inflation. When the fiscal authority communicates information about the future path of government purchases and taxes, Mitra, Evans, and Honkapohja (2012) show that output multipliers match the data more under adaptive learning than under rational expectations. Eusepi and Preston (2010) examine the benefits of central bank communication in which agents have an incomplete model of the economy when constructing expectations. When a central bank provides more information to the public about policy (e.g., the variables within a monetary policy rule), the macroeconomic variables exhibit greater stability, as agents are able

to construct more precise forecasts. Woodford (2010) studies optimal monetary policy in which the central bank understands agents may not form forecasts via the rational expectations hypothesis. He stresses the importance of policy commitment (e.g., guaranteeing stable inflation) regardless of agents' expectations not being model consistent. Slobodyan and Wouters (2012) examine the medium-scale DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) under the assumption of adaptive learning. The DSGE model's match to the data is on par with or exceeds the results under adaptive learning than rational expectations.

The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the DSGE model with financial frictions. Section 3 discusses expectations formation under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Section 4 contains the results of forward guidance under both types of expectations formations. Impulse response functions, forward guidance during an economic crisis, and the importance of financial frictions for forward guidance are examined. The results are also studied when the degree in which adaptive learning agents discount previous observations is varied. In addition, the last two portions of section 4 study the impulse responses to a spread shock and the contribution of non-forward guidance shocks to the paper's main results, respectively. Section 5 concludes.

2. Model

The aggregate dynamics of the economy are described by a medium-scale DSGE model with financial frictions following Del Negro, Giamponi, and Patterson (2012) and Del Negro et al. (2013). It contains a large number of frictions found in standard DSGE models (e.g., Smets and Wouters 2007). These include price and wage stickiness, price and wage indexation, habit formation in consumption, capital utilization, and investment adjustment costs. The model also includes credit frictions following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). The remainder of this section presents a brief description of the model followed by the log-linearized equations.

2.1 Description

2.1.1 Households and Labor Packers

Each household $j \in [0, 1]$ maximizes the sum of its expected discounted utility. They receive utility from consumption and disutility from providing work to firms. A household supplies its work to labor packers (e.g., employment agencies). The latter group bundles labor to sell to intermediate goods producers in a perfectly competitive market. In addition, a household can put its wealth in government-issued bonds, deposits held at banks, and money. As will be discussed later, the deposits held at banks are important, as entrepreneurs use them to purchase capital. The entrepreneurs funnel capital to the production side of the economy.

The frictions in the household sector take the form of habit formation in consumption and wage stickiness. Households have market power in the labor market and choose their nominal wage subject to the amount of work demanded by intermediate goods producers. Following Calvo (1983), a household has probability $(1 - \zeta_w)$ of choosing its wage each period, and probability ζ_w of not being able to choose its wage. Under the latter scenario, wages are indexed to either previous-period's inflation times last-period's productivity with probability ι_w , or steady-state inflation times the economy's growth rate with probability $(1 - \iota_w)$.

2.1.2 Firms

There exist two types of firms: intermediate and final goods producers. Intermediate goods producers operate in a monopolistically competitive market and use labor and capital to create differentiated products to sell to final goods producers. The source of their labor and capital comes from households (via employment agencies) and entrepreneurs, respectively. The intermediate goods producers are subject to nominal price rigidities in the form of a Calvo (1983) pricing scheme. In each period, firms have a probability $(1 - \zeta_p)$ of freely changing their price. The remaining fraction ζ_p of firms index their price to either previous-period's inflation with probability ι_p or the steady-state rate of inflation with probability $(1 - \iota_p)$. The final goods producers conduct business in a competitive market and bundle the intermediate goods into one composite good.

2.1.3 Financial Sector and Capital Producers

The modeling of credit frictions starts with two agents: banks and entrepreneurs. Banks pay interest on deposits received from households and use the funds to issue loans to entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs use the funds to purchase capital from capital producers and rent it to intermediate goods firms. Banks also charge entrepreneurs a premium over the risk-free interest rate, as there is a risk of default. This “spread” varies with entrepreneurs’ leverage, that is, the ratio of the value of capital to net worth. The spread widens as the value of entrepreneurs’ capital, which is positively related to the amount it borrows from banks, increases relative to its own net worth. In every period, an idiosyncratic shock also affects the amount of capital that entrepreneurs manage. An adverse shock shrinks the amount of capital they can lend and, thus, the proceeds they earn from lending to intermediate goods firms. Consequently, this negative shock decreases the ability of entrepreneurs to repay their loans to the bank. In addition, there exist spread shocks which affect the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock. This event can reflect entrepreneurs’ perceived riskiness by banks to repay loans. If the riskiness increases, banks will increase the amount it charges entrepreneurs for loans. As the cost of borrowing rises, the ability of entrepreneurs to buy capital to rent to intermediate goods producers diminishes.

Capital producers operate in a perfectly competitive market and are responsible for the creation of the stock of capital. They purchase a part of output from final goods producers and transform it into capital subject to adjustment costs. They also purchase a fraction of capital from entrepreneurs. These two sources of capital comprise the amount of capital for use next period. Capital producers sell capital back to entrepreneurs who then rent it to intermediate goods producers.

2.1.4 Government Policy

The model includes both monetary and fiscal policies. The monetary authorities follow a Taylor-type rule and adjust the short-term nominal interest rate to changes in output, inflation, monetary policy shock, and anticipated or forward guidance shocks. The fiscal authorities collect lump-sum taxes and satisfy a government budget

constraint. There also exists a government spending shock which captures exogenous fluctuations in aggregate demand.

2.2 Log-Linearized Equations

The following are the log-linearized equations that describe the DSGE model with financial frictions. The “ $\hat{\cdot}$ ” and “ $*$ ” symbols represent log-deviations from steady state and steady-state values, respectively. The \hat{E}_t indicates (potentially) non-rational expectations, while E_t denotes the model-consistent rational expectations operator. From the household’s first-order conditions, one can get the consumption Euler equation:

$$\hat{\xi}_t = \hat{R}_t + \hat{E}_t \hat{\xi}_{t+1} - \hat{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}, \quad (1)$$

where $\hat{\xi}_t$ is the marginal utility of consumption, \hat{R}_t is the nominal interest rate paid on government issued bonds and controlled by the central bank, and $\hat{\pi}_t$ is the inflation rate. Consumption is defined according to the following equation:

$$(e^\gamma - h\beta)(e^\gamma - h)\hat{\xi}_t = e^\gamma(e^\gamma - h)\hat{b}_t - (e^{2\gamma} + \beta h^2)\hat{c}_t + h e^\gamma \hat{c}_{t-1} - \beta h(e^\gamma - h)\hat{E}_t \hat{b}_{t+1} + \beta h e^\gamma \hat{E}_t \hat{c}_{t+1}, \quad (2)$$

where \hat{c}_t is consumption, \hat{b}_t is a stochastic shock to household utility, β is the discount factor, h represents habit formation in consumption, and e^γ is the steady-state (gross) growth rate of the economy. The demand for money by households is given by

$$v_m \hat{m}_t = -\frac{1}{R^* - 1} \hat{R}_t - \hat{\xi}_t, \quad (3)$$

where \hat{m}_t is money.

Households have market power in the labor market. Wages are chosen by households according to a Calvo (1983) scheme. In each period, a fraction $1 - \zeta_w$ of households can choose their wage. The remaining ζ_w of households index wages to either previous-period’s inflation times last-period’s productivity with probability

ι_w , or steady-state inflation times the economy's growth rate with probability $(1 - \iota_w)$. The optimal reset wage equation is given by

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(1 + \nu_l \frac{1 + \lambda_w}{\lambda_w}\right) \hat{w}_t + \left(1 + \zeta_w \beta \nu_l \left(\frac{1 + \lambda_w}{\lambda_w}\right)\right) \hat{w}_t \\ &= \zeta_w \beta \left(1 + \nu_l \frac{1 + \lambda_w}{\lambda_w}\right) \hat{E}_t(\hat{w}_{t+1} + \hat{w}_{t+1}) \\ &+ (1 - \zeta_w \beta)(e^{2\gamma} + h^2 \beta) \frac{e^{-\gamma}}{e^\gamma - h} \hat{b}_t + \hat{\varphi}_t + (1 - \zeta_w \beta)(\nu_l \hat{L}_t - \hat{\xi}_t) \\ &- \zeta_w \beta \iota_w \left(1 + \nu_l \frac{1 + \lambda_w}{\lambda_w}\right) \hat{\pi}_t + \zeta_w \beta \left(1 + \nu_l \frac{1 + \lambda_w}{\lambda_w}\right) \hat{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

\hat{w}_t represents the freely chosen wage by households, \hat{w}_t is the aggregate wage, \hat{L}_t is aggregate labor, and $\hat{\varphi}_t$ is a stochastic shock that affects the marginal utility of labor. λ_w defines the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor services, and ν_l represents the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. In addition, the aggregate wage equation is given by

$$\hat{w}_t = \hat{w}_{t-1} + \iota_w \hat{\pi}_{t-1} - \hat{\pi}_t + \frac{1 - \zeta_w}{\zeta_w} \hat{w}_t. \quad (5)$$

The production side of the economy is populated by intermediate- and final-goods-producing firms. The intermediate goods firms operate in a monopolistically competitive market, while final goods producers conduct business in a competitive market. Prices do not freely adjust in the former market. Specifically, a fraction $(1 - \zeta_p)$ of firms can freely adjust its price every period. The remaining ζ_p of firms either index prices to previous-period's inflation with probability ι_p or to steady-state rate of inflation with probability $(1 - \iota_p)$. Consequently, the Phillips curve is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\pi}_t &= \frac{\iota_p \zeta_p}{1 + \iota_p \beta} \hat{\pi}_{t-1} + \frac{\beta}{1 + \iota_p \beta} \hat{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} \\ &+ \frac{(1 - \zeta_p \beta)(1 - \zeta_p)}{(1 + \iota_p \beta) \zeta_p} \hat{m}c_t + \frac{1}{(1 + \iota_p \beta) \zeta_p} \hat{\lambda}_{f,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

where $\hat{\lambda}_{f,t}$ represents a cost-push shock. $\hat{m}c_t$ is marginal cost and is defined by

$$\hat{m}c_t = (1 - \alpha)\hat{w}_t + \alpha\hat{r}_t^k, \quad (7)$$

where \hat{r}_t^k is the rental rate of capital and α captures capital's share of output. Intermediate goods firms utilize both labor and capital in a Cobb-Douglas production function given by

$$\hat{y}_t = \frac{\alpha(y^* + \Phi)}{y^*}\hat{k}_t + \frac{(1 - \alpha)(y^* + \Phi)}{y^*}\hat{L}_t, \quad (8)$$

where \hat{k}_t represents effective capital in the economy and Φ is fixed costs in production.

The model's resource constraint satisfies

$$\hat{y}_t = \hat{g}_t + \frac{c^*}{c^* + i^*}\hat{c}_t + \frac{i^*}{c^* + i^*}\hat{i}_t + \frac{r^{k^*}k^*}{c^* + i^*}\hat{u}_t, \quad (9)$$

where \hat{i}_t is investment, \hat{u}_t is capital utilization, and \hat{g}_t is a government spending shock capturing exogenous aggregate demand fluctuations in the economy.

The capital-to-labor ratio is given by

$$\hat{k}_t = \hat{w}_t - \hat{r}_t^k + \hat{L}_t. \quad (10)$$

The financial side of the economy is populated by banks and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs borrow funds from banks to purchase capital from capital producers and rent it to intermediate goods producers. The amount of funds entrepreneurs can borrow is a function of their net worth, which evolves according to the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{n}_t = & \zeta_{n,\tilde{R}^k}(\hat{R}_t^k - \hat{\pi}_t) - \zeta_{n,R}(\hat{R}_{t-1} - \hat{\pi}_t) + \zeta_{n,qK}(\hat{q}_{t-1}^k + \hat{k}_{t-1}) \\ & + \zeta_{n,n}\hat{n}_{t-1} + \hat{\gamma}_t - \frac{\zeta_{n,\mu^e}}{\zeta_{sp,\mu^e}}\hat{\mu}_{t-1}^e - \frac{\zeta_{n,\sigma_\omega}}{\zeta_{sp,\sigma_\omega}}\hat{\sigma}_{\omega,t-1}, \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

where \hat{q}_t^k is the price of capital, \hat{k}_t measures the amount of installed capital, $\hat{\gamma}_t$ defines the time-varying exogenous fraction of entrepreneurs that survive each period shock, $\hat{\mu}_t^e$ is a bankruptcy cost shock, and $\hat{\sigma}_{\omega,t}$ is a spread shock. ζ_{n,\tilde{R}^k} , $\zeta_{n,R}$, $\zeta_{n,qK}$, $\zeta_{n,n}$, ζ_{n,μ^e} , and ζ_{n,σ_ω} are

the elasticities of net worth with respect to the return on capital, nominal interest rate, price of capital, net worth itself, bankruptcy cost shock, and the spread shock, respectively. ζ_{sp,σ_ω} represents the elasticity of the spread with respect to the volatility of the spread shock. ζ_{sp,μ_e} is the elasticity of the spread with respect to the bankruptcy cost shock. \hat{R}_t^k is the gross return on capital entrepreneurs receive from renting capital to intermediate goods producers and is defined by

$$\hat{R}_t^k - \hat{\pi}_t = \frac{r_*^k}{r_*^k + (1 - \delta)} \hat{r}_t^k + \frac{1 - \delta}{r_*^k + (1 - \delta)} \hat{q}_t^k - \hat{q}_{t-1}^k, \quad (12)$$

where δ is the depreciation rate. The expected excess return on capital or spread is defined by the following equation:

$$\hat{E}_t(\hat{R}_{t+1}^k - \hat{R}_t) = \zeta_{sp,b}(\hat{q}_t^k + \hat{k}_t - \hat{n}_t) + \hat{\mu}_t^e + \hat{\sigma}_{\omega,t}, \quad (13)$$

where $\hat{\sigma}_{\omega,t}$ is defined as a spread shock. It characterizes banks' perception of the riskiness of entrepreneurs. For example, if this shock increases, banks perceive entrepreneurs to be risky and, thus, bank loans are harder to receive. This decrease in funds hampers the ability of entrepreneurs to funnel capital to the intermediate goods sector. $\zeta_{sp,b}$ characterizes the elasticity of the spread to entrepreneurs' leverage, which is defined as the ratio of the value of capital to nominal net worth. The amount of installed capital in the model is given by

$$\hat{k}_t = \left(1 - \frac{i^*}{k^*}\right) \hat{k}_{t-1} + \frac{i^*}{k^*} \hat{\mu}_t + \frac{i^*}{k^*} \hat{i}_t, \quad (14)$$

where $\hat{\mu}_t$ defines the efficiency of new investments toward creating new capital and is labeled the marginal efficiency of investment shock. For instance, if there is a positive increase to this shock, investments become more productive (i.e., use fewer resources) for the creation of new capital and, thus, generate more economic activity. The amount of investment \hat{i}_t is defined by

$$\hat{i}_t = \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \hat{i}_{t-1} + \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \hat{E}_t \hat{i}_{t+1} + \frac{1}{(1 + \beta) S'' e^{2\gamma}} \hat{q}_t^k + \hat{\mu}_t, \quad (15)$$

where $S(\bullet)$ captures the cost of adjusting capital and $S' > 0$ and $S'' > 0$.

The amount of capital is described by the following equation:

$$\hat{k}_t = \hat{u}_t + \hat{k}_{t-1}. \quad (16)$$

\hat{u}_t defines the capital utilization rate, and the corresponding equation is given by

$$r_*^k \hat{r}_t^k = a'' \hat{u}_t, \quad (17)$$

where a'' captures capital utilization costs.

2.2.1 Monetary Policy

The model's central bank adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate using the following monetary policy rule:

$$\hat{R}_t = \psi_\pi \hat{\pi}_t + \psi_y \hat{y}_t + \varepsilon_t^{MP} + \sum_{l=1}^L \varepsilon_{l,t-l}^R, \quad (18)$$

where ε_t^{MP} defines an unanticipated monetary policy shock. Forward guidance is added into the model by augmenting the monetary policy rule with anticipated shocks similar to Laséen and Svensson (2011), Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012), and Cole (2015). Each anticipated or forward guidance shock ($\varepsilon_{l,t-l}^R$) is contained in the term $\sum_{l=1}^L \varepsilon_{l,t-l}^R$ found in equation (18) and is iid.² A forward guidance shock defines a central bank announcement in period $t - l$ that the interest rate will change l periods later, that is, in period t . In addition, L represents the length of the central bank's time-contingent forward guidance horizon. Thus, there are L forward guidance shocks in equation (18) that affect the monetary policy rule in period t . Following Laséen and Svensson (2011) and Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012), the system is also aug-

²These shocks are also described as news shocks in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012). They study the contribution of anticipated shocks to U.S. business cycles.

mented with L state variables $v_{1,t}, v_{2,t}, \dots, v_{L,t}$ whose laws of motion are given by

$$v_{1,t} = v_{2,t-1} + \varepsilon_{1,t}^R \quad (19)$$

$$v_{2,t} = v_{3,t-1} + \varepsilon_{2,t}^R \quad (20)$$

$$v_{3,t} = v_{4,t-1} + \varepsilon_{3,t}^R \quad (21)$$

$$\vdots$$

$$v_{L,t} = \varepsilon_{L,t}^R. \quad (22)$$

Each term in $v_t = [v_{1,t}, v_{2,t}, \dots, v_{L,t}]'$ contains the sum of all forward guidance statements known to agents in period t that change the interest rate 1, 2, \dots , and L periods later, respectively. Equations (19)–(22) can also be simplified to find that $v_{1,t-1} = \sum_{l=1}^L \varepsilon_{l,t-l}^R$, which is the sum of all forward guidance commitments announced by the central bank 1, 2, \dots , and L periods ago that affect the interest rate in period t .³ In addition, the main reason to model forward guidance in this manner regards indeterminacy. If forward guidance is alternatively modeled as pegging the interest rate to a certain value, indeterminacy can arise as described in Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) and Woodford (2005). For instance, without a monetary policy that responds to economic activity, real disturbances to the economy can produce multiple equilibria.⁴ However, forward guidance modeled by equations (19)–(22) can still attain a constant interest rate path. As will be described in section 4.3, the forward guidance shocks can be chosen such that the $\hat{R}_t = \bar{R}$ throughout the forward guidance horizon.

The following example is provided to gain intuition on equations (19)–(22). Consider the case in which the central bank's forward guidance horizon is two periods ahead, i.e., $L = 2$. The model's

³It will be helpful to note that the units of the standard deviations of the forward guidance shocks are in terms of the interest rate R_t since $v_{1,t-1}$ equals $\sum_{l=1}^L \varepsilon_{l,t-l}^R$ and is found in equation (18).

⁴Determinacy can occur from modeling forward guidance as an interest rate peg as described in Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2015). However, terminal conditions need to be known, a standard monetary policy rule needs to be followed after the interest rate peg, and exceedingly large responses of output and inflation to forward guidance occur.

system of equations includes $v_{1,t}$ and $v_{2,t}$, whose laws of motion are defined as

$$v_{1,t} = v_{2,t-1} + \varepsilon_{1,t}^R = \varepsilon_{2,t-1}^R + \varepsilon_{1,t}^R \quad (23)$$

$$v_{2,t} = \varepsilon_{2,t}^R \quad (24)$$

The variable $v_{1,t}$ contains all central bank forward guidance known in period t that affects the interest rate one period later, that is, $\varepsilon_{2,t-1}^R$ and $\varepsilon_{1,t}^R$. Forward guidance known in period t that affects the interest rate two periods later is defined by $v_{2,t}$. This variable consists of $\varepsilon_{2,t}^R$, which is defined as current-period forward guidance that affects the interest rate two periods later. Furthermore, the “ $\hat{}$ ” symbol over the variables is removed for the remainder of the paper to simplify notation.

2.3 Exogenous Shocks

The model’s exogenous shocks consist of a spread shock ($\sigma_{w,t}$), price markup shock ($\lambda_{f,t}$), labor shock (φ_t), stochastic preference shock (b_t), government spending shock (g_t), marginal efficiency of investment shock (μ_t), bankruptcy cost shock (μ_t^e), time-varying exogenous survival rate of entrepreneurs shock (γ_t), monetary policy shock (ε_t^{MP}), and forward guidance shocks ($\varepsilon_{1,t}^R, \varepsilon_{2,t}^R, \dots, \varepsilon_{L,t}^R$).⁵ Except for the unanticipated monetary policy and forward guidance shocks, the structural shocks follow an AR(1) process with autocorrelation parameters ($\rho_{\sigma_w}, \rho_{\lambda_f}, \rho_{\varphi}, \rho_b, \rho_g, \rho_{\mu}, \rho_{\mu^e}$, and ρ_{γ}).

3. Expectations Formation

This paper assumes agents evaluate the expectations in equations (1)–(17) following either the rational expectations hypothesis or adaptive learning. Rational expectations agents form expectations based on the true model of the economy. They know the structure of the model, parameters of the model (e.g., ζ_p, h , etc.), distribution of the error terms, and beliefs of other agents. Adaptive learning agents do not know the true model of the economy. Instead, they operate as

⁵The units of the standard deviations of the shocks are in terms of their respective left-hand-side variables.

real-life economists (e.g., econometricians) by creating an econometric model of the economy to produce forecasts of future economic variables. They estimate the parameters using standard econometric techniques and revise their forecasts as new data arrives.⁶

3.1 Rational Expectations

The model under rational expectations is solved using standard techniques (e.g., Sims 2002). The model is written in general state-space form:

$$\tilde{\Gamma}_0 \tilde{Y}_t = C + \tilde{\Gamma}_1 \tilde{Y}_{t-1} + \tilde{\Gamma}_2 \tilde{\varepsilon}_t + \tilde{\Gamma}_3 \zeta_t, \tag{25}$$

where

$$\tilde{Y}_t = [Y_t, \epsilon_t, v_t, \Xi_t]' \tag{26}$$

$$Y_t = [\xi_t, R_t, c_t, \bar{k}_t, i_t, k_t, u_t, r_t^k, q_t, \tilde{R}_t^K, \pi_t, n_t, w_t, \tilde{w}_t, L_t, mc_t, y_t, m_t]' \tag{27}$$

$$\epsilon_t = [\lambda_{f,t}, \mu_t, \varphi_t, g_t, \sigma_{w,t}, b_t, \mu_t^e, \gamma_t]' \tag{28}$$

$$v_t = [v_{1,t}, v_{2,t}, \dots, v_{L,t}]' \tag{29}$$

$$\Xi_t = [E_t \xi_{t+1}, E_t \pi_{t+1}, E_t c_{t+1}, E_t i_{t+1}, E_t \tilde{R}_{t+1}^k, E_t \tilde{w}_{t+1}, E_t w_{t+1}]' \tag{30}$$

$$\tilde{\varepsilon}_t = [\varepsilon_t^\lambda, \varepsilon_t^\mu, \varepsilon_t^\varphi, \varepsilon_t^g, \varepsilon_t^{\sigma_w}, \varepsilon_t^b, \varepsilon_t^{\mu^e}, \varepsilon_t^\gamma, \varepsilon_t^{MP}, \varepsilon_{1,t}^R, \varepsilon_{2,t}^R, \dots, \varepsilon_{L,t}^R]'. \tag{31}$$

C denotes a vector of constants of required dimensions, Y_t defines a vector containing the model’s endogenous variables, ϵ_t is a vector of the model’s exogenous processes, and Ξ_t denotes the vector of expectations. The iid structural disturbances and forward guidance shocks are contained in the vector $\tilde{\varepsilon}_t$. The expectational errors (e.g., $\zeta_t^\pi = \pi_t - E_{t-1} \pi_t$) are contained in the vector ζ_t of required dimensions. When using the technique proposed by Sims (2002) and the parameter values in table 1 (shown later), the solution under rational expectations is

$$\tilde{Y}_t = \tilde{C} + \xi_1 \tilde{Y}_{t-1} + \xi_2 \tilde{\varepsilon}_t, \tag{32}$$

⁶For a more in-depth discussion, see Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009).

where the matrices \tilde{C} , ξ_1 , and ξ_2 are nonlinear functions of the model’s parameters.⁷

3.2 Adaptive Learning

Adaptive learning agents evaluate the expectations in equations (1)–(17) by forming an econometric model and estimating the coefficients. This model is called the “perceived law of motion” (PLM) and contains the variables that appear in the minimum state variable (MSV) solution that exists under rational expectations.⁸ The PLM is given by

$$Y_t = a + bY_{t-1} + cv_t + d\tilde{\epsilon}_t + ev_{1,t-1} + \epsilon_t^W, \tag{33}$$

where $\tilde{\epsilon}_t = [\epsilon_t, \epsilon_t^{MP}]'$ and ϵ_t^W is perceived white-noise error. Y_t , v_t , and ϵ_t are defined as in the rational expectations model. In addition, the reader should note that v_t and $\tilde{\epsilon}_t$ can be expressed as

$$v_t = \Phi v_{t-1} + \eta_t \tag{34}$$

$$\tilde{\epsilon}_t = \tilde{\phi}\tilde{\epsilon}_{t-1} + \bar{\epsilon}_t, \tag{35}$$

where Φ is an $L \times L$ matrix given by

$$\Phi = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & & & & \ddots & \vdots & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \tag{36}$$

⁷Section 4.1 contains a discussion of the model’s parameter values.

⁸This paper utilizes a PLM that is based on the unique non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium.

and

$$\eta_t = [\varepsilon_{1,t}^R, \varepsilon_{1,t}^R, \dots, \varepsilon_{L,t}^R]' \tag{37}$$

$$\tilde{\phi} = \begin{bmatrix} \rho_{\lambda_f} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \rho_{\mu} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \rho_{\varphi} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \rho_g & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \rho_{\sigma_w} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \rho_b & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \rho_{\mu^e} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \rho_{\gamma} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \tag{38}$$

$$\tilde{e}_t = [\varepsilon_t^\lambda, \varepsilon_t^\mu, \varepsilon_t^\varphi, \varepsilon_t^g, \varepsilon_t^w, \varepsilon_t^b, \varepsilon_t^{\mu^e}, \varepsilon_t^\gamma, \varepsilon_t^{MP}]'. \tag{39}$$

a , b , c , d , and e are unknown coefficient matrices of appropriate dimensions that adaptive learning agents estimate each period. The time subscript is not added to the PLM coefficients to highlight that adaptive learning agents believe their expectations to be optimal every period. They do not take into account that they will be updating their beliefs in the future. However, the coefficients in the PLM will evolve each period, as will be described later. Furthermore, the addition of $v_{1,t-1}$ in the PLM is necessary. $v_{1,t-1}$ is contained in the rational expectations solution but not found in the vector v_t , as seen in equations (34) and (36).

This paper assumes the following timeline of events for the learning expectations formation process:

- At the beginning of period t , adaptive learning agents observe v_t and \tilde{e}_t and add these variables to their information set.
- Agents use previous-period's estimates (i.e., a_{t-1} , b_{t-1} , c_{t-1} , d_{t-1} , and e_{t-1}) and Y_{t-1} , v_t , \tilde{e}_t , and $v_{1,t-1}$ to construct forecasts of future endogenous variables.
- The values of the endogenous variables contained in Y_t are realized.
- Adaptive learning agents update their parameter estimates by computing a least-squares regression of Y_t on 1, Y_{t-1} , v_t , \tilde{e}_t , and $v_{1,t-1}$.

Agents update their parameter estimates of the PLM by following the recursive least squares (RLS) formula

$$\phi_t = \phi_{t-1} + \tau_t R_t^{-1} z_t (Y_t - \phi_{t-1}' z_t)' \quad (40)$$

$$R_t = R_{t-1} + \tau_t (z_t z_t' - R_{t-1}), \quad (41)$$

where $\phi = (a, b, c, d, e)'$ contains the PLM coefficients to be estimated and $z_t \equiv [1, Y_{t-1}, v_t, \tilde{\epsilon}_t, v_{1,t-1}]'$ defines the regressors in the PLM. R_t is the precision matrix of the regressors in the PLM. Adaptive learning agents' recent prediction error is given by the last expression in (40). The "gain" parameter τ_t governs the degree in which ϕ_t responds to new information.

This current paper examines the discounted or constant gain learning (CGL) case in which the gain parameter is fixed to a certain value, that is, $\tau_t = \bar{\tau}$. As described in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the coefficients will converge in distribution to their rational expectations counterparts with a variance proportional to $\tau_t = \bar{\tau}$. Under this scheme, recent observations also play a larger role when adaptive learning agents are updating their coefficients. This assumption allows agents to update their beliefs every period to new information (e.g., forward guidance), as is similar to real-life economists updating their forecasts as new data arrive.⁹

Adaptive learning agents solve for $\hat{E}_t Y_{t+1}$ by using equation (33). Specifically, expectations are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{E}_t Y_{t+1} = & (I_{18} + b_{t-1})a_{t-1} + b_{t-1}^2 Y_{t-1} + (b_{t-1}c_{t-1} + c_{t-1}\Phi)v_t \\ & + (b_{t-1}d_{t-1} + d_{t-1}\tilde{\phi})\tilde{\epsilon}_t + b_{t-1}e_{t-1}v_{1,t-1} + e_{t-1}v_{1,t}. \end{aligned} \quad (42)$$

Equation (42) is substituted into equations (1)–(17) to give the "actual law of motion" (ALM):

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t = & \Gamma_0(\phi_{t-1}) + \Gamma_1(\phi_{t-1})Y_{t-1} + \Gamma_2(\phi_{t-1})v_t + \Gamma_3(\phi_{t-1})v_{t-1} \\ & + \Gamma_4(\phi_{t-1})\tilde{\epsilon}_t + \Gamma_5(\phi_{t-1})\tilde{\epsilon}_{t-1}. \end{aligned} \quad (43)$$

⁹This approach is in contrast to the decreasing gain or RLS case in which $\tau_t = t^{-1}$. If the E-stability condition is satisfied and a projection facility is used, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) describe that RLS implies past observations are equally weighted and the coefficients converge to their rational expectations counterparts with probability one as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

The previous equation describes the evolution of the model's endogenous variables implied by the PLM in (33).

The approach employed in this paper to model expectations under adaptive learning is the "Euler equation" (EE) method, which is in contrast to the infinite-horizon approach (IH). The former is the most common approach used in the literature in which one-period-ahead expectations show up in the model's equilibrium equations. Another approach is IH learning, discussed in Preston (2005). The values of current-period macroeconomic variables (e.g., output and inflation) depend on the infinite-horizon expectations of the endogenous variables. It is apparent that the outcomes to forward guidance of these two approaches might vary as the future stream of interest rates are modeled in the IH approach.¹⁰ However, if agents know or quickly learn the market clearing conditions, Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans (2013) show that the two approaches to learning are valid and model consistent. The stability of the adaptive learning model is also typically not affected by implementing either EE or IH learning as described by Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009).¹¹

EE learning is employed in this paper over IH learning for the following reasons. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of forward guidance when the standard assumptions of rational expectations and frictionless financial markets are relaxed. Thus, by utilizing a standard financial friction model with rational expectations (i.e., FRBNY DSGE), both assumptions can easily be relaxed to investigate the effects of forward guidance. In addition, EE learning is more straightforward and tractable than IH learning to implement in larger models, such as the FRBNY DSGE model employed in the present paper.¹² Therefore, while infinite-horizon learning in a financial friction model would be interesting to explore in a future

¹⁰The future stream of interest rates could add another channel through which forward guidance could operate. However, as will be detailed below, the purpose of the paper is to investigate the effects of forward guidance when relaxing the benchmark assumptions of frictionless financial markets and rational expectations in a standard DSGE financial friction model.

¹¹Another part of the adaptive learning literature examines "finite-horizon learning" (Branch, Evans, and McGough 2013, p. 143). This area examines adaptive learning under expectations that are in the middle of EE and IH.

¹²However, IH learning is relatively simple to apply in smaller models (e.g., the New Keynesian model presented in Woodford 2003).

study, this approach to modeling adaptive learning expectations is beyond the scope of the paper.

4. Results

4.1 Parameterization

Table 1 displays the values of the parameters used in simulation. The values largely follow from empirical work by Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) and Del Negro et al. (2013). There exists a high degree of habit formation in consumption with $h = 0.71$. $a'' = 0.2$ indicates a smaller reaction of the rental rate of capital to changes in the capital utilization rate. The value of the price stickiness parameter implies that prices change once a year, which also corresponds to empirical work by Klenow and Malin (2010). The inclusion of a financial sector also adds additional credit market parameters. The survival rate of entrepreneurs is set to 0.99. $\zeta_{sp,b}$ defines the elasticity of the spread ($E_t(\tilde{R}_{t+1}^K - R_t)$) with respect to leverage ($q_t^k + \bar{k}_t - n_t$) and equals 0.05. For simplicity, the structural shocks are assumed to be iid. The distribution of the noise shocks is not assumed to be highly dispersed. There also is no covariance between the structural shocks.

The CGL parameter, $\bar{\tau}$, is chosen to be 0.02 for the following two reasons. This value closely follows Orphanides and Williams (2005), Branch and Evans (2006), and Milani (2007). The value of $\bar{\tau} = 0.02$ is also justified by following the procedure of Eusepi and Preston (2011) and Sinha (2016). Specifically, the autocorrelations of the forecast error of the interest rate across the benchmark, lower, and higher values of the constant gain learning parameter are compared with their counterparts in the data.¹³ The data regard the forecast error of the one-quarter-ahead three-month Treasury bill rate from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The time period spans 1981:Q3 to 2016:Q2. Table 2 displays the results, which show that the adaptive learning model with a gain of $\bar{\tau} = 0.02$ is closest to the data in terms of autocorrelation of the forecast error for the interest rate.

¹³The lower and higher values of $\bar{\tau}$ are 0.001 and 0.03, respectively. These values follow from section 4.5.

Table 1. Parameter Values

	Description	Value
α	Capital's Share of Output	0.33
ζ_p	Price Stickiness	0.75
ι_p	Price Indexation	0.54
δ	Depreciation	0.025
Φ	Share of Fixed Costs	0.3
S''	Investment Adjustment Cost	4
h	Habit Formation	0.71
a''	Capital Utilization Cost	0.2
ν_l	Elasticity of Labor Supply	2
ν_m	Money Demand	2
β	Discount Factor	0.99
ζ_w	Wage Stickiness	0.75
ι_w	Wage Indexation	0.5
λ_w	Elast. of Sub. Diff. Labor Services	0.3
ψ_π	Feedback Inflation	1.40
ψ_y	Feedback Output	0.10
ζ_{spb}	Elast. of Spread w.r.t. Leverage	0.05
γ	Steady-State Growth Rate of Economy	2.75
λ_f	Steady-State Price Markup	0.15
g^*	Steady-State Government	0.3
$F(\bar{\omega})$	Steady-State Default Rate	0.03
L	FG Horizon	12
$\bar{\tau}$	CGL	0.02

Notes: The standard deviations of the structural shocks are set to 0.0001. FG stands for forward guidance. The autoregressive parameters for the structural shocks are set to equal 0.

Table 2. Autocorrelation in Forecast Errors of the Nominal Interest Rate

SPF	CGL $w/\bar{\tau} = 0.001$	CGL $w/\bar{\tau} = 0.02$	CGL $w/\bar{\tau} = 0.03$
0.11	0.18	0.13	0.20

Notes: This table presents the autocorrelation in forecast error of the nominal interest rate computed as the difference between R_t and $E_{t-1}R_t$. SPF stands for Survey of Professional Forecasters. CGL means constant gain learning. Data for SPF span from 1981:Q3 to 2016:Q2.

The values of the monetary policy parameters in table 1 closely match the existing literature. Monetary policy positively responds to output and positively adjusts at more than a one-to-one rate to inflation. The value of χ_x closely follows Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajšek (2009), who estimated a medium-scale DSGE model with financial frictions. The value of the inflation feedback parameter (i.e., χ_π) closely follows empirical adaptive learning work by Milani (2007). In addition, L represents the length of central bank time-contingent forward guidance and is set equal to 12. This number is based on the FOMC September 2012 statement, which was one of its last announcements to exclusively use time-contingent forward guidance language. In this statement, the FOMC said “the Committee also decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015.” The number of quarters from September 2012 to “mid-2015” is 12 when taking “mid-2015” to be, at most, the end of the third quarter of 2015.

4.2 Normal Economic Times

I first examine the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance under the DSGE model with financial frictions. K -period impulse responses of output, investment, and inflation to negative-one-standard-deviation forward guidance shocks under different expectations assumptions are examined in figures 1 and 2.¹⁴ In addition, adaptive learning impulse response functions cannot be computed using standard linear techniques, as equation (43) exhibits a nonlinear structure. Thus, the following approach from Eusepi and Preston (2011) is utilized. The model is simulated twice for $T + 1 + K$ periods, where K is the impulse response horizon and is chosen to be 20 periods.¹⁵ One

¹⁴The forward guidance shocks are found in equations (19)–(22).

¹⁵To ensure that the adaptive learning coefficients converge to its stationary distribution, T is chosen to be a large number. In this paper, $T = 5,000$. This also eliminates the effect of initial conditions. In addition, the initial beliefs for ϕ are set to their rational expectations counterparts and for R are set to the identity matrix.


simulation contains a negative-one-standard-deviation forward guidance shock in period $T + 1$. The impulse responses are given by the difference between the two simulations over the final $K = 20$ periods. Besides the addition of a negative-one-standard-deviation shock in time period $T + 1$ in the first simulation, the shocks are the same in both simulations across the $T + 1 + K$ time period and are drawn from a normal distribution with standard deviations reported in section 4.1. This process is repeated a large number of times and the average is taken to arrive at the reported impulse response function. Furthermore, the solid lines in figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent rational expectations impulse response functions. The dashed lines denote the adaptive learning impulse response functions with 95 percent confidence bands given by the dotted lines.¹⁶

Figures 1 and 2 show that the macroeconomic variables overall display a stronger reaction to forward guidance under rational expectations than under adaptive learning.¹⁷ Even though forward guidance has stimulative effects on both expectations assumptions, the adaptive learning output path exhibits a smaller reaction to forward guidance shocks than rational expectations. Rational expectations agents' forecasts are based on the true model of the economy. Consequently, rational expectations agents understand the effects that statements about the future interest rate have on future macroeconomic variables. However, adaptive learning agents are unable to base their expectations on the true model of the economy, as they are not endowed with that knowledge. Instead, they estimate the effects of forward guidance utilizing an econometric model of the economy.

¹⁶ As described by Branch, Evans, and McGough (2014), CGL models can also exhibit explosive dynamics, especially with lagged variables in adaptive learning agents' forecasting equation. Thus, by following the CGL literature, this paper implements a projection facility. Specifically, if the eigenvalues on the b matrix in equation (33) have modulus greater than or equal to one, agents are assumed to stop updating. The parameter estimates for ϕ are returned back to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and the R matrix to its initial value, that is, the identity matrix. Moreover, as stated by Branch, Evans, and McGough (2014, p. 2), projection facilities can be interpreted as agents discarding "data that do not align with their prior belief that the economic system is stable."

¹⁷ Overall, the effects of forward guidance in this model are also symmetric, that is, the case of a one-standard-deviation forward guidance shock increase.

Figure 1. Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic Variables to Forward Guidance Shocks




Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

Adaptive learning agents are continually adjusting their forecasts each period, causing a smaller reaction to forward guidance.¹⁸

Figures 3 and 4 show the reaction of financial variables to forward guidance statements under both expectations formations. The impulse responses of net worth to (negative) 1-, 4-, 8-, and 12-period-ahead forward guidance shocks display a stronger reaction under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. The response

¹⁸It is important to note that adaptive learning agents’ responses could be exactly the same as their rational expectations counterparts, as the former agents use the MSV solution of a linearized model when constructing forecasts. This situation arises if the former agents had REE-consistent beliefs. Therefore, the discrepancy in results between the two expectations formation processes is due to adaptive learning forecasts diverging from REE as a consequence of adaptive learning adjustment process.

Figure 2. Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic Variables to Forward Guidance Shocks




Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

of the spread displays intuition for this result. For instance, the response of the spread to one- and four-period-ahead forward guidance shocks is more favorable under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. This beneficial change in the spread causes a larger increase in net worth under rational expectations than adaptive learning.¹⁹ The reasoning is the same as the previous paragraph: rational expectations agents base their forecasts on the true model of the economy, while adaptive learning agents do not.

¹⁹The spread for the 8- and 12-period-ahead shocks are closer together for both rational expectations and adaptive learning. However, the responses of net worth are still less than rational expectations for both of the shocks.


Figure 3. Impulse Responses of Financial Variables to Forward Guidance Shocks



Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

The inclusion of a financial sector contributes to the differences between adaptive learning and rational expectations. Under the latter expectations formation scheme, a forward guidance announcement has the following effects. First, rational expectations agents know precisely how the opportunity cost of future consumption decreases with lower future interest rates. They lower future savings for more future consumption. Since agents are forward looking, current consumption (and thus, output as seen by figure 1) increases with a decrease in current savings. Rational expectations agents also know precisely how forward guidance statements to drop future interest rates will affect future expected cost of borrowing by entrepreneurs from the financial sector. Since a commitment to decrease future interest rates lowers the expected cost of borrowing, a favorable forward guidance statement entices entrepreneurs to take out

Figure 4. Impulse Responses of Financial Variables to Forward Guidance Shocks




Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

more loans to purchase capital. Investment then increases by capital producers to produce more capital for entrepreneurs. The latter funnel more capital to the intermediate goods sector, increasing overall economic activity. However, adaptive learning agents do not precisely understand how forward guidance affects future consumption, savings, and expected cost of borrowing, as they base their expectations on an econometric model of the economy. Current consumption (and thus, savings) and investment are not as responsive under adaptive learning as they are under rational expectations, as evidenced by figures 1 and 2.²⁰

²⁰Moreover, as will formally be explained in section 4.4, financial frictions create a larger “wedge” between the responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance.


Figure 5. Impulse Responses of Expected Inflation to Forward Guidance Shocks



Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

It is also useful to examine the response of inflation expectations to forward guidance shocks. Figure 5 displays the response of inflation expectations to 1-, 4-, 8-, and 12-period-ahead forward guidance shocks. Under both expectations formation schemes, an announcement to lower future interest rates implies agents expecting future increases in demand. Future demand increasing implies more inflation in the future. However, both types of agents do not expect the same amount of future inflation, as they form expectations differently. Overall, there is a stronger reaction between the announcement and realization of the shock under rational expectations than under adaptive learning, as the dashed line is below the solid line. Afterwards, there is a slower adjustment of the adaptive learning path toward rational expectations. Thus, the results show that the stronger reaction of rational expectations to forward

Figure 6. Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic Variables to a Monetary Policy Shock




Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

guidance announcements is in part due to the response of inflation expectations.

The impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a favorable monetary policy shock are shown in figures 6 and 7. These graphs display the impulse responses to a negative-one-standard-deviation shock to ε_t^{MP} . Overall, the adaptive learning responses are not as favorable relative to rational expectations, which is similar to the case of forward guidance shocks.²¹ For instance, the path of

²¹In addition, persistence is not as great as compared to Rychalovska (2013), who estimated a DSGE model with financial frictions under adaptive learning and rational expectations but without forward guidance. However, this discrepancy may be due to Rychalovska (2013) using a PLM with more lags (i.e., AR(2) + constant) than the one presented in this paper (i.e., equation (33)), which could induce greater amounts of persistence in expectations formation and, thus, the macroeconomic variables.

Figure 7. Impulse Responses of Financial Variables to a Monetary Policy Shock



Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

output under adaptive learning is below its rational expectations counterpart. The logic for the monetary policy shock result is the same as the forward guidance shock case. Adaptive learning responses are not as great as responses under rational expectations because the former type of agents form expectations based on an econometric model of the economy and the addition of financial frictions.

It is also helpful to understand the filtering problem of both types of agents. At the time of the announcement of the forward guidance shock, both agents know the forward guidance shock and understand the magnitude of it. However, adaptive learning agents attribute their forecast error partly to permanent and temporary changes in their coefficients. This fraction depends on the constant gain parameter $\bar{\tau}$. This result is similar to the case of a standard unanticipated monetary policy shock. However, the filtering

problem of a forward guidance shock and monetary policy shock differ in that a forward guidance shock directly affects agents' expectations and has yet to be realized on the economy. Thus, adaptive learning agents are slower than rational expectations agents to understand the full effects of the forward guidance shock, as they form expectations utilizing an econometric model. As seen in figures 1 and 2, their estimations of the effects of forward guidance are less relative to rational expectations.

Overall, the message from this section is that rational expectations exhibits a stronger reaction to forward guidance and a financial sector compounds the differences between the two types of agents. When the central bank communicates forward guidance to agents, the adaptive learning path of output is different than rational expectations. Rational expectations agents precisely understand the effects forward guidance has on macroeconomic variables, as they base their beliefs on the true model of the economy. However, the expectations of adaptive learning agents are slower to adjust to forward guidance statements, as they base their forecasts on an estimated model of the economy. The presence of financial frictions also creates bigger differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance news.

4.3 Economic Crisis

Central bank forward guidance was implemented in response to the 2007–09 financial crisis. With that event in mind, this section examines the effects of forward guidance during a period of economic crisis (e.g., a recession) under both rational expectations and adaptive learning assumptions. Specifically, the central bank communicates forward guidance information such that the interest rate $\bar{R} = 0$ throughout the recession and forward guidance horizon. The policy simulation is described next and is motivated by similar exercises in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) and Cole (2015).

The model is first simulated until period $T + 1$ with the shocks drawn from the same normal distribution as in section 4.2. This time frame reflects a period of economic stability (e.g., the period before the Great Recession). In period $T + 1$, the economy

experiences a recession that lasts six periods.²² A large negative spread shock affects the model in period $T+1$, followed by a sequence of five more adverse spread shocks.²³ To counter the adverse effects in the economy, the central bank implements forward guidance. It communicates to the public that the interest rate will equal $\bar{R} = 0$ in period $T+1$ and L periods into the future. This forward guidance announcement corresponds to an unanticipated change in the interest rate in period $T+1$ and anticipated changes in the interest rate in periods $T+2$ through $T+L+1$. Specifically, the central bank chooses the unanticipated monetary policy shock, ε_{T+1}^{MP} , and the anticipated forward guidance shocks $\eta_{T+1} = [\varepsilon_{1,T+1}^R, \varepsilon_{2,T+1}^R, \dots, \varepsilon_{L,T+1}^R]$ such that the nominal interest rate equals 0 from the time period $T+1$ through $T+L+1$.²⁴ In addition, the length of the central bank's forward guidance spans a recession and normal times since $L = 12$. If agents expect the interest rate to be lower than usual even during economic expansions, that is, normal times, forward guidance can have additional stimulative effects. The central bank also assumes that agents form their expectations via the rational expectations hypothesis. This expectations formation scheme is the standard assumption in macroeconomic models. The same forward guidance is then given to adaptive learning agents in order to examine the differences between the two types of expectations formation assumptions.

The previously described exercise assumes that the central bank is committed to keeping the interest rate at zero throughout the forward guidance horizon. Rational expectations agents precisely understand how the central bank's forward guidance statements affect the economy. Thus, the interest rate equals $\bar{R} = 0$ throughout the forward guidance horizon. However, adaptive learning agents

²²The recession's length is chosen in accordance with the National Bureau of Economic Research's definition of the 2007–09 Great Recession.

²³After the recession, the shocks are drawn from a normal distribution.

²⁴The shocks across the $T+L+1$ horizon are drawn from the same normal distribution as in section 4.2 with the exception of the chosen unanticipated monetary policy and forward guidance shocks in period $T+1$ and the additional adverse spread shocks in periods $T+1$ through $T+6$. After the forward guidance shocks are chosen in period $T+1$, they are not drawn in the remaining periods. In addition, $T = 5,000$, as in section 4.2.


have an incomplete model of the economy when forming expectations. By giving adaptive learning agents the same forward guidance information that was given to rational expectations agents, the interest rate will not achieve a model-implied $\bar{R} = 0$ throughout the forward guidance horizon. To model the central bank promising to keep $\bar{R} = 0$ over the forward guidance horizon and ensure the interest rate is the same value in both rational expectations and adaptive learning, this policy exercise follows Cole (2015) such that the central bank chooses ε_t^{MP} each period to guarantee that $\bar{R} = 0$.

The spread shock operates through the financial sector to cause a downturn in the economy. A higher spread implies that banks perceive entrepreneurs to be riskier and, thus, borrowing costs and cost of capital for firms increase. This result hinders firms from receiving capital from entrepreneurs. Lower economic activity results from less capital being channeled to the production side of the economy. Furthermore, the modeling of a recession via a spread shock closely matches the data. Del Negro et al. (2013) show that spread shocks accounted for about half the decline in output growth during the Great Recession in the United States.

Figure 8 displays the macroeconomic effects of forward guidance during an economic recession. The difference between rational expectations and adaptive learning of different macroeconomic variables is plotted. A positive value indicates that the macroeconomic variable's value is higher under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. If the value is negative, the value of the macroeconomic variable is lower under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. The figure shows that the stimulative economic effects of forward guidance are larger under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. Specifically, the value of output in the top panel of figure 8 is higher under rational expectations than under adaptive learning across the entire forward guidance horizon.

What accounts for the higher response of output to forward guidance under rational expectations than under adaptive learning? The first source comes from the financial sector of the model. In the bottom three panels of figure 8, differences occur between the responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance. However, the disparity is greater under investment than consumption and inflation, indicating that financial elements are driving the disparity in output between rational expectations and

Figure 8. Macroeconomic Effects of Forward Guidance during an Economic Crisis



Notes: The graphs show the difference in the paths of the macroeconomic variables between rational expectations and adaptive learning agents. This exercise occurs under both negative spread shocks and when the central bank communicates forward guidance such that the interest rate $\bar{R} = 0$ throughout the recession and forward guidance horizon. A positive value indicates that the value under rational expectations is higher than under adaptive learning. A negative value indicates that the variable's value under rational expectations is lower than under adaptive learning.

adaptive learning. The differences between the amount of the knowledge rational expectations and adaptive learning agents have about the economy also influence the results seen in figure 8. Since they construct forecasts using the true model of the economy, rational expectations agents precisely understand how central bank forward guidance will stimulate the economy. However, adaptive learning agents do not know the true model of the economy when constructing their expectations. Since they use an econometric model to build their forecasts, adaptive learning agents *estimate* the effects of forward guidance on the economy. Thus, they fail to understand all of the positive benefits of forward guidance.

The results in this section also relate to the “forward guidance puzzle” found in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012). Their paper showed that central bank forward guidance produced


an exceedingly large reaction of the macroeconomic variables in relation to the data. Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) also solved expectations via the rational expectations hypothesis. In addition, the model in this present paper is based on the model in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012), but is solved under both the assumptions of rational expectations and adaptive learning. As shown in the top panel of figure 8, the value of output exhibits a much larger and more favorable reaction to forward guidance under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. Thus, this paper suggests that the extreme responses of the macroeconomic variables to forward guidance found in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2012) could be due to the expectations assumption.

Overall, the effect of forward guidance is larger when agents form beliefs via the rational expectations hypothesis rather than under adaptive learning. Since they construct forecasts of future endogenous variables using the true model of the economy, rational expectations agents precisely understand the positive effects of forward guidance. However, adaptive learning agents have partial knowledge about the true model of the economy and must *estimate* the effects of forward guidance using an econometric model. In addition, financial factors play an important role in explaining the more favorable response of output to forward guidance under rational expectations than under adaptive learning. Specifically, the differences in investment between rational expectations and adaptive learning drive the disparity in output. The results of adaptive learning to forward guidance also seem to match the data better than those of rational expectations.

4.4 *Importance of Financial Frictions*

While the previous section commented on the importance of credit frictions, this current section investigates in depth how the addition of financial frictions to a standard DSGE model affects the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements. This examination is important for two reasons. Financial frictions play an integral part of an economy. Del Negro et al. (2013) show that spread shocks emanating from the financial sector contributed to about half the decrease in U.S. output during the 2007–09 financial crisis. In addition, the inclusion of

Figure 9. Difference between Impulse Response Functions of Rational Expectations and Adaptive Learning to Forward Guidance Shocks under Different Values of ζ_{spb}




Notes: Solid line: $\zeta_{spb} = 0.05$. Dashed line: $\zeta_{spb} = 0.001$.

a financial component in modern macroeconomic models is not standard practice. This exclusion may leave out an important channel through which forward guidance operates.

The impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance shocks across rational expectations and adaptive learning assumptions are computed under different values of ζ_{spb} . This parameter defines the elasticity of the spread with respect to leverage of entrepreneurs and governs the strength of the financial sector’s influence on the economy. When ζ_{spb} decreases, the influence of entrepreneurs’ leverage (i.e., the ratio of the value of capital to net worth) on the economy diminishes, that is, the effects of financial conditions on the economy decrease. Therefore, the results of section 4.2 are examined under the baseline case of $\zeta_{spb} = 0.05$ as well as $\zeta_{spb} = 0.001$ to show the contribution of the financial sector to the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance.

Figures 9 and 10 show that the addition of a financial sector into a standard New Keynesian model amplifies the disparity between

Figure 10. Difference between Impulse Response Functions of Rational Expectations and Adaptive Learning to Forward Guidance Shocks under Different Values of ζ_{spb}



Notes: Solid line: $\zeta_{spb} = 0.05$. Dashed line: $\zeta_{spb} = 0.001$.

rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance. The top rows in the figures display the difference in output between the two expectations formation schemes to forward guidance shocks under different values of ζ_{spb} . When the effect of financial conditions on the economy diminishes, that is, $\zeta_{spb} = 0.001$, the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance reduce. However, when financial factors are allowed to exist, that is, $\zeta_{spb} = 0.05$, the disparity between the two increases. As financial conditions play a bigger role in the economy, a bigger “wedge” exists between the output responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance. The adaptive learning agents must estimate how forward guidance will alleviate the recession by forecasting not only future variables concerning households and firms but also the financial sector. This creates more errors by the adaptive learning agents relative to their rational expectations counterparts, causing the effects of forward guidance to be larger under rational expectations relative to adaptive learning. Thus, the removal of financial frictions from standard DSGE models leaves out an important channel through which forward guidance operates.

The impulse responses of investment in the bottom rows of figures 9 and 10 also show how the addition of a financial sector can exacerbate the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements. The same type of large wedge that exists between rational expectations and adaptive learning under output is apparent under investment. When credit frictions play a larger role in the economy (e.g., $\zeta_{spb} = 0.05$), adaptive learning agents' forecasting model is more influenced by the financial sector. Thus, bigger differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning exist.


Overall, the findings in this section suggest a key takeaway for policymakers. If monetary policymakers want to understand the effects of forward guidance and utilize macroeconomic models with the standard assumptions of rational expectations and frictionless financial markets, the results may be potentially misleading. This section shows that the addition of financial frictions into a standard macroeconomic model exacerbates the differences between the responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance.

4.5 *Alternative Constant Gains*

This section examines the importance of financial frictions for forward guidance effectiveness when the degree in which adaptive learning agents discount previous observations is changed. Specifically, the financial friction “wedge” that exists between the responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance is examined to see how sensitive it is to different values of $\bar{\tau}$. The exercise in section 4.2 is rerun under the baseline value of $\zeta_{spb} = 0.05$. Lower and higher values of $\bar{\tau}$ are also chosen. To capture adaptive learning agents placing less weight on new information, the results are examined under $\bar{\tau} = 0.001$, represented by the dotted line in figure 11. To capture adaptive learning agents placing more weight on new information, the results are examined under $\bar{\tau} = 0.03$, represented by the dashed line. The benchmark rational expectations impulse response functions are also displayed and denoted by the solid line in figure 11.

Figure 11 shows that the degree in which financial frictions amplify the differences between rational expectations and adaptive


Figure 11. Impulse Response Functions to Forward Guidance Shocks under Different Values of $\bar{\tau}$



Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dotted line: CGL with $\bar{\tau} = 0.001$. Dashed line: CGL with $\bar{\tau} = 0.03$. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

learning depends on the value of $\bar{\tau}$. When adaptive learning agents place more weight on previous observations, that is, as $\bar{\tau}$ increases, financial conditions in the economy have a bigger impact on their forecasts. Thus, output does not exhibit as strong a response to forward guidance as under a lower value of $\bar{\tau}$. Figure 11 shows a larger wedge between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance under $\bar{\tau} = 0.03$ than $\bar{\tau} = 0.001$ from the time of the announcement of the forward guidance shock to its realization. As adaptive learning agents weight previous observations less, that is, as $\bar{\tau}$ decreases, their beliefs and forecasts should not vary as much from the previous period. Consequently, current financial conditions in the economy do not play as big a role in their forecasts. Thus, the financial friction wedge between rational expectations and adaptive learning diminishes. Figure 11 shows the smaller difference between rational expectations and CGL with $\bar{\tau} = 0.001$ from the time of the announcement of the forward guidance shock to its realization.

Figure 12. Impulse Responses of Macroeconomic Variables to a Spread Shock




Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

4.6 Spread Shock

Section 4.4 investigated how the addition of a financial sector to a standard DSGE model affected the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance announcements. However, it is also useful to explore the significance of introducing financial frictions by examining the effects of a spread shock on the macroeconomic variables. Specifically, the current section will examine the results of impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a (favorable) shock to $\sigma_{w,t}$.

The results are displayed in figures 12 and 13. These outcomes are best seen when analyzing the variables' responses to a negative-one-unit spread shock. When an unanticipated lowering of $\sigma_{w,t}$ occurs, both agents recognize the positive effects occurring on the economy. Under both rational expectations and adaptive learning, lower spreads lead to higher net worth, investment, and output. However,

Figure 13. Impulse Responses of Financial Variables to a Spread Shock



Notes: Solid line: rational expectations. Dashed line: CGL. Dotted lines: 95 percent confidence bands. Following Eusepi and Preston (2011), the adaptive learning impulse responses are given by the difference between the shocked and unshocked simulations.

figures 12 and 13 display an amplified response of these variables under adaptive learning. This amplification relates to Rychalovska (2013), who found that in a DSGE model with financial frictions there is a stronger immediate reaction of the macroeconomic variables under adaptive learning than rational expectations. However, the adaptive learning impulse responses in Rychalovska (2013) exhibit more persistence than those in figures 12 and 13 in the current paper. This outcome could be due to the following reason. Rychalovska (2013) utilizes a more persistent adaptive learning forecasting model (i.e., AR(2) + constant) than the PLM utilized in the present paper (i.e., equation (33)), which could cause greater persistence in the macroeconomic variables.

4.7 Contribution of Monetary Policy Shocks

Section 4.3 showed that the effects of forward guidance are larger under rational expectations relative to adaptive learning during a

recession. In the exercise of that section, the central bank chose the forward guidance shocks such that $\bar{R} = 0$ across the forward guidance horizon. The same shocks chosen under rational expectations were given to adaptive learning agents in order to analyze the differences between the two expectations formation schemes. However, these forward guidance shocks are not sufficient to keep the interest rate at zero under adaptive learning, as the two expectations formation processes are different. To remedy this situation, the central bank was also assumed to be committed to a constant interest rate, and thus chose ε_t^{MP} in the adaptive learning case such that the interest rate was zero across the forward guidance horizon. However, a natural issue arises regarding the contribution of this shock toward the larger differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning exhibited during a recession relative to normal times.

Figures 6, 7, 12, and 13 show that the results are not driven by non-forward-guidance shocks. The panels in figures 6 and 7 display the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a negative-one-standard-deviation monetary policy shock. The results do not exhibit notably larger responses relative to the baseline impulse responses of the variables to forward guidance shocks. In addition, figures 12 and 13 display the impulse responses to a spread shock. Overall, the differences between the two expectations formation schemes are not notably large.²⁵

What then could be driving the larger discrepancy between rational expectations and adaptive learning under a recession relative to normal times? The answer concerns the sizes of the anticipated/forward guidance shocks in section 4.3 that were chosen in time period $T + 1$ such that the interest rate equals 0 from the time period $T + 1$ through $T + L + 1$ (i.e., η_{T+1}). Recall that the impulse responses under normal times involved a negative-one-standard-deviation forward guidance shock in period $T + 1$. However, under the recession scenario, the sizes of the chosen forward guidance shocks in period $T + 1$ (i.e., η_{T+1}) are larger in absolute value terms than their standard deviations, leading to greater differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning relative


²⁵Recall that these impulse responses display a negative-one-unit spread shock, as stated in section 4.6.

to normal times. It is not uncommon in the literature for these chosen anticipated/forward guidance shocks to be relatively large (see Galí 2009). Greater discrepancies between rational expectations and adaptive learning would also occur during normal economic times under larger forward guidance shocks. Figure 14 displays this reasoning. Each impulse response path is simulated using the same shocks as described in the first paragraph of section 4.2. However, the difference between the lines regards the size of the shock in period $T + 1$. The solid line contains a -1 -standard-deviation forward guidance shock (i.e., the benchmark case of section 4.2), the dotted line a -10 -standard-deviation forward guidance shock, and the dashed line a -20 -standard-deviation forward guidance shock. As the value of the forward guidance shock increases, the results show that the disparity between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements enlarges during normal times.²⁶ Moreover, the disproportionate response of adaptive learning responses to larger shock sizes is not uncommon for nonlinear models. For example, Weise (1999) shows disproportionate responses of output to larger monetary policy shocks in a nonlinear VAR. Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Potter (2000) also describe how the impulse responses of nonlinear models depend on the magnitude of the shocks.

It is also important to clarify the initial T time periods under both normal economic times and economic crisis times. Under both types of scenarios, the shocks were drawn from the same normal distributions with standard deviations stated in section 4.1. Table 3 also shows the similarities in the initial time periods across both normal economic times and economic crisis times. This table describes how far (or close) the adaptive learning beliefs are from REE at the end of period T . For instance, the first row shows the matrix norm of the difference between the adaptive learning matrix a_T found in equation (33) and its REE counterpart. Across both normal and crisis scenarios, the differences are very similar, indicating the similarities in the initial T time periods for both sections 4.2 and 4.3.

²⁶ A noticeable feature of the bottom-right panel of figure 14 is that the dashed and dotted lines are in the negative territory. However, this is not surprising given the baseline paths of adaptive learning and rational expectations in the top-right panel of figure 2. Overall, as the value of the forward guidance shock enlarges, the difference between the two expectations formation schemes grows.

Figure 14. Difference between Impulse Response Functions of Rational Expectations and Adaptive Learning to Forward Guidance Shocks under Different Value in Period $T + 1$



Notes: Solid lines: 1-standard-deviation (favorable) shock in period $T + 1$. Dotted lines: 10-standard-deviation (favorable) shock in period $T + 1$. Dashed lines: 20-standard-deviation (favorable) shock in period $T + 1$.

Table 3. Matrix Norm of Adaptive Learning Coefficient Matrices Minus REE Coefficient Matrices

	Normal Times	Crisis Times
$\ a_T - \bar{a}\ $	0.0205	0.0207
$\ b_T - \bar{b}\ $	0.0304	0.0317
$\ c_T - \bar{c}\ $	0.0006	0.0007
$\ d_T - \bar{d}\ $	0.0002	0.0002
$\ e_T - \bar{e}\ $	0.0002	0.0002

Notes: a_T , b_T , c_T , d_T , and e_T denote the adaptive learning coefficient matrices at the end of time period T . \bar{a} , \bar{b} , \bar{c} , \bar{d} , and \bar{e} represent the rational expectations counterparts.

5. Conclusion

The 2007–09 global financial crisis caused central banks around the world to implement the unconventional monetary policy of forward guidance to stimulate their economies. The effectiveness of forward guidance hinges on two key channels—expectations and financial markets—that are largely overlooked in standard macroeconomic models. The standard expectations formation assumption is the rational expectations hypothesis, while frictionless financial markets are largely assumed for convenience. Thus, it is of interest to investigate the effectiveness of forward guidance when the rational expectations assumption has been relaxed and credit frictions are included.

This paper utilizes a medium-scale DSGE model with financial frictions to compare the effects of forward guidance under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. The results show that the addition of financial markets into a DSGE model amplifies the differences between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance statements. Adaptive learning agents do not respond as strongly to a forward guidance shock relative to their rational expectations counterparts. During a period of economic crisis (e.g., a recession), output under rational expectations also displays more favorable responses to forward guidance than under adaptive learning. Rational expectations agents form their forecasts based on the true model of the economy and, thus, can understand how forward guidance will precisely help the economy. However, adaptive learning agents must estimate the effects of forward guidance on the economy, as their forecasts are based on an econometric model of the economy. In addition, the differences between the responses of rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance decrease as the effect of financial frictions in the model diminishes. Furthermore, these results are especially important to policymakers. If they want to understand the effects of forward guidance on the economy, monetary policymakers should consider the way in which expectations and financial frictions are modeled.

There are other modifications to the model presented in this paper that are worth noting. For example, the credibility of central bank forward guidance announcements could be examined as

in Dong (2015). In the model presented above, agents believe the forward guidance statements, and the central bank implements its forward guidance promises. However, the results could be examined when agents do not completely believe that the central bank will follow through with its forward guidance statements. The type of forward guidance could also be changed. This current paper examines time-contingent forward guidance, in which the central bank communicates the end date of forward guidance. Forward guidance could be state contingent, in which the completion date of central bank forward guidance is linked to economic conditions (e.g., unemployment rate and output). The RLS formula could also be modified to allow agents to better track structural changes in the economy as described in Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Milani (2014). Specifically, the gain parameter would be a constant if the recent prediction errors were large and would be decreasing if the recent prediction errors were small. Overall, the roles of expectations and financial frictions are important to understand when examining the effects of forward guidance on the economy.

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