

Imperfect Common Knowledge in First-Generation Models of Currency Crises*

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First-generation models assume that the level of reserves of a central bank is common knowledge among arbitrageurs, and therefore the timing of the attack on the currency can be correctly anticipated. The collapse of the peg thus leads to no discrete change in the exchange rate. We relax the assumption of perfect information and introduce uncertainty about the willingness of a central bank to defend the peg. In this new setting, there is a unique equilibrium at which the fixed exchange rate is abandoned. The lack of common knowledge will lead to a discrete devaluation once the peg finally collapses.

JEL Codes: D82, E58, F31.

1. Introduction

Traditionally, exchange rates have been explained by macroeconomic fundamentals. However, there seem to be significant deviations from them. The need to understand these unexplained movements has drawn attention to the basic assumptions of the standard models,

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such as the homogeneity of market consumers or the irrelevance of private information.

First-generation models of currency crises assume that consumers are perfectly informed about macroeconomic fundamentals. The original model is due to Krugman (1979), who drew on the work of Salant and Henderson (1978) on the study of attacks on a government-controlled price of gold.¹ Krugman (1979) presents an economy in which the level of the central bank's foreign reserves is common knowledge among consumers. In this setting, market participants know not only the level of reserves but also that the other agents know it too. There is perfect transmission of information, and speculators can precisely coordinate the attack on the currency. The model concludes that the attack is therefore accurately predictable and implies zero devaluation. However, during currency crises, large discrete devaluations are normally observed.

In this paper, we incorporate the information structure presented in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)² to introduce uncertainty about the willingness of the central bank to defend the peg in first-generation models of currency crises. The application of Abreu and Brunnermeier's dynamic model to currency crises presents several advantages over the original setting. Firstly, it provides a reasonable explanation for the assumption that the asset's market price remains constant until the time when the bubble bursts. In our setting, the exchange rate does remain invariable until the peg collapses, and the cumulative selling pressure will not affect the fixed exchange rate until it exceeds a certain threshold and the central bank can no longer maintain the peg. Secondly, it gives a sound interpretation to the exogenous price paths, which in our model can be intuitively identified with the fixed exchange rate. Thirdly, in Abreu and Brunnermeier's model it is necessary to introduce a final condition that guarantees the burst of the asset bubble even if no arbitrageur sells his shares. In our model, the central bank will be ultimately

¹For a review on the currency crises literature, see Flood and Marion (1999).

²Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) consider an economy in which arbitrageurs learn sequentially, but in random order, that the market price has departed from fundamentals. They assumed this information structure to argue the existence and persistence of asset bubbles despite the presence of rational agents in the economy.

forced to abandon the peg when the foreign reserves are exhausted (even if no speculator attacks the currency).

We consider an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime and a persistent deficit that reduces the central bank's reserves. In this setting, we suppose a continuum of arbitrageurs who, one by one, cannot affect the exchange rate. They can choose between local and foreign currency. We assume that holding local currency generates higher returns, although there is a risk of devaluation. Arbitrageurs take their investment decisions by evaluating the trade-off between these higher profits and the fear of capital losses. At some random time, they become sequentially aware that the shadow price has exceeded the peg,³ and they have to decide between canceling and maintaining their positions. Arbitrageurs notice the mispricing in random order, and they do not know if other arbitrageurs are also aware of it. They would prefer to hold local currency for as long as possible, since it produces higher profits, but they would not want to wait for too long because of the capital losses caused by devaluation.

We suppose that arbitrageurs have financial constraints that limit their individual maximum positions and their impact on the exchange rate. To force the exchange rate off the peg, it will be necessary to coordinate the attack on the currency. Arbitrageurs face a synchronization problem and, at the same time, a competition dilemma: only a fraction of them can leave the market before the peg collapses, because as soon as a large-enough number of arbitrageurs sell out local currency, the central bank will be forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime, and those who still hold local currency at that time will suffer a capital loss.

We prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in which, for moderate heterogeneity among arbitrageurs, the peg is abandoned after enough arbitrageurs have held overvalued currency for some period of time τ^* since they noticed that the fixed exchange rate lies below the shadow price. Arbitrageurs will hold a maximum long position in local currency until they fear the attack is imminent. At that time, they will sell out, causing the fall of the peg. For extreme

³The shadow price is the exchange rate that would prevail in the market if the peg were abandoned. This concept was originally developed by Flood and Garber (1984).

levels of dispersion of opinion among them, the fixed exchange rate regime collapses when the central bank's foreign reserves are completely exhausted. In either case, the abandonment of the peg implies a discrete devaluation of the currency. In the former, we will prove that arbitrageurs optimally hold overvalued currency for some time $\tau^* > 0$. (For their setting, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) state: "After becoming aware of the bubble, they [arbitrageurs] ... optimally choose to ride the bubble over some interval.") Hence, the attack will take place strictly after the shadow price exceeds the peg, causing a jump in the exchange rate. In the latter, the central bank will defend the peg until the reserves are exhausted. This will necessarily occur some time after the shadow price exceeds the peg, which will imply a discrete change in the exchange rate. In this paper we derive a first-generation model of currency crises with imperfect information, which explains the discrete jump in the exchange rate generally observed in the transition from a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime.

This paper is related to the recent literature on currency crises that incorporates private information to accommodate discrete devaluations. Guimarães (2006) introduces uncertainty in a first-generation model by assuming that agents do not know whether they would be able to escape the devaluation. He argues that there is a unique equilibrium in which agents delay their decisions to attack the currency due to these market frictions. A different approach is presented in Pastine (2002). He incorporates a forward-looking rational policymaker that dislikes speculative attacks and is capable of choosing the timing of the move to a floating exchange rate regime. Pastine (2002) shows that the monetary authority has an incentive to introduce uncertainty into the speculators' decisions in order to avoid predictable attacks on the currency. In this model, the standard perfectly predictable attack is replaced by an extended period of speculation that gradually places increasing pressure on the policymaker.

Broner (2006) relaxes the assumption of perfect information and includes a new type of investor: the uninformed consumer. The ratio between informed and uninformed consumers is fixed exogenously and determines the resulting equilibria. He concludes that if the fraction of informed consumers is high enough, market agents face a situation similar to the lack of private information. However, when

the private information is high, the model arrives at a large set of equilibria, characterized by possible discrete devaluations, which differ on the informed consumers' propensity to attack the currency. In Broner's model, the threshold level of the central bank's reserves—and, therefore, the exact time when the peg is attacked—is still common knowledge among informed consumers. In a competitive environment, though, rational agents may not be willing to reveal what they know to other participants.

In independent work, Rochon (2006)⁴ applies Abreu and Brunnermeier's structure to currency crises. She considers an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime in which a negative shock triggers a gradual depletion of the central bank's foreign reserves. The similarities between Rochon (2006) and our work lie in the application of Abreu and Brunnermeier's information structure to currency crises. However, our paper differs from Rochon (2006) in several ways. We consider a different setting; we assume a first-generation model, as described in Krugman (1979), in which a government runs a persistent deficit that will gradually reduce the central bank's foreign reserves. Rochon (2006) defines a model in which the central bank is committed to defend the fixed exchange rate regime, but it is not forced to finance an expansionary monetary policy. Also, we suppose that rational agents have imperfect information about the shadow price, while in Rochon (2006) the key variable is the level of reserves. From there on, the specification and focus of the model, the derivation of the unique equilibrium, and the timing of the attack are clearly different.

The paper is organized in the following order. Section 2 analyzes the Krugman model. We explain Abreu and Brunnermeier's model in section 3. Section 4 illustrates the generalization of the traditional first-generation model of currency crises. We relax the assumption of perfect information and define the new setting. Section 5 studies the resulting unique equilibrium. We derive the timing of the attack and analyze the determinants of the period of time τ^* during which arbitrageurs optimally hold overvalued domestic currency. Finally, we present our conclusions in section 6.

⁴I am thankful to Fernando Broner for bringing this paper to my attention at the International Economics Seminar (London School of Economics, December 2004).

2. The Krugman Model

The original model of speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates is due to Krugman (1979). He considered an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime where the government runs a budget deficit that will gradually reduce the central bank's reserves. The model concludes that the peg will be abandoned before the reserves are completely exhausted. At that time, there will be a speculative attack that eliminates the lasting foreign exchange reserves and leads to the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate.

In this model, the central bank faces two different tasks. First, it must satisfy the financial needs of the government, and second, it has to maintain a fixed exchange rate. The central bank finances the deficit by issuing government debt and defends the peg through direct intervention in the foreign exchange rate market. In this economy, the asset side of the central bank's balance sheet at time t is made up of domestic credit (D_t) and the value in domestic currency of the international reserves (R_t). The balance sheet's liability side consists of the domestic currency in circulation, the money supply (M_t^s). Hence:

$$M_t^s = D_t + R_t.$$

The budget deficit grows at a constant rate μ ($\mu > 0$):

$$\mu = \frac{\dot{D}_t}{D_t}.$$

Also assume that the purchasing parity holds:

$$S_t = \frac{P_t}{P_t^*},$$

where, at time t , P_t is the domestic price level, S_t is the exchange rate of domestic currency for foreign, and P_t^* is the foreign price level. We can fix $P_t^* = 1$, and therefore the exchange rate can be identified with the domestic price level ($P_t = S_t$).

In this model it is supposed that money is only created through the deficit. As long as the central bank is committed to defend the peg, it will print money to finance the deficit. This will tend to raise the money supply and hence affect the domestic prices and

the exchange rate. Domestic prices will begin to increase, bringing about an incipient depreciation of the currency. To maintain the exchange rate fixed, the authorities will reduce the foreign reserves to purchase the domestic currency, and foreign reserves will fall as domestic assets continually rise. Ultimately, if the budget is in deficit, pegging the rate becomes impossible, no matter how large the initial reserves were.

However, the model concludes that the attack comes *before* the stock of foreign reserves would have been exhausted in the absence of speculation. Why? In Krugman's model, consumers can correctly anticipate the exhaustion of the reserves, they can only choose between domestic and foreign money, and it is also supposed that foreigners do not hold domestic money. Then, the assumption of perfect foresight implies that speculators, anticipating an abandonment of the peg, will attack the exchange rate to acquire the central bank's reserves and to avoid a capital loss.

To determine the timing of the crisis, we introduce the following definition.

DEFINITION 1 (*Krugman and Obstfeld 2003*). *The shadow floating exchange rate or shadow price at time t (S_t) is the exchange rate that would prevail at time t if the central bank held no foreign reserves and allowed the currency to float but continued to allow the domestic credit to grow over time.*

In appendix 1, we derive an expression for the shadow floating exchange rate. To simplify the analysis, it is convenient to express all magnitudes in logarithms.⁵ We present logarithmic versions of the previous equations and describe the monetary equilibrium by the Cagan equation. Then, the logarithm of shadow price is given by

$$s_t = \gamma + \mu \times t,$$

where γ and μ are constants, and μ is the rate of growth of the budget deficit. The time of the attack on the currency T is

⁵We use the standard notation in which an uppercase letter represents a variable in levels and a lowercase one its logarithm: $s_t = \ln(S_t)$. From now on, exchange rates will be expressed in logarithms. To simplify the reasoning, we will still refer to them as fixed exchange rate and shadow price, where, to be precise, it should say fixed *log*-exchange rate and *log*-shadow price.

defined as the date on which the shadow price reaches the peg ($s_t = \bar{s}$):

$$T = \frac{\bar{s} - \gamma}{\mu}.$$

In the Krugman model, the level of the central bank's foreign reserves is common knowledge among consumers. Thus, the timing of the attack is accurately predictable, and the transition from a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime occurs without discrete jumps in the exchange rate.

3. The Abreu and Brunnermeier Model

Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) present a model in which an asset bubble can survive despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs. They consider an information structure where rational arbitrageurs become sequentially aware that an asset's market price has departed from fundamentals and do not know if other arbitrageurs have already noticed the mispricing. The model concludes that if the arbitrageurs' opinions are sufficiently dispersed, the asset bubble bursts for exogenous reasons when it reaches its maximum size. And in the case of moderate levels of dispersion of opinion, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) prove that endogenous selling pressure advances the bubble collapse. They demonstrate that these equilibria are unique. Also, the model shows how news events can have a disproportionate impact on market prices, since they allow agents to synchronize their exit strategies.

This model considers two types of agents: behavioral traders (influenced by fads, fashions, overconfidence, etc.) and rational arbitrageurs. Initially the stock price p_t grows at the risk-free interest rate r ($p_t = e^{rt}$) and rational arbitrageurs are fully invested in the market. At $t = 0$, the price starts growing at a faster rate g ($g > r$). Behavioral traders believe that the stock price p_t will grow at a rate g in perpetuity. Hence, whenever the stock price falls below $p_t = e^{gt}$, they are willing to buy any quantity of shares (up to their aggregate absorption capacity κ). Then, at some random time t_0 (exponentially distributed on $[0, \infty)$), rational arbitrageurs become (in random order) sequentially aware that the price is too high. However, the price continues to grow at a rate $g > r$ and, hence,

only a fraction $(1 - \beta(\cdot))$ of the price is explained by the fundamentals, where $\beta(\cdot)$ represents the “bubble component.” Rational agents understand that the market will eventually collapse but still prefer to ride the bubble as it generates higher returns.

In Abreu and Brunnermeier’s model, the bubble collapses as soon as the cumulative selling pressure exceeds some threshold κ (the absorption capacity of the behavioral traders) or ultimately at $t = t_0 + \bar{\tau}$ when it reaches its maximum size $(\bar{\beta})$. It is assumed that arbitrageurs, one by one, have limited impact on the price, because of the financial constraints they face. Consequently, large movements in prices require a coordinated attack. They consider that in each instant t , from $t = t_0$ until $t = t_0 + \eta$, a mass of $1/\eta$ arbitrageurs becomes aware of the mispricing, where η can be understood as a measure of the dispersion of opinion among agents concerning the timing of the bubble. Since t_0 is random, the arbitrageurs do not know how many other rational arbitrageurs have noticed the mispricing, because they will only become aware of the selling pressure when the bubble finally bursts. Rational arbitrageurs face temporal miscoordination. Then, an arbitrageur who becomes aware of this mispricing at time t_i has the following posterior cumulative distribution for the date (t_0) on which the price departed from its fundamental value, with support $[t_i - \eta, t_i]$:

$$\Phi(t_0|t_i) = \frac{e^{\lambda\eta} - e^{\lambda(t_i - t_0)}}{e^{\lambda\eta} - 1}.$$

Therefore, from $t = t_0 + \eta\kappa$ onward, the mispricing is known to enough arbitrageurs to correct it. Nevertheless, they do not attempt to, since as soon as they coordinate, the selling pressure will burst the bubble. However, there is also a competitive component in the model: only a fraction κ of the arbitrageurs will be able to sell out before the bubble collapses (because it bursts the moment the selling pressure surpasses κ). Thus, arbitrageurs also have an incentive to leave the market.

In this setting, each arbitrageur can sell all or part of his stock of shares until a certain limit due to some financial constraints. It is possible to buy back shares and to exit and reenter the market multiple times. The strategy of an agent who became aware of the bubble at time t_i is defined as the selling pressure at time t : $\sigma(\cdot, t_i) =$

$[0, t_i + \bar{\tau}] \mapsto [0, 1]$. The action space is normalized to be the continuum between $[0, 1]$, where 0 indicates a maximum long position and 1 a maximum short position. Then, the aggregate selling pressure of all agents at time $t \geq t_0$ is given by $s(t, t_0) = \int_{t_0}^{\min\{t, t_0 + \bar{\eta}\}} \sigma(t, t_i) dt_i$, and therefore the bursting time can be expressed as

$$T^*(t_0) = \inf\{t | s(t, t_0) \geq \kappa \text{ or } t = t_0 + \bar{\tau}\}.$$

Given this information structure, arbitrageur t_i 's beliefs about the date on which the bubble bursts are described by

$$\Pi(t_0 | t_i) = \int_{T^*(t_0) < t} d\Phi(t_0 | t_i).$$

In their analysis, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) focus on trigger strategies in which an agent, who sells out at t , continues to attack the bubble at all times thereafter. In this case, solving the optimization problem of the arbitrageur who notices the bubble at time t_i and sells out at time t yields the following condition.

LEMMA 1 (*Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003*) (*sellout condition*). *If arbitrageur t_i 's subjective hazard rate is smaller than the "cost-benefit ratio," i.e.,*

$$h(t | t_i) < \frac{g - r}{\beta(t - T^{*-1}(t))},$$

trader t_i will choose to hold the maximum long position at t . Conversely, if $h(t | t_i) > \frac{g - r}{\beta(t - T^{-1}(t))}$, trader t_i will trade to the maximum short position.*

With this condition, $h(t | t_i) = \frac{\pi(t | t_i)}{1 - \Pi(t | t_i)}$ is the hazard rate that the bubble will burst at time t , $\Pi(t | t_i)$ represents arbitrageur t_i 's beliefs about the bursting date, and $\pi(t | t_i)$ denotes the associated conditional density. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) conclude that an arbitrageur who becomes aware of the mispricing at time t_i will hold a maximum long position until his subjective hazard rate becomes larger than the cost-benefit ratio. That is, arbitrageur t_i will ride the bubble until his subjective probability that the bubble will burst in

the next trading round is high enough. At that time, arbitrageur t_i will trade to the maximum short position to get out of the market.

They consider two different scenarios. When arbitrageurs' opinions are sufficiently dispersed, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) prove that the selling pressure does not affect the time when the bubble collapses, because each arbitrageur optimally rides the bubble for so long that, at the end of the horizon ($t = t_0 + \bar{\tau}$), there is not enough pressure to burst the bubble (less than κ will have sold out). They show that there is a unique equilibrium at which the bubble bursts for exogenous reasons at $t = t_0 + \bar{\tau}$. A different conclusion is reached when a moderate level of heterogeneity is assumed. In this case, they demonstrate that there is a unique and symmetric equilibrium in which each arbitrageur sells his shares τ^* periods after becoming aware of the mispricing. The bubble bursts at $t = t_0 + \eta\kappa + \tau^*$ ($< t_0 + \bar{\tau}$, given small values for η).

The model assumes an information structure based on the lack of common knowledge (when an arbitrageur becomes aware of the mispricing, that arbitrageur does not know if others know) and derives that these equilibria are unique. However, in typical applications, the symmetry information game has multiple equilibria. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) argue that the fact that arbitrageurs are competitive (since at most a fraction of them can leave the market prior to the crash) leads to a unique equilibrium even under symmetric information.

4. Imperfect Common Knowledge

This section presents a first-generation model of currency crises in which the traditional assumption of perfect information is relaxed. We introduce the new setting, and we derive the sellout condition that determines the moment when an arbitrageur fears the abandonment of the peg and prefers to attack the currency.


Consider an economy similar to the one described in Krugman (1979) and summarized in section 2. In this setting, the level of the central bank's foreign reserves is common knowledge among arbitrageurs and, therefore, the peg is attacked whenever it leads to no discrete change in the price level, i.e., as soon as the shadow price reaches the fixed exchange rate ($s_t = \bar{s}$). In our model, we incorporate the information structure presented in Abreu and Brunnermeier

(2003) (and reviewed in section 3) to introduce uncertainty about the willingness of the central bank to defend the peg. We consider that the level of reserves is no longer common knowledge among arbitrageurs, and in this paper we analyze the consequences of this uncertainty on the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate.

4.1 The Model

The following process is assumed in our setting. The central bank establishes the fixed exchange rate at a certain level \bar{s} as depicted in figure 1. We denote (the logarithm of) the shadow price by s_t .⁶

Figure 1. Fixed Exchange Rate (\bar{s}) and Shadow Price (s_t)



Note: We represent a fixed exchange rate regime in which the central bank finances a persistent deficit and maintains the exchange rate fixed at a certain level (\bar{s}). We plot the random time $t = \tilde{t}$, when (the logarithm of) the shadow price (s_t) reaches the peg (\bar{s}).

⁶In appendix 1, we prove that the logarithm of the shadow price is a linear function of time ($s_t = \gamma + \mu \times t$) or, equivalently, that the shadow price grows exponentially.

We assume that \tilde{t} is exponentially distributed on $[0, \infty)$ with cumulative distribution function $F(\tilde{t}) = 1 - e^{-\lambda\tilde{t}}$ ($\lambda > 0, \tilde{t} \geq 0$). Prior to $t = \tilde{t}$, the peg lies above the shadow price s_t ($\bar{s} > s_t$), and the fixed exchange rate cannot collapse, since arbitrageurs would only attack the peg if it was profitable for them. If before $t = \tilde{t}$ the peg is abandoned, the currency would immediately reevaluate to reach the shadow price (the local currency would be worth more while arbitrageurs hold short positions in domestic currency). Hence, anticipating this capital loss, arbitrageurs will not attack the currency, and therefore no speculative attack will occur before $t = \tilde{t}$. From $t = \tilde{t}$ onward, the shadow price exceeds the fixed exchange rate ($\bar{s} < s_t$), and the peg might be attacked.

4.1.1 Agents and Actions

In our model, there is only one type of agent: the rational arbitrageurs. We assume a continuum of arbitrageurs, with mass equal to one, who one by one cannot affect the exchange rate because of some financial constraints that limit their maximum market positions. In currency crises, however, it may seem more realistic to consider that only a few relevant institutions actively participate in currency markets and that information might be clustered. This assumption would not modify the intuition of our results. Brunnermeier and Morgan (2004) prove that the equilibrium delay in such games always exceeds equilibrium delay in the game with a continuum of agents and no information clustering (i.e., in the Abreu and Brunnermeier model). Hence, defining a finite number of arbitrageurs and allowing for information clustering increases the optimal waiting time τ^* , and therefore it delays longer the attack on the fixed exchange rate regime, causing a larger discrete devaluation of the home currency.

Let us denote by arbitrageur i the agent who, at time t_i , receives a signal indicating that the shadow price exceeds the fixed exchange rate. Arbitrageur i may take one of two actions—hold local currency or buy foreign currency. Investing in domestic currency generates a return equal to r , while the foreign investment yields r^* . We impose the following condition.

ASSUMPTION 1. $r > r^*$.

We consider that the local currency pays an interest rate r higher than the foreign currency ($r > r^*$) to guarantee that, initially, arbitrageurs invest in domestic currency. Hence, in our economy, rational arbitrageurs originally prefer to invest in domestic currency because of the higher profits, but they understand that the exchange rate will be attacked and the peg eventually abandoned. Therefore, the only decision is when to exit. Selling too early leads to less profitable outcomes, but if they wait too long and they do not leave the market before the fixed exchange rate collapses, they will incur capital losses associated with the devaluation.

An individual arbitrageur is limited in the amount of currency he can buy or sell. As in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), we can normalize the action space to lie between $[0, 1]$ and define the strategy of arbitrageur i by his selling pressure at time t : $\sigma(\cdot, t_i) = [0, t_i + \bar{\tau}] \mapsto [0, 1]$. A selling pressure equal to 0 ($\sigma(t, t_i) = 0$) indicates a maximum long position in local currency, and a value equal to 1 ($\sigma(t, t_i) = 1$) implies that arbitrageur i has sold out all his holdings of domestic currency (maximum pressure). Let $s(t, \tilde{t})$ denote the aggregate selling pressure of all arbitrageurs at time $t \geq \tilde{t}$.

4.1.2 Collapse of the Peg

The fixed exchange rate can collapse for one of two reasons. It is abandoned at $t = \tilde{t} + \tau^* + \eta\kappa$ when the aggregate selling pressure exceeds a certain threshold κ ($s(t, \tilde{t}) \geq \kappa$) or ultimately at a final time when all foreign reserves are exhausted, say at $t = \tilde{t} + \bar{\tau}$. Let us denote this collapsing date by $T^*(\tilde{t}) = \tilde{t} + \zeta$, where $\zeta = \tau^* + \eta\kappa$ if the abandonment of the peg is caused by arbitrageurs' selling pressure (endogenous collapse) and $\zeta = \bar{\tau}$ if it is due to the exhaustion of reserves (exogenous collapse). Since we have assumed that arbitrageurs have no market power, they will need to coordinate to force the abandonment of the peg. However, only a proportion $\kappa < 1$ of arbitrageurs can exit the market before the peg is abandoned. Therefore, arbitrageurs face both cooperation and competition.

4.1.3 Information Structure

To simplify the analysis, we assume that at the random time $t = \tilde{t}$ when the shadow price reaches the peg, arbitrageurs begin to notice

this mispricing. They become aware sequentially and in random order, and they do not know if they have noticed it early or late compared to others. They cannot know if they are the first or the last to know. Specifically, at each instant (between \tilde{t} and $\tilde{t} + \eta$), a new mass $1/\eta$ of arbitrageurs receives a signal indicating that the shadow price exceeds the fixed exchange rate, where η is a measure of the dispersion of opinion among them. The timing of arbitrageur i 's signal is uniformly distributed on $[\tilde{t}, \tilde{t} + \eta]$, but since \tilde{t} is exponentially distributed, each arbitrageur does not know how many others have received the signal before him. Arbitrageur i only knows that at $t = t_i + \eta$ all other arbitrageurs received their signals. Conditioning on $\tilde{t} \in [t_i - \eta, t_i]$, arbitrageur i 's posterior cumulative distribution function for the date \tilde{t} on which the shadow price reached the peg is $\Phi(\tilde{t}|t_i) = \frac{e^{\lambda\eta} - e^{\lambda(t_i - \tilde{t})}}{e^{\lambda\eta} - 1}$. Then, arbitrageur i 's posterior cumulative distribution function over the collapsing date $T^*(\tilde{t})$ is

$$\Pi(T^*(\tilde{t})|t_i) = \frac{e^{\lambda\eta} - e^{\lambda(t_i + \zeta - T^*(\tilde{t}))}}{e^{\lambda\eta} - 1},$$

given that $T^*(\tilde{t}) \in [t_i + \zeta - \eta, t_i + \zeta]$.

4.1.4 Further Assumptions

We consider the following statements to simplify the analysis and the specification of our setting.

ASSUMPTION 2. *In equilibrium, an arbitrageur holds either a maximum long position or a maximum short position in local currency: $\sigma(t, t_i) \in \{0, 1\} \forall t, t_i$.*

We consider that an arbitrageur prefers to invest his whole budget in local currency, since it generates higher returns, until a certain time when he fears that the attack on the currency is imminent and decides to cancel his position by selling all his stock of domestic currency. Hence, his selling pressure is initially equal to zero (when he is fully invested in domestic currency) and equal to one once he sells out. The information structure considered in our model and assumption 2 implies the following result.

COROLLARY 1. *If arbitrageur i holds a maximum short position at time t in local currency ($\sigma(t, t_i) = 1$), then at time t any arbitrageur j ($\forall t_j \leq t_i$) has already sold out his stock of domestic currency ($\sigma(t, t_j) = 1, \forall t_j \leq t_i$).*

We assume that once an arbitrageur sells his stock of domestic currency, any arbitrageur that became aware of the mispricing before him is already out of the market.

ASSUMPTION 3. *No reentry.*

To simplify the analysis, we suppose that once an arbitrageur gets out of the market, he will not enter again. Intuitively, an arbitrageur sells out when he believes that the attack is close. Then, even if he does not observe the attack during some period of time after leaving the market, he still will not know when the fixed exchange rate will collapse, but certainly it will happen sooner than he thought when he exited the market. Therefore, if he does not change his beliefs, he will not have an incentive to reenter the market.

4.1.5 The Sellout Condition

In our economy, an arbitrageur can choose between buying domestic or foreign currency. Initially, each arbitrageur is fully invested in local currency because of the higher returns ($r > r^*$), but there is a risk of devaluation. Hence, each arbitrageur will sell exactly at the moment when the fear of the devaluation of the home currency offsets the excess of return derived from investing in local currency. Ideally, the arbitrageur would like to sell *just* before the exchange rate is abandoned and the domestic currency suffers devaluation or, equivalently, just before the appreciation of the foreign currency. In appendix 2, we define the size of the expected appreciation of the foreign currency perceived by arbitrageur i as $A_f^i(t - t_i) = \left| E \left[\frac{\frac{1}{S_t} - \frac{1}{\bar{S}}}{\frac{1}{\bar{S}}} \middle| t_i \right] \right| = 1 - E \left[\frac{\bar{S}}{S_t} \middle| t_i \right] \geq 0$ (if $E \left[\frac{\bar{S}}{S_t} \middle| t_i \right] \leq 1$), and we present the optimization problem that yields the following sellout condition.

LEMMA 2 (*sellout condition*). *Arbitrageur i prefers to hold a maximum long position in local currency at time t if his hazard rate is*

smaller than the “greed-to-fear ratio,” i.e., if

$$h(t|t_i) < \frac{r - r^*}{1 - E\left[\frac{\bar{S}}{S_t} | t_i\right]} = \frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)}.$$

He trades to a maximum short position in local currency, if $h(t|t_i) > \frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)}$.

In our model, an arbitrageur who notices the mispricing at time $t = t_i$ compares his subjective hazard rate ($h(t|t_i)$) with the “greed-to-fear ratio” $\left(\frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)}\right)$ and trades to a maximum short position as soon as he observes that the probability of devaluation given that the peg still holds is larger than the “greed-to-fear ratio.”

5. Equilibrium

The exchange rate collapses as soon as the cumulative selling pressure exceeds a threshold κ or at a final date $t = \tilde{t} + \bar{\tau}$ when all foreign reserves are exhausted. This statement implies that no fixed exchange rate regime in an economy with persistent deficit can survive in the long term. We will focus our analysis on the first scenario, in which the peg collapses for endogenous reasons.

5.1 Endogenous Collapse of the Peg

We have seen that arbitrageurs become aware of the mispricing in random order during an interval $[\tilde{t}, \tilde{t} + \eta]$, where \tilde{t} is exponentially distributed and represents the time when the shadow price reaches the peg. To simplify the analysis, we have supposed that \tilde{t} is also the moment when the first arbitrageur notices the mispricing. η is a measure of the heterogeneity of the arbitrageurs (a larger η corresponds to a wider dispersion of opinion among them). Since all arbitrageurs are ex ante identical, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria. Then, for moderate values of the parameter η , we will show that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which the peg falls when the aggregate selling pressure surpasses a certain threshold (κ).


Consider the following backward reasoning. If at the final date $t = \tilde{t} + \bar{\tau}$ the selling pressure has not exceeded the threshold κ , we

have assumed that the exchange rate collapses because the central bank's foreign reserves are exhausted, and that this final condition is common knowledge among all arbitrageurs.⁷ This induces arbitrageur i to sell out at τ_1 periods after he observes the mispricing ($t_i + \tau_1 < \tilde{t} + \bar{\tau}$) in order to avoid a capital loss. Therefore, the currency will come under attack at $t = \tilde{t} + \tau_1 + \eta\kappa < \tilde{t} + \bar{\tau}$ (since we consider small values of the parameters η and κ). But if the peg is abandoned at $t = \tilde{t} + \tau_1 + \eta\kappa$, arbitrageurs will sell out earlier, let us say $\tau_2 < \tau_1$ periods after they notice that the shadow price exceeds the peg. But given the new timing, arbitrageurs will choose to sell even earlier (τ_3) and so on. As the selling date advances, the cost of devaluation of the domestic currency (or the appreciation of the foreign currency) diminishes and, therefore, the benefit from holding local currency rises—that is, the “greed-to-fear ratio” increases as the selling date advances. In our setting, at each instant, an arbitrageur compares his hazard rate to his “greed-to-fear ratio.” He will prefer to sell local currency until the time ($t = t_i + \tau^*$) when the “greed-to-fear ratio” equals the probability of the peg collapsing, given that it still holds (the equality defines the switching condition). This guarantees that arbitrageurs will have an incentive to hold “overvalued” local currency for some period of time after they become aware of the mispricing or, equivalently, that the decreasing sequence of periods converges to $\tau^* > 0$. This result is depicted in figure 2.

We can derive an expression for τ^* from previous results. We have assumed that, in equilibrium, an arbitrageur holds either a maximum long position or a maximum short position in local currency, depending on the relation between the probability of the peg collapsing and the profits derived from holding local currency.

⁷Specifically, $\bar{\tau}$ is common knowledge among arbitrageurs but not $t = t_i + \bar{\tau}$, which will depend on the random time when each arbitrageur notices the mispricing. It is supposed that once an arbitrageur finds out that the shadow price has exceeded the peg, he knows that the central bank's foreign reserves will last *at most* $\bar{\tau}$ periods, and he also knows that all other arbitrageurs, who are aware of the mispricing, will know it too. But this arbitrageur does not know if he has learned this information early or late compared to the other arbitrageurs, and hence he does not know if the attack on the currency will happen before this final date.

Figure 2. Collapse of the Peg (Moderate Levels of Dispersion of Opinion)



Note: We plot (the logarithm of) the fixed exchange rate (\bar{s}), (the logarithm of) the shadow price (s_t), and relevant moments in time. At $t = \tilde{t}$, the shadow price exceeds the peg and arbitrageurs become sequentially aware of it. At $t = \tilde{t} + \eta\kappa$, enough arbitrageurs have noticed the mispricing, but they prefer to wait τ^* periods before selling out. At $t = \tilde{t} + \tau^* + \eta\kappa$, the selling pressure surpasses the threshold κ and the peg is finally abandoned. There is a discrete devaluation of the exchange rate.

Hence, we can obtain τ^* from the time ($t = t_i + \tau^*$) when agent i will switch from maximum holding to maximum selling. This is given by

$$\tau^* = \frac{1}{\mu} \ln \left[\left(1 - \frac{r - r^*}{h} \right)^{-1} \right] - \tau',$$

where $r - r^*$ is the excess of return, $h = h(t|t_i)$ denotes the hazard rate (which we will prove remains constant over time), μ is a positive

constant corresponding to the slope of the linear logarithm of the shadow price (s_t) that represents the rate of growth of the budget deficit, and τ' is indicative of the difference between the date t_i at which the arbitrageur receives the signal about the mispricing and the time when he believes the foreign currency begins appreciating.

We can summarize this result in proposition 1.

PROPOSITION 1. *There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium at which each arbitrageur sells out τ^* periods after becoming aware of the mispricing, where*

$$\tau^* = \frac{1}{\mu} \ln \left[\left(1 - \frac{r - r^*}{h} \right)^{-1} \right] - \tau'.$$

Thus, the fixed exchange rate will be abandoned at $t = \tilde{t} + \tau^ + \eta\kappa$.*

Proof. Arbitrageur i prefers to invest in local currency for as long as possible, since this strategy generates higher returns than buying foreign currency ($r > r^*$). But, at a certain moment in time ($t = t_i$), he learns that the shadow price exceeds the peg and that there exists a risk of devaluation. We have argued that he still prefers to hold domestic currency (for some period of time τ^*) until he fears that the attack on the currency is imminent and he decides to sell out. This occurs at $t = t_i + \tau^*$. Arbitrageur i sells whenever his “greed-to-fear ratio” equals his hazard rate, i.e., when $h(t|\tilde{t}) = \frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)}$. From this switching condition, we will derive the optimal waiting time τ^* , i.e., the period of time when an arbitrageur knows that he is holding overvalued currency.

We will organize the proof in three steps. In the first step, we demonstrate that the “greed-to-fear ratio” is decreasing in time. Step 2 shows why the hazard rate is constant in time. Finally, in step 3 we derive the expression for τ^* from the time when the hazard rate equals the “greed-to-fear ratio” and arbitrageur i changes from a maximum long position to a maximum short position in local currency.

STEP 1. *The “greed-to-fear ratio” decreases in time.*

Proof. The “greed-to-fear ratio” is defined as

$$\frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)},$$

where $r - r^*$ is the excess of return derived from investing in domestic currency and $A_f^i(t - t_i)$ denotes the size of the expected appreciation of the foreign currency feared by agent i :

$$A_f^i(t - t_i) = \left| E \left[\frac{\frac{1}{S_t} - \frac{1}{\bar{S}}}{\frac{1}{\bar{S}}} \middle| t_i \right] \right| = 1 - E \left[\frac{\bar{S}}{S_t} \middle| t_i \right]$$

and

$$E \left[\frac{\bar{S}}{S_t} \middle| t_i \right] = \int_{t_i - \eta}^{t_i} e^{-\mu(t - \tilde{t})} \phi(\tilde{t} | t_i) d\tilde{t} = k e^{-\mu(t - t_i)},$$


where $k = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda - \mu} \frac{e^{(\lambda - \mu)\eta} - 1}{e^{\lambda\eta} - 1}$, $k \in [0, 1]$ for $\lambda \geq \mu$. Hence, $A_f^i(t - t_i)$ is a strictly increasing and continuous function of the time elapsed since agent i received his signal indicating that the shadow price exceeded the peg.

Assumption 1 establishes that the excess of return ($r - r^*$) is positive and constant in time. Therefore the “greed-to-fear ratio,” $\frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)}$, decreases in time. Intuitively, the further in time, the larger the possible appreciation of the foreign currency once the peg collapses, and therefore the smaller the benefits (in relative terms) that a rational agent obtains from holding local currency. Thus, the “greed-to-fear ratio” will decrease in time.

STEP 2. *The hazard rate is constant in time.*

Proof. The hazard rate is defined as $h(T^*(\tilde{t}) | t_i) = \frac{\pi(T^*(\tilde{t}) | t_i)}{1 - \Pi(T^*(\tilde{t}) | t_i)}$, where $\pi(T^*(\tilde{t}) | t_i)$ is the conditional density function and $\Pi(T^*(\tilde{t}) | t_i)$ is the conditional cumulative distribution function of the date on which the peg collapses. The hazard rate represents, at each time, the probability that the peg is abandoned, given that it has survived until $t = t_i$. We have considered that the timing of agent i 's signal is uniformly distributed on $[\tilde{t}, \tilde{t} + \eta]$ and that \tilde{t} is exponentially distributed. Then, an arbitrageur who becomes aware that

Figure 3. Posterior Density Function for Arbitrageurs i and j



the shadow price exceeds the peg at $t = t_i$ has a posterior density function of the date on which the peg is abandoned, with support $[t_i + \tau^* + \eta\kappa - \eta, t_i + \tau^* + \eta\kappa]$, given by $\pi(T^*(\tilde{t})|t_i) = \frac{\lambda e^{\lambda(t_i + \zeta - T^*(\tilde{t}))}}{e^{\lambda\eta} - 1} = \frac{\lambda e^{\lambda(t_i + \tau^* + \eta\kappa - T^*(\tilde{t}))}}{e^{\lambda\eta} - 1}$, where $\zeta = \tau^* + \eta\kappa$ if the peg collapses for endogenous reasons. This is depicted in figure 3.

At time $t = t_i$, arbitrageur i only knows if the peg has collapsed or not. But if the fixed-rate regime has not been attacked, arbitrageur i cannot know when it will happen, since he does not know if any other agent became aware of the mispricing before him. At any other time $t = t_j > t_i$, arbitrageur j faces an equivalent scenario (shifted from t_i to time t_j , but with no additional information); i.e., arbitrageurs cannot learn from the process (if the peg has not collapsed, they cannot know when the attack will take place). Therefore, the hazard rate, over the collapsing dates $t = t_i + \tau^*$, is constant in time and is given by the following expression:

$$h(t_i + \tau^*|t_i) = \frac{\lambda}{1 - e^{-\lambda\eta\kappa}} \equiv h.$$

STEP 3. The optimal τ^* is given by $\tau^* = \frac{1}{\mu} \ln \left[\left(1 - \frac{r - r^*}{h} \right)^{-1} \right] - \tau'$.

Proof. We have obtained that the “greed-to-fear ratio” is a decreasing function of time, while the hazard rate is constant. Therefore, we can derive τ^* from the time $t = t_i + \tau^*$ when arbitrageur i fears that the collapse of the peg is imminent and decides to sell out the local currency. We have proved that he will hold local currency during τ^* periods after becoming aware of the mispricing; i.e., arbitrageur i will hold a long position in local currency until $t = t_i + \tau^*$, when his “greed-to-fear ratio” equals his hazard rate:


$$\underbrace{\frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)}}_{\text{Greed-to-Fear Ratio}} \Big|_{t=t_i+\tau^*} = \underbrace{\frac{\lambda}{1 - e^{-\lambda\eta\kappa}}}_{\text{Hazard Rate}} \Rightarrow \frac{r - r^*}{1 - ke^{-\mu(t_i+\tau^*-t_i)}} = h \Rightarrow$$

$$\Rightarrow \tau^* = \frac{1}{\mu} \ln \left[\left(1 - \frac{r - r^*}{h} \right)^{-1} \right] - \tau'$$

where $\tau' = \frac{1}{\mu} \ln \frac{1}{k} \in [0, \infty)$. The optimal waiting time τ^* has two components. The first one defines the trade-off between the excess of return derived from investing in domestic currency and the capital loss borne by arbitrageur i if the fixed exchange rate is abandoned before he sells out. The second component τ' is due to the information structure and measures the period of time elapsed between the date $t = t_i$ at which arbitrageur i receives the signal and the time when he believes that the foreign currency starts appreciating. To simplify the reasoning, suppose that there is no delay; i.e., assume that at $t = t_i$ arbitrageur i receives the signal about the mispricing and believes that the shadow price has “just” reached the peg. In this case, $\tau' = 0$, and each arbitrageur waits $\tau^* = \frac{1}{\mu} \ln \left[\left(1 - \frac{r - r^*}{h} \right)^{-1} \right]$ after receiving the signal. Then, he exits the market.

Figure 4 represents the decreasing “greed-to-fear ratio,” the hazard rate, τ^* , and the time of the attack. It is interesting to note that if the hazard rate is larger than the excess of return ($h > r - r^*$), arbitrageurs wait a finite positive period of time ($\tau^* > 0$) before selling out. At some point in time, they believe that the attack on the fixed exchange rate is imminent and they cancel their positions in home currency. There is an endogenous collapse of the peg. However, if $h = r - r^*$, arbitrageurs sell overvalued currency after waiting for an infinite time ($\tau^* = \infty$) to elapse since receiving the signal.

Figure 4. Timing of the Attack



Note: An arbitrageur holds a maximum long position in local currency until he believes that the attack is imminent and he prefers to sell out—that is, when his “greed-to-fear ratio” equals his hazard rate. At $t = \tilde{t} + \tau^* + \eta \kappa$, enough arbitrageurs have sold out and the currency comes under attack.

Finally, if $h < r - r^*$, arbitrageurs never sell, i.e., if the probability that the peg collapses (given that it still holds) is lower than the excess of return derived from investing in domestic currency, then arbitrageurs do not fear a devaluation, and hence they never leave the market. In this case ($h \leq r - r^*$), the fixed exchange rate collapses for exogenous reasons when the central bank’s foreign reserves are exhausted.

5.2 Determinants of τ^*

Excess of Return. The period of time τ^* during which arbitrageurs optimally hold overvalued local currency depends directly on the excess of return derived from investing in domestic currency. Increasing the spread between returns ($r - r^*$) delays the attack on the peg, since a more attractive local currency will induce arbitrageurs

to hold overvalued currency for a longer time. The size of the delay depends on

$$\frac{\partial \tau^*}{\partial (r - r^*)} = \frac{1}{\mu} \cdot \frac{1}{h - (r - r^*)}.$$

This suggests that rising returns will have a small impact on the delay of the attack if the probability of the peg collapsing (given that it still holds) and the slope of the (logarithm of the) shadow price are high.

Hazard Rate. τ^* is a decreasing function of the hazard rate ($\frac{\partial \tau^*}{\partial h} < 0$). The hazard rate represents the probability that the fixed exchange rate is abandoned, given that the peg is still in place. Assuming the information structure presented in this paper, the hazard rate remains constant over time⁸ and equal to

$$h = \frac{\lambda}{1 - e^{-\lambda \eta \kappa}},$$

where λ characterizes the exponential distribution of \tilde{t} (the time when the shadow price exceeds the peg), η is a measure of the dispersion of opinion among agents, and κ defines the threshold level of cumulative selling pressure that triggers the attack on the currency.

A lower heterogeneity among market participants increases the hazard rate and advances the currency crises. In the limit, as η tends to zero (no private information), we converge to the Krugman setting in which the fundamentals are common knowledge and the peg is attacked as soon as the shadow price reaches the fixed exchange rate. In this case, $h \rightarrow \infty$ and $\tau^* = 0$. On the other extreme case where there is large dispersion of opinion among arbitrageurs, the hazard rate tends to zero and the peg is abandoned whenever the central bank's foreign reserves are exhausted.

Also, a higher threshold κ delays the crisis. If the central bank is determined to commit a larger proportion of its foreign reserves to defend the fixed exchange rate, the peg will survive longer.

Slope of the Shadow Price. The optimal time τ^* depends inversely on the slope of (the logarithm of) the shadow price μ ($\frac{\partial \tau^*}{\partial \mu} < 0$). μ can be seen as the speed of depletion of the central

⁸This is proved in subsection 5.1.

bank's foreign reserves. This suggests that a steeper (logarithm of the) shadow price implies a faster rate of exhaustion of reserves and, ultimately, that the central bank's reserves will be exhausted earlier. Hence, a higher slope reduces τ^* and advances the attack on the fixed exchange rate.

μ also represents the rate of growth of the government's budget deficit. Then, the faster the level of the government's expenditure, the shorter arbitrageurs will be willing to hold the overvalued local currency, hence advancing the attack on the currency.

Our analysis suggests that in a first-generation model in which a government runs a persistent deficit, which grows at a constant rate μ , raising the spread between returns to make the local currency more attractive, committing more foreign reserves to defend the peg, and inducing dispersion of opinion among arbitrageurs will delay the attack on the currency. However, since the expansionary monetary policy makes a fixed exchange rate ultimately unsustainable, these policy instruments would only increase the size of the devaluation whenever it occurs. The only effective means would be to reduce the rate of growth of the budget deficit (μ). This would delay the speculative attack on the fixed exchange rate and diminish the size of the devaluation when the peg finally collapses.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we relax the traditional assumption of perfect information in first-generation models of currency crises. We consider an economy similar to the one described in Krugman (1979) and, to introduce uncertainty about the willingness of a central bank to defend the peg, we incorporate the information structure presented in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).

At a random time, the shadow price exceeds the fixed exchange rate and sequentially, but in random order, arbitrageurs become aware of this mispricing. They understand that the currency will be attacked and the peg eventually abandoned, but still prefer to hold local currency during some period of time (τ^*) after they notice the mispricing, since we have assumed that holding domestic currency generates higher returns. We derive an expression for τ^* . The optimal period of time τ^* is the same for all arbitrageurs, and it is independent from the time when each arbitrageur notices the

mispricing. Increasing the excess of return ($r - r^*$) obtained from investing in domestic currency, reducing the hazard rate or diminishing the level of persistent deficit, would increase the period of time when arbitrageurs prefer to hold overvalued local currency and therefore would delay the attack on the currency.

In our model, arbitrageurs sequentially know that the peg lies below the shadow price, but they do not know if other arbitrageurs have already noticed it; i.e., macroeconomic fundamentals are no longer common knowledge among market participants. Therefore, arbitrageurs in this economy face a synchronization problem. However, they do not have incentives to coordinate, since as soon as they do, the peg collapses. There is also a competitive component in our model: only a fraction κ of arbitrageurs can leave the market before the fixed exchange rate is abandoned. Consequently, in our setting, the currency does not come under attack the moment the shadow price exceeds the peg, as in Krugman's model, but at a later time when a large-enough mass of arbitrageurs has waited τ^* periods and decides to leave the market because of fear of an imminent attack.

We conclude that there is a unique equilibrium in which the fixed exchange rate collapses when the selling pressure surpasses a certain threshold (κ) or ultimately at a final date $t = \bar{t} + \bar{\tau}$, when the central bank's foreign reserves are exhausted, if dispersion of opinion among arbitrageurs is extremely large. This equilibrium is unique, depends on the heterogeneity among agents, and leads to discrete devaluations. This result differs from the zero-devaluation equilibrium in Krugman's model and also from other settings (Broner 2006) in which lack of perfect information brings multiple equilibria.

Appendix 1. The Shadow Price

In this section, we will derive an expression for the shadow price in a first-generation model of currency crises. To simplify the calculations, it is convenient to express magnitudes in logarithms. We will use uppercase letters to represent a variable in levels and lowercase letters to indicate its logarithm.

We consider an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime ($\bar{s} = \ln(\bar{S})$), in which a government runs a persistent deficit.

In particular, we assume that it grows at a positive constant rate μ :

$$\mu = \frac{\dot{D}_t}{D_t} = \frac{1}{D_t} \frac{d(D_t)}{dt} = \dot{d}_t \Rightarrow \dot{d}_t = \mu, \quad (1)$$

where $d_t = \ln(D_t)$ is the logarithm of the domestic credit.

The central bank has two main tasks: to finance the government's deficit by issuing debt and to maintain the exchange rate fixed through open market operations. In our economy there are no private banks. Then, from the central bank's balance sheet, the money supply at time t , M_t^s , is made up of domestic credit (D_t) and the value in domestic currency of the international reserves (R_t):

$$M_t^s = D_t + R_t. \quad (2)$$

We assume that the purchasing parity holds. Then, the exchange rate S_t is defined as

$$S_t = \frac{P_t}{P_t^*} \Rightarrow s_t = p_t - p_t^*.$$

We can take the foreign price as the numeraire ($P_t^* = 1 \Rightarrow p_t^* = 0$). Then,

$$s_t = p_t. \quad (3)$$

The monetary equilibrium is described by the Cagan equation:

$$m_t^s - p_t = -\delta \times \dot{p}_t.$$

By equation (3), the Cagan equation can then be written as

$$m_t^s - s_t = -\delta \times \dot{s}_t. \quad (4)$$

The shadow price is the exchange rate that would prevail in the market if the peg is abandoned. The central bank will defend the peg until reserves reach a minimum level. To simplify the analysis, assume that the central bank abandons the fixed exchange rate when the reserves are exhausted, i.e., when $R_t = 0$. Then, the money supply (equation (2)) is given by

$$M_t^s = D_t \Rightarrow m_t^s = d_t. \quad (5)$$

Equations (1) and (5) imply

$$\dot{m}_t^s = \dot{d}_t = \mu \Rightarrow m_t^s = m_0^s + \mu \times t.$$

Hence, substituting this result in equation (4), we obtain

$$m_0^s + \mu \times t - s_t = -\delta \times \dot{s}_t \Rightarrow m_0^s + \mu \times t - s_t + \delta \times \dot{s}_t = 0.$$

To solve this differential equation, we can try a linear solution:

$$s_t = \text{constant} + \mu \times t.$$

Then,

$$m_0^s + \mu \times t - \text{constant} - \mu \times t + \delta \times \mu = 0 \Rightarrow \text{constant} = m_0^s + \delta \times \mu.$$

Therefore, (the logarithm of) the shadow price is given by

$$s_t = \underbrace{m_0^s + \delta \times \mu}_{\gamma} + \mu \times t = \gamma + \mu \times t \Rightarrow s_t = \gamma + \mu \times t, \quad (6)$$

where γ and μ are constants and μ represents the rate of growth of the budget deficit.

We have proved that (the logarithm of) the shadow is a linear function of time.

Appendix 2. Sellout Condition

In this section, we derive the sellout condition stated in lemma 2. In our economy, an arbitrageur can choose between holding either local or foreign currency. Investing in domestic currency generates a return equal to r , while the foreign currency yields r^* . Assumption 1 ($r > r^*$) makes the domestic investment more attractive. Therefore, arbitrageurs are initially fully invested in domestic currency. At some random time $t = \tilde{t}$, the shadow price reaches the fixed exchange rate and from then onward the peg might be attacked.

We want to determine the optimal selling date for the arbitrageur who becomes aware of the mispricing at time $t = t_i$. Each arbitrageur's payoff from selling out depends on the price at which he can sell the domestic currency. At time $t \geq \tilde{t}$, the peg may

or may not hold. The price (in local currency) of an asset that yields a constant rate r is e^{rt} . The payoff function is denominated in foreign currency; hence, the price of domestic currency if the peg still holds is $p_t = e^{rt} \frac{1}{\bar{S}}$, where \bar{S} is the fixed exchange rate. However, if the peg has been abandoned, the price will be $E[p_t|t_i] = E[e^{rt} \frac{1}{\bar{S}_t} | t_i]$, which can be expressed as a fraction of the precrisis price as $E[p_t|t_i] = e^{rt} \frac{1}{\bar{S}} E[\frac{\bar{S}}{\bar{S}_t} | t_i]$, and $E[\frac{\bar{S}}{\bar{S}_t} | t_i]$ can be understood as a rate of variation in the exchange rate. Then, arbitrageur i 's payoff from selling out at time t is given by

$$\int_{t_i}^t e^{-r^*s} e^{rs} E\left[\frac{1}{\bar{S}_s} \middle| t_i\right] \pi(s|t_i) ds + e^{-r^*t} e^{rt} \frac{1}{\bar{S}} (1 - \Pi(t|t_i)),$$

where $\Pi(t|t_i)$ represents agent i 's conditional cumulative distribution function of the date on which the peg collapses and $\pi(t|t_i)$ indicates the associated conditional density.⁹

Differentiating the payoff function with respect to t yields

$$\frac{\pi(t|t_i)}{\underbrace{1 - \Pi(t|t_i)}_{h(t|t_i)}} = \frac{r - r^*}{1 - E[\frac{\bar{S}}{\bar{S}_t} | t_i]} \Rightarrow h(t|t_i) = \frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)},$$

where $A_f^i(t - t_i)$ is the size of the expected appreciation of the foreign currency feared by agent i once the fixed exchange rate is abandoned. $A_f^i(t - t_i)$ is a strictly increasing and continuous function of $t - t_i$, the time elapsed since arbitrageur i becomes aware of the mispricing.

Therefore, arbitrageur i maximizes his payoff to selling out at time t when his hazard rate equals the "greed-to-fear ratio." Thus, arbitrageur i holds

- a maximum long position in local currency, if $h(t|t_i) < \frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)}$, or
- a maximum short position in local currency, if $h(t|t_i) > \frac{r - r^*}{A_f^i(t - t_i)}$.

⁹We assume there are no transaction costs to simplify the specification of the payoff function. We could easily incorporate transaction costs in our setting. For example, let us define the transaction cost at time t equal to ce^{r^*t} (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003). This convenient formulation guarantees that the optimal solution is independent of the size of the transaction costs.

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